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This thesis is a study of the development and uptake of an emerging infrastructural 
technology: the mobile Wireless Broadband technology and service known as WiBro 
in South Korea, and Mobile WiMAX internationally. WiBro has emerged through a 
national development effort since the early 2000s. The commercial service was 
launched in 2006. However, uptake fell far below initial expectations, only 
succeeding in niche markets. This study was motivated by concerns about the 
perceived gulf between development and diffusion and the ‘failure’ of WiBro. 
However, this study seeks to go beyond the technology-driven perspective that 
informs conceptions of diffusion gap: it aims to explicate the sociotechnical factors 
leading to such a gap. 
This study draws on Science and Technology Studies (STS) and in particular the 
Social Shaping of Technology (SST) perspective, which provides tools to scrutinize 
the interactions among the various interests and factors involved in the process of 
technological innovation. The SST perspective goes beyond approaches that treat 
technology as a static object to be developed and diffused. It provides tools to 
examine the complex and dynamic forces that develop technical capacity towards 
particular forms and uses. The ‘social learning’ perspective extends SST and 
provides concepts to explore the changing dynamics over multiple cycles of 
innovation. Here, Jørgensen’s concept of ‘development arena’ helps examine the 
interlinked, yet dispersed and multiple spaces in which differing goals, motivations 
and strategies of innovation players together shape technological innovation. 
Through comprehensive analyses of a longitudinal study of WiBro, a broader view 
of the process and the outcomes of technological innovation have been achieved. 
Rather than viewing the technology as a stable object that would progress in a linear 
manner through the stages of design, development, and diffusion, it has focused on 
the process of shaping of WiBro through multiple cycles of innovation. Several 
arenas of innovation were identified as diverse players sought to align their interests 
towards exploiting the resources, capacities, and tools for innovation that seemed to 
be available. In these spaces, conflicting and yet coevolving dynamics were 
observed: one involving coordination through alignments of multiple interests, and 
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the other incorporating tensions and misalignments among the differing concerns, 
aims and commitments towards the innovation. The complex dynamics involved a 
multi-level game where the collective actions among the innovation players and their 
individual strategies diverged to a degree. Furthermore, changing contingencies, 
linked to shifting choices of innovation players, resulted in the deviation of the 
innovation from the initial visions and aims. 
The study thus illustrates the outcomes of highly divergent interactions at play in 
innovation process and the mutual enrollment efforts of players that constituted the 
distributed governance of innovation. Here the complex interplays among the 
innovation players involved in multi-level games produced a gap between the 
generic vision and the actual uptake of WiBro. Changing contingencies, especially 
linked to broader and evolving structures and relations - brought about the re-
shaping of the generic vision of WiBro. This research therefore suggests the concept 
of the ‘distributed governance of innovation’ as a new mode for governance: that 
accommodates not only differing knowledges and interests but also the shifting 
choices and visions through the various cycles of technological innovation. The 
boundary of social learning is thus extended to incorporate diverging choices over 
time and across the multiple spaces of innovation. Its implications for policy include 
achieving reflexivity by incorporating into the policy framework the learning process 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
1.1 Aims and motivations 
The research was initially rooted in a broad concern about how to address 
uncertainties in technological innovation. Having been introduced to Science and 
Technology Studies through the master’s program at Edinburgh, I was fascinated 
and to an extent shocked by the views offered by the Social Shaping of Technology 
perspective (MacKenzie and Wajcman, 1985; Williams and Edge, 1996). It 
broadened my mind to look more deeply into the problems linked to technological 
innovation in society. At the same time, I aimed to find ways to better manage 
technological innovation in the face of uncertainties. This goal, however, seemed to 
suggest additional challenging issues and tasks in linking the social shaping of 
technology (SST) perspective with practical approaches and solutions to 
technological innovation. 
Upon searching for a case to study around 2008, I came across the national success 
story of a wireless broadband technology in South Korea that was simultaneously 
facing a degree of uncertainty with regard to market adoption. WiBro (named after 
Wireless Broadband) had been developed and promoted through a national IT 
strategy (IT839) with the specific aim of reaching technological leadership by 
securing “home-grown” technology. As the technical specification of WiBro was 
further promoted as a global standard for mobile communications in 2007, it was 
regarded as an unprecedented success for South Korea through technological 
innovation (Chu, 2007). Yet, this promising technology carried a degree of 
uncertainty in its timely uptake in the domestic market. Despite the service launch in 
the Korean domestic market as the world’s first wireless broadband service based on 
a global standard in 2006, the rate of service adoption during the 2 years of 
commercial roll out remained far below initial expectations. 
The uncertainties in service adoption in South Korea, vis-à-vis the promises that had 
been heightened by global standardisation, were then largely framed as a problem of 
diffusion to be overcome. Especially in relation to the successful outcome of 
innovation efforts through government coordination and global standaradisation, 
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growing voices requested additional policy measures to promote diffusion and to 
vitalise the market for WiBro (Hong, 2007; Yun, 2007). However, ongoing debate 
ensued about whether the technology would still be viable for a wider diffusion in 
the longer term as it competed with and complemented other evolving mobile-
communication technologies. 
This is when my research gained momentum. I recognised the status of WiBro as in 
need of certain remedies for wider commercial uptake through policy measures, 
industry efforts, and perhaps most, to overcome the problem of diffusion. Critics, 
analysts, and government researchers suggested various causes. They variously 
diagnosed issues such as limited service coverage and poor device line-up as the 
main causes for the sluggish adoption of WiBro in the domestic market (Kim, 
2009d; Paik et al., 2009). Furthermore, many argued that the biggest disadvantage of 
the current WiBro service was the failure to provide an outstanding application 
(ROA, 2008). An outstanding application such as voice support through Voice over 
IP (VoIP) would be key to competing with existing and evolving mobile-
communication technologies such as high-speed downlink packet access (HSDPA). 
However, such diagnoses did not bring about immediate remedies or action to 
overcome the problem of diffusion. In fact, many of the remedial suggestions 
seemed to carry a degree of conflict and dispute among the diverse interests involved 
in the development and implementation of WiBro.  
The future seemed uncertain in how the conflicts and disputes would eventually be 
settled to bring about a solution for domestic implementation. Based on the SST 
perspective (MacKenzie and Wajcman, 1985; Williams and Edge, 1996), this 
research aimed to elucidate a holistic picture of WiBro that would explain what had 
shaped and is shaping the technology and the services to the current mode of design 
and use. Rather than tracing fragments of causal relations, I aimed to describe the 
interactions involved in the shaping of the WiBro technology and services. The SST 
perspective, however, further emphasises future uncertainties: the unpredictability 
and serendipity of social and technical outcomes of innovation (Williams, 2006). 
Such a grounding seemed crucial, especially in relation to an ongoing process of 
technological innovation and its societal uptake. Although disputes arose in the ways 
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and legitimacy of further promoting WiBro in the domestic market, the fundamental 
task seemed to be to bring about realisation about how to deal with the uncertainties 
and the contingencies in the process of shaping the technology and the services. 
Therefore, this research was set for the study of the evolution of WiBro service 
through the development and uptake of an emerging telecommunication technology. 
1.2 Overview of WiBro 
Next generation mobile communication service 
	  
WiBro is a portable high-speed Internet technology and service developed by the 
telecom industry, manufacturers, and research institutes in South Korea. Commercial 
WiBro service was first introduced in the Korean domestic market in June 2006. 
WiBro was based on a technology developed by Samsung and the Electronics and 
Telecommunication Research Institute (ETRI): High-speed Portable Internet. The 
development of HPi was carried out through a collaborative R&D programme 
coordinated by the Ministry of Information and Communication (MIC) and funded 
by telecommunications-industry vendors and network operators. The industry 
characterised High-speed Portable Internet (HPi) as a technological innovation 
leading to next-generation mobile communications, adopting the orthogonal 
frequency-division multiplexing (OFDM) scheme, considered to characterise mobile 
technology “beyond IMT2000 (3G)” (Cho, 2003). WiBro service to be deployed in 
the Korean domestic market was initially characterised by low to medium speed 
mobility and high-speed data access enabling multimedia communications. WiBro 
was designed to be implemented with various mobile-communication devices such 
as mobile phones, Personal Digital Assistants (PDAs), Handheld PC (HPC), and 




WiBro is a service profile to a global standard internationally known as Mobile 
WiMAX. Worldwide interoperability for microwave access (WiMAX) is a 
telecommunication technology that provides wireless broadband, based on the 
Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)802.16 standard. WiBro was 
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standardised by the Telecommunications Technology Association (TTA) of Korea in 
2004, and through the process of standardisation, TTA reached an agreement with 
the IEEE802.16 group on harmonising the TTA standard for WiBro with 
IEEE802.16 standard. In the course of the process of globalisation, the South Korean 
MIC had to clarify the positioning of WiBro in relation to WiMAX as “the service 
name for Mobile WiMAX in Korea” on 29 July 2004 (Oh, 2009; WimaxForum, 
2006). In 2007, WiBro (Mobile WiMAX based on IEEE802.16e-2005) was 
approved as the sixth IMT-2000 third-generation (3G) telecommunications standard 
by the International Telecommunications Union (ITU). In 2012, WirelessMAN-
Advanced, evolving from the IEEE802.16e, based on 802.16m-2011, was specified 
as the standard for IMT-Advanced, the next-generation global wireless broadband 
communications by the ITU in 2012, along with LTE-Advanced evolving from 
Global System for Mobile Communications (GSM) (ITU, 2012). 
Key issues 
 
In the early years of technological development, the developers and service 
providers regarded WiBro as 3.5G technology or pre-4G as it is based on key 
technologies required by 4G, namely OFDM and multiple-input and multiple-output 
(MIMO). Also, WiBro, with an advanced version called WiBro Wave 2, could 
realise, in theory, a maximum data-transmission speed of 37.44 Mbps for download 
and 10.08 Mbps for upload. Such performance by WiBro was then compared to that 
of the data-transfer speed required by 3G (1Mbps) and 4G (100Mbit/s). 
However, since the launch of its commercial services in Korea, the commercial 
uptake of WiBro service fell far below initial expectations. Subsequently, much 
dispute ensued about the success or failure of the policy drive towards the 
development and the commercialisation of WiBro. During its commercial 
deployment, it faced challenges from the rapid evolution of HSDPA as mobile 
operators in Korea implemented 3G mobile-communications service based on 
HSDPA. HSDPA is the 3G successor to GSM, based on the Universal Mobile 
Telecommunications System (UMTS) and was increasingly viewed as 3.5G. By the 
year 2009, HSDPA could reach downlink speeds up to 7.2 Mbps. Although 
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challenged by the competition in evolving mobile-communications technology in the 
emerging market, WiBro faced operators’ choices of positioning WiBro as a 
complementary network and service for the existing and evolving mobile 
infrastructure. 
The Korean government prepared and implementated various measures to promote 
WiBro service in the domestic market, especially by applying a series of ‘WiBro 
vitalisation policies’ to promote what had generally been considered a “home-grown” 
technology. The Korea Communications Commission (KCC), succeeding the MIC 
after 2008, allowed the deployment of VoIP service to enable the service providers 
to bring voice services to WiBro (Choi, 2009). Also, the government encouraged 
partnerships among government and private organisations and industry to develop 
and devise new services that would spur the commercial uptake of WiBro. 
However, to date WiBro service has failed to meet initial visions and expectations. 
In the South Korean domestic market, WiBro service is sustained through a 
relatively small portion of service provided as mobile wifi. The service has largely 
been positioned as a complementary service to existing 3G and LTE networks, 
aiming to distribute the rapidly increasing data traffic. As of July 2013, the number 
of subscribers were 1,039,289, seemingly reaching stagnation (MSIP, 2013b) 
Who are involved? 
	  
The major contribution to technological development of WiBro came from the 
collaboration between ETRI, a government research institute, and Samsung. HPi, the 
technology adopted for WiBro service, was developed through a national R&D 
programme (2002-–005) coordinated by MIC through ETRI, major fixed-line and 
mobile operators funded and participated in the R&D programme. WiBro, as one of 
the leading advanced-telecommunications services, was also supported and 
promoted by the government’s IT policy named IT839, initiated in 2004 and later 
renamed u-IT839 (‘u’ stands for ubiquitous).  
The standardisation of WiBro (initially named Portable Internet) was also actively 
pursued through TTA, the nongovernmental organisation for information and 
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communication technologies (ICT) standardisation in Korea. The standard setting of 
Portable Internet was coordinated by MIC, aligned with policy decisions in 2002 to 
use the 2.3GHz frequency band for Portable Internet, based on a single standard to 
be set through TTA. The inaugural meeting of the Project Group for the 
standardisation of Portable Internet was attended by 235 individuals from 52 
organisations. 
In 2005, three operators—KT, SKT and Hanaro Telecom—were granted licenses for 
WiBro service on the 2.3GHz frequency band. SKT and KT remained the two 
operators of WiBro to date. Hanaro Telecom returned its license a few months after 
the license was granted. Despite multiple attempts by the Korean government to 
bring about an additional mobile operator for WiBro service, attempts have failed as 
of June 2014. WiBro operators have collaborated with other industry players who 
have traditionally been in the mobile-communications and fixed-line broadband 
Internet fields, as well as in other industries, as they sought to develop mobile 
handsets, platforms, applications and other convergence services. 
1.3 Research questions 
The objective of this research was initially driven by an aim to examine how a 
collectively driven, large-scale technological innovation could meet or respond to an 
evolving user environment. Having encountered STS, and in particular the SST 
perspective, however, I have come to pay particular attention to uncertainties and 
contingencies, and how they were addressed vis-à-vis efforts to coordinate 
interactions towards a particular vision. Based on the aims, motivations, and 
objectives of this research, as discussed above, the research questions were 
formulated to address the complex process of a lifecycle of innovation: from design 
to use and vice versa. First, an inquiry emerged about how the WiBro technology 
was conceptualised, designed, and developed. The second question extended the 
scope of this inquiry to include the process of deployment of WiBro services while 
addressing the gap between the initial visions of innovation and its actual 
commercial uptake. The third question aimed to bring a holistic view of the lifecycle 
of WiBro by examining how WiBro services evolved. 
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RQ. 1. What are the dynamics that led to the design and development of the 
emerging WiBro technology? 
 - How did alignments among innovation players emerge and evolve towards 
the design and development of WiBro? 
RQ. 2. How were WiBro services deployed, and what caused the gap 
between the initial visions of WiBro and its commercial uptake? 
 - What choices did innovation players make and how did they interact 
towards the commercialisation of WiBro, and how did WiBro services 
evolve? 
RQ. 3. How did WiBro services evolve, and how and to what extent could 
the gap be mediated? 
 - How did the dynamics of innovation differ through the stages of 
technological development and uptake, and how should the ‘gap’ be 
addressed? 
The first research question guided me to look into the processes of WiBro design and 
development, where the initiative of developing a home-grown technology took 
place and was carried out. I sought to examine how initial visions and alignments 
formed and evolved to drive the design and the development of WiBro. As WiBro 
had been pursued through a national-scale project involving a diverse array of 
innovation players, it seemed important to follow how those interested gathered and 
mobilised to develop WiBro, and how the interactions among the diverse interests 
drove WiBro towards innovation. 
The second question points to the gap recognised in the commercial uptake. Despite 
the large-scale initiative towards technological innovation, the commercial uptake of 
WiBro deviated markedly from initial visions and expectations with regard to market 
diffusion. The question thus established a way to examine interactions among the 
diverse players that led to shifts and changes from the initial choices, vis-à-vis 
changing environments during the process of commercialisation. I aimed to consider 
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how the varying choices and their interactions during the process of innovation 
resulted in the current mode of service adoption of WiBro and how, in turn, the 
mode of service uptake has further shaped the innovation of WiBro. 
Last, the question inquired about how WiBro services evolved. By examining how 
the services evolved and are evolving, I intended to examine what filled the gap 
between initial visions of innovation and commercial outcome. The gap was largely 
the problem of market diffusion of WiBro in South Korea. Much dispute arose about 
the role of policy in further promoting WiBro service in the South Korean domestic 
market. Certain measures were taken at the policy level, yet failed to bring about 
significant changes to its current status. Nonetheless, WiBro service has evolved. By 
applying the concept of the coshaping of technology and society, I aimed to 
reinterpret what has been framed as a ‘gap’. 
1.4 The organisation of the thesis 
This thesis is comprised of eight chapters including this chapter as an introduction. 
This section introduces the structure of this thesis with a brief summary of each 
chapter. 
Following this introductory chapter, Chapter 2 presents a review of the relevant 
literature. There, I discuss theoretical and analytical perspectives in relation to the 
problems briefly raised in Chapter 1: the problem of uncertainties of technological 
innovation and change. The literature review for this thesis is divided into two 
sections: in the first section I discuss aspects of technological innovation and change 
in society: how innovation is projected, shaped, and addressed. The second section 
draws further attention to ICTs in particular, where the key concepts and frameworks 
to address complex processes of the design, development, and use of ICTs were 
introduced, discussed, and to some extent, employed for the study of WiBro. 
Chapter 3 presents the overall design of this research along with the methodology 
adopted to conduct this study. In this chapter, I explicitly discuss how the choices 
were made; choices ranging from those that delimited the boundary of this research 
to various methodological choices. I introduce the general framework for this 
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research, the case sites studied, key methods used during the field work, and the 
methods for data analysis. I also offer some reflections on the research. 
Chapter 4 is the first of three empirical chapters, consisting mainly of the empirical 
analysis based on the case study of WiBro. This chapter discusses the initial stages 
of the technology design and development, which involved varying interests in 
dispersed processes of innovation that were gradually linked to the development of 
WiBro. It deals with events and activities of players involved from approximately 
2001 to 2005, beginning with the period that includes initial activities advanced 
towards the design and development of WiBro until the year commercial WiBro-
system products were fully developed to be deployed in the market. This chapter 
focuses on the dynamic interactions among diverse players who coordinated and 
built alignments. 
Chapter 5 is the second empirical chapter, which links the stages of initial design and 
development of an emerging technology to the process of appropriation. In this 
chapter, the analytic focus shifts to the process of commercial uptake of emerging 
technological products and the services. Therefore, the process of appropriation 
highlights the divergence and discrepancies that arise during the process of 
commercial uptake of an emerging technology and standard. In contrast to the 
process of building alignments, discussed in the previous chapter, this chapter 
focuses on dynamics that made the alignments rather incomplete: incomplete in 
varying interests carrying differing priorities, aims, and strategies while pursuing the 
shared goal and vision. This chapter also presents other dynamics that brought the 
actual uptake of the generic capabilities of the technology away from the initial 
visions and anticipations. Although focused on the gap that arose through the 
complex processes of innovation and uptake of the technology, it does not attempt to 
mediate the gap, but rather to explicate the gap. 
Chapter 6 is the last empirical chapter, added as the research came to highlight not 
only the complexities but also the changing contingencies over time. The chapter 
mainly addresses the shaping of choices that effectively delimited the boundaries of 
application areas of WiBro, explicated through the interactions among the innovation 
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players whose interactions were also greatly influenced by and also shaped the 
evolving mobile technologies and mobile services. Yet, the diverging outcomes also 
produced controversies through which particular directions for future innovation 
were shaped, thereby representing the dynamics of changing contingencies which 
were, nonetheless, shaped by, and themselves shaped the human choices of 
technology design, development, and use. 
Chapter 7 integrates the findings from the empirical research to answer the research 
questions. It introduces the concept of distributed governance of innovation, as a 
mode of governance for technological innovation and change, based on the empirical 
findings from this research. 
Chapter 8 is the concluding chapter, including my final remarks on the findings and 
how they contribute to knowledge. The chapter addresses some reflections on the 




Chapter 2. The social shaping of technological innovation and change 
2.1 Introduction 
Technological innovations proliferate while there is little assurance about the 
outcomes beforehand. Technological innovation often appears in the form of 
emerging technologies that entail opportunities and uncertainties about their future 
uptake. In many cases, however, the projections about the anticipated future of a 
technology can become a powerful driving force, setting the direction for innovation. 
Yet, the ways in which these projections are formed and how they are incorporated 
into technology development is extremely complex, arising from interplays of 
diverse arrays of actors and factors (Russell and Williams, 2002; Williams et al., 
2005). Contingencies of use and other contexts linked to technologies bring further 
uncertainties about what may have been projected as the future. 
In some fields (and especially the physical information infrastructural technologies 
being explored here), innovations entail large-scale resources and networks of 
players at national and the global levels geared towards certain directions of 
technological change. Such innovations, supported with large-scale investments as 
well as collective activities and goals, still face challenges with regard to wide and 
timely uptake by the market and society (Russell and Williams, 2002). Some are 
confronted with risk issues whereas others face discrepancies between what had been 
the projected future (Lyall and Tait, 2005) and the reality they come to face. 
Furthermore, misalignment between projections at the design stage and the reality in 
use is often recognised only in hindsight (Stewart and Williams, 2005). Still others 
may face obstacles from inflexible and tardy processes of necessary changes in the 
social system (Johnson, 1992). 
This chapter discusses the problem of uncertainties of technological innovation and 
change on the one hand, and the complex dynamics on the other. These are perhaps 
two sides of the same coin. The problem of uncertainties are often addressed by 
recognising a gap between initial visions and actual outcomes. In this case, this gap 
had been projected as a problem of diffusion – e.g. diffusion lag. Thus, it begins by 
reviewing diffusion studies but moves quickly towards a broader discussion of the 
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co-shaping of technology and society reflecting the need to look into the process of 
the technology being shaped. However, further review of literatures on managing 
uncertainties of socio-technical change raises the need for reflexivity in examining 
the problem of uncertainties – to take into account how the intentions, visions and 
aims have been co-shaped through the process of technological innovation. 
The second section focuses upon sociotechnical dynamics – and thus, complexities - 
in the process of innovation, and uptake of information and communication 
technologies (ICTs) in particular. In the field of ICTs, standardisation has become 
key to complex and dynamic interactions among the various actors involved in the 
process of technological development. The social-learning framework links this 
relatively supply-side-focused dynamic with that of the user side. The social-learning 
framework highlights contingencies in the process of user appropriation of new 
offerings that are not fixed at the outset, but go through multiple iterative cycles of 
design, development, implementation, and use. Learning becomes central to this 
cyclical feedback relationship, explicating the gap between the initial visions and 
actual use. Concepts such as intermediaries, the multilevel game, and development 
arena are introduced and applied to map and analyse the complex interactions. 
2.2 Dealing with uncertainties: From diffusion to social shaping of 
technological innovation 
The starting point of this research was a concern with how technological innovation 
gets diffused, and how and to what extent the process of wide adoption and diffusion 
may be directed and managed. This section first evokes discussion of the notion of 
diffusion of innovation where diffusion has been characterised through patterns of 
adoption over time. Although varying factors have been identified that influence the 
rate and mode of adoption, diffusion studies tend to treat technology as a static 
object, thereby limiting the scope of enquiry during the diffusion process. Here we 
turn to the social shaping of technology perspective which broadens the scope for 
analysing complex interactions involved in the process leading to technological 
innovation and diffusion. Finally, the section critically reviews current approaches 
and attempts to explicate and tackle uncertain and contingent processes for 
technological innovation and diffusion. 
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2.2.1. Patterns, modes, and rates of innovation diffusion 
Many innovations are accompanied by diverse ways of anticipating the future uptake 
and use of innovations. Diffusion studies have had much influence in estimating and 
predicting the future modes and rates of diffusion of innovations, and therefore, in 
assessing them. Diffusion processes have been studied from a number of 
perspectives rooted in varying fields such as history, sociology, and economics. 
Primary concerns in the studies of diffusion of innovations related to questions about 
the factors that influence diffusion, and why diffusion processes, including modes 
and the rates of adoption, vary. Scholars have sought to explain the nature of 
introduction and diffusion of innovations in the market and society. In particular, 
economists have suggested various models and concepts to explain the modes and 
rates of adoption of innovative technologies, including the growth model of new 
products (Bass, 1969) and concepts of “network externalities” and “lock-in” (Arthur, 
1989; Bass, 1969; Katz and Shapiro, 1986; Menanteau and Lefebvre, 2000). These 
concepts have explained how innovative technologies, especially newly introduced 
consumer durables, are adopted, in terms of the rates and modes of accumulation in 
the number of adopters, as well as external environment consisting of competing 
technologies. 
Roger’s study of diffusion (Rogers, 1962, 1995) has also been influential and has 
provided a widely used framework for studying the diffusion of innovation. Rogers 
considered the process in which people transferred and shared knowledge and 
information, as well as how certain forms of persuasion took place that led to 
adoption or rejection of innovation. Defining diffusion as “the process by which an 
innovation is communicated through certain channels over time among the members 
of a social system,” (Rogers, 1995) Rogers assessed the process as two-way 
communication about new ideas that may go through several cycles. This process is 
represented by the S-curve shape, which shows that technologies launch with a small 
number of earlier adopters and gradually increase adoption over time; the speed is 
represented through the steepness of the curve. Rogers identified four elements—
presenting innovation, communication channels, time, and social system—as key to 
 
 14 
diffusion, and investigated how communications between individuals whose 
response to new ideas (innovation) differ and affect the rate of diffusion. 
In particular, Rogers (1995) defined five characteristics of innovation diffusion, seen 
to influence individuals’ decisions to adopt or reject an innovation, thereby affecting 
the rate of adoption: relative advantage, compatibility with existing values and 
practices, simplicity and ease of use, trialability, and observable results. The rate of 
adoption is influenced by the degree to which an innovation is perceived to be better 
and bring relative advantage to users compared to existing use. The compatibility of 
the innovation to existing norms, values, and practices of potential adopters would 
also influence driving, delaying, or rejecting the adoption of innovation. Innovations 
with simplicity and ease of use diffuse more rapidly than those that require 
developing additional skills and knowledge. Trialability brings greater certainty to 
the individual in making decisions for use. Uncertainty may also decrease as 
individuals observe the results of the innovation, and individuals are then more likely 
to adopt the innovation. 
Diffusion studies, in turn, suggest certain criteria on which to predict, measure, and 
assess the outcomes of diffusion. Following the models and patterns of adoption, one 
seeks to find the determinants that lead to ‘successful diffusion’ or causes for a 
‘diffusion lag’. However, limits and challenges in assuring timely and wide diffusion 
of innovative technologies still exist. In particular, technological innovations are 
increasingly integrated into complex systems of a wide range of interoperating 
technologies, and thereby involve various social actors, institutional organisations, 
and systems. The adoption of complex and often-networked technologies such as 
ICTs, often require continuous learning to align organisational structures, processes, 
and the technologies on varying time scales (Lyytinen and Damsgaard, 2001). 
Technologies are therefore intricately related to such diverse factors that together 
shape the technologies to particular uses. 
In diffusion studies, ‘social’ factors are considered to influence aggregate levels of 
adoption. How factors come to influence the content of technologies (Williams and 
Edge, 1996), however, is seldom questioned and explained. Rogers (1995) did 
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consider ‘re-invention’ as an important process involved in the diffusion of 
innovation, but in the limited sense of recognising the process as one of the key 
characteristics that enhance the rate of adoption of a relatively static object. Re-
invention becomes meaningful only through wider diffusion of the particular 
innovation in focus. Consequently, the diffusion process is discussed as a social 
process or phenomenon, less in relation to the technological-innovation process, 
often drawing on a static view of technology (Sorensen, 1996). 
Within the current dynamics of technological innovation, varying efforts are made to 
measure and predict the patterns, modes, and rates of diffusion of particular 
technological innovations. Strong visions that often drive industry- or national-scale 
innovation are often predicated on efforts to estimate the future. These estimates and 
visions then become the criteria upon which the outcomes of technological 
innovation are judged and assessed. 
As it was the starting point of this research, this section has briefly discussed the 
usefulness and the limits of diffusion studies in explicating the factors that influence 
the diffusion of technological innovation. These diffusion studies have contributed 
generalized models for explicating the societal process involving wide adoption or 
lack of adoption of a certain technological product. However in these accounts the 
artefact is generally regarded as being constituted by a more or less stabilised set of 
technical components and features. However, the diffusion studies often leave 
unexplored the question of how the technical properties – or the content of 
technologies - are further shaped by, or shape the societal process leading to 
particular mode of adoption and use of the technologies. 
The following section brings the initial inquiry on the problem of diffusion towards 
an interrogation upon the process of shaping technology through its lifecycle of 
being designed, developed and used. 
2.2.2. The co-evolution of technology and society 
Scholars in STS and especially social shaping of technology (SST) have observed 
the negotiation process upon making ‘choices’ that involve interactions among 
various social actors and factors in shaping the content of technology (MacKenzie 
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and Wajcman, 1985; Williams and Edge, 1996). The SST perspective provides a 
helpful analytical framework on which the negotiation processes can be observed 
along with the process of making choices in technological and social options. The 
SST perspective arose from recognition that technological change does not follow 
some inner logic of technology into a clear, predetermined, and foreseeable path. 
The scrutiny of technological change and its relationship with society by scholars 
from the field of STS have widened the analytical stance to embrace the 
technological, social, cultural, economic, and political factors and their interactions. 
The scope of this research thus embraces the broad spectrum of innovation and 
diffusion processes where the mobilization of technological options and social 
choices and their reciprocal impacts may be observed. 
Studying the innovation and diffusion of technologies from the social-shaping 
perspective has been the prevalent and major interest and occupation for scholars in 
STS. Earlier works based on the social-constructivist perspective focused on the 
reshaping and redesigning of artefacts by various social groups or relevant social 
groups or actors involved in technological development and diffusion (Bijker, 1992; 
Pinch and Bijker, 1984). More recent studies in STS, and in SST in particular, 
undertaken on a wider range of technological areas, suggest more sophisticated 
approaches that consider the diversities and complexities of interrelated actors and 
factors in sociotechnical constructs or systems, as they focus on the processes of 
technological development and use that bring about a coevolution of technology and 
society. 
By integrating diverse research areas of technological innovation including 
evolutionary economics, politics, history, cultural studies, and many others, SST 
studies have contributed to building insights about the dynamism in interactions 
between technologies and a broad range of mechanisms in society. The detailed case 
studies based on an SST perspective and broader scope of STS have shown how 
alignments of diverse interests bring about technological change, stabilisation, and 
entrenchment in sociotechnical systems (Law and Callon, 1992), and go through or 
face restructuring, reconfiguration, or a transitional shift (Geels, 2002a). Furthermore, 
innovation has taken place continuously as technologies are brought into the 
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implementation and appropriation process, finding the innovation processes to be 
iterative rather than linear (Fleck, 1999; Williams et al., 2005). The studies that 
especially considered the appropriation and domestication of innovative technologies 
have scrutinised how differing concepts and meanings are given to technologies by 
customers and users, and how they, in turn, affect and shape technologies, just as the 
use and users are configured to particular modes of use according to the inscription 
(Akrich, 1992) of developers to a certain degree. 
Although there has been increasing recognition about complexities in the 
technological-innovation process and the resultant contingencies in the nature of the 
coproduction of technologies and society, recent studies of SST have also observed 
efforts in the policy domain to counteract the complexities and contingencies by 
other means of shaping the technology and society. On the one hand, policy 
structures and directions have become much geared towards inclusiveness and 
participatory style (Lyall and Tait, 2005). On the other hand, such a move could be 
seen to head towards mapping and assessing future outcomes of certain 
technological development at early stages of innovation (Williams, 2006). Such 
tendencies raise additional questions in relation to linking the insights about the 
relationship between technology and society with possible actions to take to manage 
favourable conditions for the coevolution of technology and society. 
Much of the technological innovation taking place in our present society tends to be 
driven by the combination of aims and fears about the outcomes of the interactions 
between technological innovation and society. Technologies are framed, planned, 
and assessed at a very early stage of development in its use, modes of adoption, as 
well as the outcomes of accumulative appropriation and social embedding of the 
technologies, well in advance of their actual implementation and appropriation, let 
alone development. Such modes of technological choice take place in varying scales: 
from a relatively small scale at individual firms through larger industrial partnerships, 
and even larger scales of national initiatives or international coordination. 
However, such a trend does seem to have turned away from the traditional linear 
model based on a simplistic assumption of a seamless flow from research and 
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development to production and then to diffusion through market and society. The 
technology policy of the European Union, for example, has shown a new orientation 
towards recognition of the complexities and uncertainties in the technological-
innovation process, the difficulties of control, as well as the need for integration and 
flexibility in science and technology policy (Russell and Williams, 2002). The shift 
also has or is taking place in many other parts of the world in developed and 
developing countries, albeit to different degrees and with different approaches. 
Yet, intentions, goals, and projections are directing much of the present 
technological innovation and comprise the essential elements of the drivers of the 
present society. To a certain extent, the resilient linearity of the basic frame of the 
projection and drive for technological innovation may represent the characteristic of 
a social process. Although technological change may endeavour to be more inclusive 
towards broader views and wider accounts, it will still be placed within fluctuating 
goals, projections, and directions. Therefore, it seems critical to view such a process 
not only as an attempt to intervene in the technological innovation process but is 
itself a social process that needs to be examined vis à vis the dynamics of the 
technological innovation and diffusion processes: how the evolving goals, intentions, 
visions, and projections shape and are shaped by technological capabilities, social 
appropriation of innovative technologies, and modes of uptake and use by the 
consumers and by the public, which together comprise the complex map of the 
sociotechnical environment. 
2.2.3. Managing uncertainties of technological change 
In recent decades, uncertainties have become one of the major concerns in 
technological change. Several sources of uncertainty have been recognised in the 
development of technologies and innovations in many areas of science and 
technology. For example, increasing concerns about risks and undesirable outcomes 
of technological innovation gave rise to challenging tasks for regulators, policy 
makers, and developers. Also, industry and governments have been faced with 
certain challenges to link emerging technologies to market and potential users. The 
linear model of innovation (incorporating a view of innovation as driven by 
advances in scientific knowledge and industrial research) that has dominated 
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technology policy for several decades has largely given way to the recognition of the 
need for more sophisticated approaches, such as those that encompass the whole 
lifecycle of a technology, from research and development to use (Russell and 
Williams, 2002). 
However, the limitations of the linear model have not been fully overcome whereas 
efforts have been made to bring about more integrated approaches towards 
considering complex interactions among diverse actors and factors that directly or 
indirectly influence and are influenced by the technological innovation. The inherent 
complexities that arise from the integrated model pose additional challenges to 
possible interventions to guide technological innovation with desirable and desired 
outcomes. It seems there is no definitive answer or generally applicable method to 
tackle such challenges, whereas this does not negate the effectiveness of the efforts 
to manage uncertainties in the societal uptake or societal embedding of technological 
innovation (Deuten et al., 1997). 
Management approaches and the relevant conceptual tools based on the 
understanding of the complex relationship between technology and society have 
been introduced by the scholars in the field of technology and innovation studies 
including the constructive technology assessment (CTA), technology transition (TT) 
with a multilevel perspective, and strategic niche management (SNM). CTA has 
sought to improve the ways of addressing uncertainties and contingencies of 
technological innovation through ongoing anticipation and broadening the design, 
development, and implementation stages to include iterative learning processes 
among heterogeneous actors (Rip et al., 1995; Rip and Schot, 2002; Schot and Ripp, 
1997). CTA has been aimed at managing the process of technological change, based 
on an assumption that the internal process of technological development can be 
steered, to a certain extent (Schot, 1992, 37p). Attempts to steer such complex 
processes require societal learning where feedback and reflexivity become critical. 
However, additional challenges were recognised to facilitate such learning processes, 
especially where the feedback from a broadened agenda was seen as less effective in 
the process of technology design (Schot and Rip, 1997). 
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SNM, an offspring of this approach, offers a view of creating and constructing 
technological niches to facilitate the processes to allow sustainable innovation by 
bridging the new technologies and their market introduction (Schot and Geels, 2008). 
Technological niches are the sources or spaces for radical novelties, developed while 
being protected from the competition in existing selected environments. 
Technological niches are different from those considered market niches, as the 
technology design and user demands have not yet been stabilised (Schot and Geels, 
2007). Yet, they are constructed often involving policy makers, as well as users. 
SNM thus addresses management challenges in matching a radical innovation to the 
social environment where the novel technologies are to be embedded, as well as the 
long-term sustainability of innovations. 
These conceptual analyses of technological change have been further elaborated 
through a multilevel perspective (MLP) built on the observation of the process, 
framed as TT. The MLP provides a conceptual framework based on horizontal and 
vertical interactions among diverse players, regimes, and the larger environment. 
The multi-level framework consists of the micro level of ‘niches’, the meso-level of 
‘sociotechnical regimes,’ and the macro-level of ‘sociotechnical landscape’ (Geels, 
2002a). It stresses the linking of ongoing processes at each level (Schot and Geels, 
2008). Niches are radical novelties that emerge often in response to the problems, 
rules, and capabilities of existing regimes and landscapes. They emerge in a 
protected space while they still have low technical performance, which separates 
them from the competitions from market selection in the existing regime. The 
existing regime represents the meso-level of sociotechnical regimes where 
technological developments follow certain degrees of stabilisation and trajectories, 
generating incremental innovation. The macro-level of sociotechnical landscape 
consists of structural and material context in which the establishment and 
arrangements render it difficult to change, often requiring longer-term changing 
processes than the regimes (Geels, 2002a). 
The relationships between the levels are conceptualised as follows: Niches are 
produced on the basis of the existing sociotechnical regimes while also being 
influenced by existing landscape. Although ongoing practices and processes 
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characterise each level, niches may find opportunities to move from uncertain radical 
novelties towards stabilisation at the regime level as tensions emerge in the 
sociotechnical regime or shifts occur at the landscape level that also put pressure on 
the regime level. Then the regimes and landscape that had been configured based on 
existing technologies go through reconfiguration, albeit at different degrees of 
difficulty, that may eventually bring about successful introduction of new 
technologies to society, culminating in TT (Geels, 2002a; Kemp et al., 1998). 
The process of TT has thus been illustrated, and over the years the MLP has gained 
wide recognition as a useful theory to explain and guide the transition process. A 
number of case studies have been built on the model suggested by MLP, whereas 
many have been aimed at informing policy-level practices related to the governance 
of sociotechnical change (Belz, 2004; Correlje and Verbong, 2004; Geels, 2002b). 
However, critics assess its key conceptualisation of levels and their interactions, as 
well as its practical applicability to policy agendas for governing sociotechnical 
change or transitions. Whilst the regime shift is the key focus of studies of TT, 
Berkhout and others (2004b) argued that MLP, by drawing on past histories of 
sociotechnical transformations, tend to bring a risk of treating the transition process 
as a unilinear process. The niche-driven interactions, particularly built on historical 
narratives of regime change, tend to assume a degree of inevitability about the 
process and the outcome. 
Smith and others (Smith et al., 2005; Smith et al., 2010) have argued for better 
understanding of sociotechnical transitions as changes mediated by actors and 
networks of actors, through their interests, expectations, and resources. MLP has also 
been complemented with further acknowledgement on the roles of the agent and 
actors in the causal mechanisms working through the levels (Geels, 2010). 
Sociotechnical change poses to be a ‘global model’ of overall paths and patterns to 
be complemented by a ‘local model’ of actions (Geels and Schot, 2007). Still, the 
task of bringing the main narratives of level interactions to the level of agencies and 
actors remains, if it were to offer ‘navigational support for actors’ (Jørgensen 2012, 
997). Mapping the mediating actions and interactions of various actors and agencies 
rather than the levels may, however, be better placed to elicit suggestions to navigate 
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towards future transitions, thereby enhancing the ‘prescriptive usefulness’ 
(Jørgensen, 2012, 1001p) of the approach. 
So far, such depiction of the world has been applied to seek explanations about 
technological transformation that also involves transformation of other elements of 
society including organisations, regulations, infrastructures, and cultures. TT is an 
analytical framework based on retrospective observations on sociotechnical change, 
aiming to provide a tool that can serve as a forward-looking glass as much as a 
retrospective one, creating a challenge regarding the extent of extrapolation from the 
past experience in the act of anticipation. Also, anticipation is twofold in considering 
the present web of heterogeneous actors and factors, and possible outcomes of their 
interactions, whereas the present niches are themselves being formed on the basis of 
the actors’ expectations. However, the twofold act of anticipation about niches and 
outcomes is itself a sociotechnical process which not only influences actor networks, 
technological changes, and shifts in regimes and landscapes, but is also influenced 
by them. Therefore, reflexivity seems to be centrally placed, along with the diversity 
and complexity to be considered in attempting to tackle the uncertainties and 
contingencies of sociotechnical changes and the coevolution of technology and 
society. 
2.2.4. Summary 
This section reviewed scholars’ work in various fields that addressed issues related 
to technological innovation and change: the patterns of technology diffusion, the 
process of shaping technology, and the approaches that have aimed to direct and 
manage technological innovation and change. Diffusion theories have especially 
resorted to modeling patterns drawn from aggregate levels of adoption over time, 
and applied to varying degrees of anticipating future diffusion of innovations and 
assessing the outcomes. Certain factors influenced the time of adoption by affecting 
the individual as well as interpersonal decision-making criteria. Yet, the decision 
making was viewed as a unilinear process, unconcerned with changes in the shape or 
content of the technology being adopted. 
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The SST perspective contributed insights and recognition of the need to broaden the 
spectrum for viewing the relationship between technology and society. Complexities 
and unpredictability in the process of technological innovation and diffusion were 
stressed, while cautioning against simplistic and hasty attempts at controlling the 
directions of technological innovation and change. 
Building on these insights, as well as insights from evolutionary economics, scholars 
have introduced and suggested analytical frameworks and tools for more practical 
approaches to addressing the uncertainties and contingencies in innovation and 
diffusion of emerging technologies. By offering conceptual tools to examine vertical 
and horizontal interactions among diverse actors and factors in broadened arena of 
sociotechnical changes, for example, the MLP has been suggested to guide 
understanding and assumptions about possible interactions between emerging 
technologies and their embedding environment. Yet, such guidance inevitably carries 
some simplification of the complex world, which requires further scrutiny into the 
complexities that may have been left undescribed. 
2.3 Sociotechnical dynamics of innovation and uptake of ICTs 
This section focuses on particularities of ICTs in relation to technological innovation 
and uptake. ICTs have been developed and widely adopted throughout society 
during recent decades. Furthermore, technological innovation and diffusion of ICTs 
are increasingly linked to large-scale global networks of infrastructures, 
complementing technologies and services through continuous development and 
advancement. Due to network externalities and compatibilities among these 
technologies and services, technological innovation in ICTs, and in particular 
mobile-communication technologies, are often pursued in collective and proactive 
mode (Shin, 2006a, b). However, despite the collective and often coordinated 
innovative activities, uncertainties arise with regard to appropriation and uptake of 
the emerging technologies in society. 
Complexities, uncertainties, and dynamics in the development and diffusion of ICTs 
have been recognised and evinced, especially through the studies of standardisation 
whereby alignments of different interests, conflicts, and active processes of 
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collaboration and coordination have been highlighted (Graham et al., 1995; Kano, 
2000; Oshri and Weeber, 2006; Williams et al., 2004). These studies offer helpful 
insights into additional challenges in the future uptake of those often large-scale 
networked technologies in which boundary and scale are not limited to a single 
organisation or an industrial sector. 
Dynamics of user appropriation of ICTs are examined through the social-learning 
framework, which complements and brings the scope beyond supply-side 
interactions. In particular, the social-learning perspective in technological innovation 
provides a lens through which to focus on the detailed processes of design and 
development, as well as the take up of innovative technologies in society (Rip et al., 
1995; Williams, 2000; Williams et al., 2005). User appropriation of ICT particularly 
highlights complex learning processes and knowledge flows among heterogeneous 
players, representation of users and uses, and the processes of appropriation by 
actual users (Williams, 2000; Williams et al., 2005) 
These processes, involving complex interactions and relations, were mapped for 
analysis based on the concepts of intermediaries, the multilevel game (Williams, 
2000; Williams et al., 2005), and the development arena (Jorgensen and Sorensen, 
1999). The concept of intermediaries has been employed to observe the roles and 
activities that have been engaged to bridge the varying levels of supply and use 
dynamics. The concept of the multilevel game maps the perceptions of innovation 
actors as their roles and goals diverge from those that had initially been taken. The 
concept of a development arena brings these dynamic interactions of intermediation, 
alignments, competition, and divergence into a cognitive space, as they are held 
together by certain linkages. 
2.3.1. Standardisation in ICTs and the evolution of mobile standards 
The evolution of mobile technologies and mobile services has involved dynamic 
interactions among the diverse arrays of innovation players including the 
manufacturers of technologies, government, public research and development 
institutes, service providers, and users in their particular institutional structures, 
social systems, cultures, and political environments. In recent decades, 
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standardisation has become one of the most prominent sites for interactions, whereas 
the development of technical standards and standards-setting activities have aimed at 
achieving compatibility and wide interoperability among differing technologies and 
systems that are increasingly implemented in large-scales, beyond the boundaries of 
the nation states. Furthermore, the evolution of mobile-communication technologies 
have largely resorted to proactive standards-setting activities where alignment 
through cooperation and competition actively take place due to high ambiguity in 
technological development. Various reasons for such proactive and collective moves 
include rapid changes in knowledge and interests, rapid innovation of new products 
and services, increasing fragmentation, and the costs of innovation exceeding the 
proprietary benefits that may ensue (Oshri and Weeber, 2006; Van De Ven, 2005). 
Anticipation has therefore increasingly played a major role in standards setting 
processes of mobile-communication technologies, as the standards are often pursued 
prior to the existence of the markets for the standardised products or services (Lee 
and Oh, 2008). Standards in general can be understood as ‘a set of technical 
specifications that can be adhered to by a producer, either tacitly, or in accordance 
with some formal agreement, or in conformity with explicit regulatory authority’ 
(David and Steinmueller, 1994, p218). In this regard, anticipatory standards carry the 
characteristics of guiding future compatibility or interoperability related to products, 
systems, or service platforms (Lyytinen and King, 2006). Mobile-communication 
standards generally fall into a category of ‘compatibility standards’, defined as those 
that ‘assure the user that a component or sub-system can successfully be 
incorporated, and be “inter-operable” with other constituents of a larger system of 
closely specified inputs and outputs’ (David and Steinmueller, 1994, p218). 
However, seeking interoperability, especially in an anticipatory mode, incorporates 
further challenges, as the interoperability between heterogeneous sets of components 
such as terminals, network devices, platforms, and software systems often extends 
beyond the domain of technical compatibility: it further requires future compatibility 
with broader systems in society that represent complex sociotechnical systems 
(Williams et al., 2004). Interoperability must align with existing values, past 
experiences, and needs of potential adopters, as it moves towards wider diffusion 
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(Rogers, 1995). Therefore, the boundaries of interoperability are often extended to 
consist of heterogeneous actors and factors that interact with the technology. 
There are a wide range of actors and factors whose interactions shape and are shaped 
by standardisation, whereas the coordination of these interactions poses additional 
challenges in bringing about workable standards. Scholars have attempted to 
examine and investigate the interactions among various actors in the process of 
innovation and evolution of information and communications technologies and 
standards. Studies based on the actor-network theory (ANT), in particular, have 
shown how actors pursue alignment of interests, thereby bringing standards to 
closure or irreversibility (Fomin, 1999; Hanseth, 1996; Yoo et al., 2005). Yoo et al. 
(2005) for example, examined how configuration of actor networks were mediated 
and coordinated through standards and led to successful innovation and diffusion of 
a broadband mobile infrastructure and services. In their analyses of the innovation 
and diffusion process, standards played a pivotal role in aligning and coordinating 
different and conflicting interests, thereby enrolling key actors to build necessary 
actor networks. Standardisation here is viewed as a process where agreements 
regarding the necessary specifications of technology are achieved among a set of 
actors who go through the process of the translation in which persuasion and 
enrollment bring other actors into a network. Successful enrollment in the process 
would then enable certain technology to be selected, thereby achieving closure. The 
success or failure of a standard, they argued, depends on the configuration of actor 
networks, through which the associated networks reach closure and thus become 
irreversible. 
ANT-based analyses generally leads to observing the unification of networks 
whereby closure to certain technologies and configurations of actors are reached. 
The core concepts such as translation, alignment, and irreversibility describe how 
heterogeneous actors, when successfully performed, finally come to consensus on 
certain aspects of technologies and modes of interactions, which brings a rather 
partial and monotonous view of the world as a whole. Their focus remains, 
furthermore, on the coordination and cooperation of actors, failing to capture the 
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aspects of competition between different actor networks (Jorgensen and Sorensen, 
1999; Williams et al., 2004). 
Indeed, the global evolution of mobile-communication technologies and standards in 
the recent decades has highlighted varying degrees of alignments, competitions, and 
conflicts during the process of the development and implementation of the standards. 
First-generation mobile-communication technologies were introduced in the early 
1980s while the systems installed across the globe were based on seven mutually 
incompatible national standards (Bohlin et al., 2010). A large number of European 
countries were then aligned to develop and implement the second generation of 
mobile-communication standard; they formed a global system for mobile 
communication around the European Technology Standards Institute. Yet, strong 
alignment among the European equipment and service providers caused a measure of 
barriers for firms outside Europe to enter the community (Funk and Methe, 2001), 
which in part resulted in the formation of alignment around a separate standard of 
code division multiple access (Lee et al., 2009). The global mobile-phone market 
was fragmented by having five different standards. 
The evolution to the third-generation standard was further accompanied by the role 
played by the International Telecommunications Union for the harmonisation of 
global standards (Ames and Gabor, 2000). The International Telecommunications 
Union initiated the international mobile telecommunications IMT-2000 project to set 
the framework for the third generation (3G, (Chen and Guizani, 2006; Kano, 2000). 
The collaboration among industry and standard-setting organisations led to the 
coordination of two partnership projects, one based on GSM and the other on code 
division multiple access systems. The standardisation thus moved away from 
hierarchical structures of national level coordination towards global, industry 
coordinated consortia (e.g., 3G partnership project, 3GPP2; (Tilson and Lyytinen, 
2006). 
The outcome of such collaborative efforts however varied by region and nation state. 
The roll out of 3G in Japan was regarded as a success accompanied by its particular 
market structure (Lindmark et al., 2004). However, although European nations had 
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collectively chosen the evolution path towards 3G, many had delayed its commercial 
implementation and failed to achieve the anticipated rate of adoption in an expected 
time (Ansari and Garud, 2009). They were also faced with varying issues that 
conflicted with what had been anticipated initially: users did not enact the vision of 
3G, which was driven mainly by suppliers of technology and services; and they 
lacked compelling applications and content (Ansari and Garud, 2009). 
Standardization as a process represents strategic alignments and articulation of 
heterogeneous interests and expectations (Graham et al., 1995; Williams et al., 2004). 
Standards setting generally leads to collective choices on certain technological 
frames through agreements, alignments on solutions of conflicts, and recurrent 
problems. This may be viewed as ‘striking a balance between the requirements of 
users, the technological possibilities and associated costs of producers, and 
constraints imposed by government for the benefit of society in general’ (Tassey, 
2000, p588). However, such a collective move towards seemingly balancing 
heterogeneous interests and issues of wider society does not always lead to smooth 
introduction and implementation, leading to wide diffusion of technologies. 
Although greater complexities of technologies often bring analysts’ focus onto the 
supply side networks of research and development, manufacturers, and service 
providers, there is still a crucial conceptual gap that needs to be linked between the 
dynamics on the supply side and the user side in the development and appropriation 
of technologies. 
2.3.2. Users, appropriation, and social learning in technological 
innovation 
This section brings the discussion of use and users in the process of technological 
innovation and uptake. Recognition of the role of users expands in the process of 
design and development of emerging technologies. The notion of user innovation per 
se emphasises the role of users in the innovation process: the perceptions and real-
life experiences of the users were incorporated into the process of actual design and 
development of new market products and services (von Hippel, 1986, 2005). The 
sphere of use and users, however, reaches beyond informing future directions of the 
development and introduction of new technological products and services in market; 
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it incorporates uncertainties and contingencies in the shaping of technologies and 
technological pathways. Extending from the perspective of social shaping of 
technology, the social-learning framework focuses greater attention on the 
contingencies in the process of use and design by focusing on how the complexly 
interwoven choices in the cyclical process of design, development, through 
implementation and use together shape technology and the evolving paths of 
technological innovation (Rip et al., 1995; Williams, 2000; Williams et al., 2000; 
Williams et al., 2005). 
Projection of users and uses in particular has increasingly become crucial to the 
present state of technological development. They often serve as an important source 
to rationalize and promote future directions of technological innovation, often 
enforced through visions and anticipation of future use (Stewart, 2005; Williams, 
2000). Images of users and customers often become a “currency” used to enroll 
necessary resources for development, as well as to attest or mobilize visions through 
business-trial environments (Nicoll, 2000). However, although the presumptions of 
use and users are incorporated into an initial design of the technology, the 
representation of the intended users and uses does not easily lead to smooth uptake 
by actual users through the implementation and diffusion stages. Concepts such as 
‘configuring the user’ (Woolgar, 1991) and ‘inscribing’ (Akrich, 1992) stress how 
developers and innovators construct and appropriate user representations and their 
own understanding of the contexts into the designs. However, the suggested 
solutions, such as achieving the convergence of all the different user representations 
by developing and incorporating user representations during the design stage (Akrich, 
1995), do not offer ideal means to link the gap between representation and actual use 
or users. Even an attempt to carry out an explicit investigation on future uses and 
users would, at best, gain partial representation of the prospective use of the 
technology (Hyysalo, 2006; Stewart and Williams, 2005). 
Thus, problems of design are an inherent problem, critical to successful innovation 
and implementation of new technological products and services, whereas their 
shortcomings or mismatches become evident only at the stage of actual consumption. 
The social-learning perspective addresses these challenges while it explicates the 
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inherent gap between suppliers’ offerings and the actual adoption of technologies. It 
provides a lens through which to focus on detailed processes of design and 
development, as well as the adoption and use of innovative technologies. It 
emphasises the ‘learning’ process that takes place in the course of acquisition and 
integration of technologies into local use and the user environment. The term ‘social 
learning’ does not indicate a ‘narrowly cognitive process’ but is instead regarded as a 
‘process of negotiation, subject to conflicts of interest amongst players with rather 
different capabilities, commitments, cultures and contexts’ (Williams et al., 2005). 
The value of a social-learning perspective therefore lies in its extension to the scope 
of observation beyond the stages of design and development, and to enter the process 
of appropriation and use. The concept of domestication is key to social learning, as it 
seeks to observe how people explore technical capabilities and give meaning to the 
technology whereas the technologies are integrated into local social settings 
(Silverstone and Haddon, 1996). Brosveet and Sørensen (2000) thus described the 
process of social learning as the ‘process of using, producing, and making sense of 
the new technology, emphasizing spatial as well as temporal aspects’ (Brosveet and 
Sorensen, 2000, 263p). 
Although the gap between the design and use seems pertinent to the reality of 
pursuing technological innovation, which precedes the existence of evident demand 
or market, the gap needs to be viewed not with a linear conception of the process of 
design followed by use, but in a rather more cyclical relationship between user 
representation, design, and appropriation (Williams et al., 2005). The gap comes to 
represent a space where developers and users, as well as other relevant players, 
interact directly or indirectly with each other, and form a cyclical feedback 
relationship. This conforms to the idea that technological innovation is not just a 
matter of production but includes consumption and use as an essential part of the 
innovation process: 
Technological innovation is not just a matter of production. Consumption and 
use are equally essential components of the innovation process. 
Technological innovation is also not just a matter of engineering. Both new 
and old technologies are social products: they are symbolic and aesthetic as 
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well as material and functional. Production and consumption are not related 
to each other in a singular or linear fashion, but are the product of a complex 
pattern of activities in which producers and consumer-users, as well as those 
who intervene in and facilitate the process of consumption, take part. 
(Silverstone and Haddon, 1996, p44) 
Through the studies of diffusion and use, practitioners increasingly recognise that 
diffusion and use are intrinsic parts of the innovation process (Fleck, 1988, 1999; 
Haddon, 2005; Hall, 2005; Nicoll, 2000; Silverstone and Haddon, 1996; Williams et 
al., 2005). Observations have been made in various settings and sites ranging from in 
industrial organisations to mass-market environments, where evidence of innovation 
during implementation or appropriation of new technologies could be traced. 
However, the extent to which innovation may occur during the diffusion process 
may vary depending on certain factors that affect the appropriation process such as 
strength of supplier-user links, locations of consumption, and the possible scale of 
adoption (Williams et al., 2005). Innovation during diffusion is particularly related to 
the modes and intensity with which users engage themselves with innovative 
technologies: how they identify objects; how, where, and why they decide to 
appropriate the technologies; and so forth. 
Successful introduction and uptake of new technologies therefore means the 
technologies or artefacts become ‘situated practically, and symbolically, while the 
social system develops routines and institutions to support and regulate it’ while the 
users ‘construct practice as well as meanings around the artefact’ (Brosveet and 
Sørensen 2000). Brosveet and Sørensen (2000) called this process ‘domestication’ 
through which the artefact turns from an alien to a recognisable element. Such a 
notion of successful embedding of technology in society brings further attention to 
reflexivity; especially of the actors involved whose particular experiences lead to 
‘responding creatively to novel and changing circumstances’ (Williams et al., 2005, 
91p). 
The social-learning framework thus leads to encompassing the process of 
sociotechnical change, where choices and reflexivity reciprocally shape technology 
 
 32 
and society. The process of diffusion is merged with the process of design and 
development in the analytical scope that embraces the cyclical processes of design, 
implementation, and use. The analytical sphere thus brings attention not only to the 
initiation of often a grand visionary project and its outcome, but also on the 
mediating visions, choices, and actions that link heterogeneous actors and factors. 
The outcome is then not to be heedlessly assessed against the initial visions and 
conceptions of the technology, but to consider various interactions involving 
designers, suppliers, regulators, intermediaries, and end-users. Although supply-side 
and user-side dynamics have been the two main pinnacles of innovation and 
technology studies, the social-learning framework brings greater attention to 
intermediate-level interactions, where varying translations of technologies, shifting 
choices, and interests of appropriation dynamically shape the design and use of the 
artefact. 
2.3.3. Mapping the dynamics of complex interactions: Intermediaries 
and the multilevel game in a development arena 
Intermediate-level interactions or the term intermediation is used in this thesis to 
mainly denote a range of activities concerned with bridging the domains of 
development and use (Williams et al., 2005). Particularly in relation to complex 
technologies such as ICTs, this process is vital in linking not only consumer products 
and services to use, but also linking many layers of complementary technologies, 
systems, infrastructures, and applications that together constitute the products and 
services. Thus, the process of intermediation is not always straightforward in the 
sense that the sites for linking development and use can be numerous and distributed 
across varying levels of the appropriation process. The players involved in such an 
intermediation process are denoted as ‘intermediaries’ whereas the intermediaries 
have been observed to emerge rather than ‘follow formal and predetermined 
structures and roles’ in the course of an ICT experiment (Williams et al., 2005, 80p). 
Intermediaries in innovation processes have broadly been viewed as organizations or 
individuals having various roles in supporting and facilitating innovation and 
diffusion by mediating activities such as dissemination of information, knowledge, 
and technology transfer, and provision of applications or solutions to market needs 
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(Howells, 2006). In the framework of social learning in technological innovation, 
intermediaries are identified as individuals or institutions that learn and facilitate 
learning by others, transferring and translating relevant knowledge and information 
(Stewart and Hyysalo, 2008; Williams et al., 2005): 
Intermediaries are continuously forced to learn about, filter, translate and 
reflect on information, products and practices of other actors to remain 
relevant and thus in existence. An important part of this learning is about 
how to relate and manipulate as well as how to dominate and control other 
actors around them. 
(Stewart and Hyysalo, 2008, p311) 
Stewart and Hyysalo (2008) explicated the role of intermediaries in relation to social 
learning by identifying roles in three distinct categories: facilitating, configuring, and 
brokering. Facilitating includes activities of setting spaces to provide opportunities to 
fulfil various needs. The activities may involve education and training, gathering and 
distributing resources (e.g., physical devices or economic funds), influencing 
regulation, and creating rules for managing and reducing uncertainties. Configuring 
involves processes to facilitate appropriation of technologies by others through 
technical and symbolic influences: the activities include adjusting technology for use, 
as well as creating and configuring contents and rules on the basis of the 
interpretation and meanings that are given to the technologies by intermediaries, 
sponsors, suppliers, and users. Brokering includes means for bridging and bringing 
together suppliers, users, and other necessary actors into the innovation process, 
often through direct communication, thereby gaining support for the appropriation of 
innovative products and services. Intermediaries mobilise and mediate between 
suppliers and users of various layers of technologies (e.g., platforms, components, 
content, and applications) as well as other actors involved. Intermediaries thus 
include a wide range of players such as retailers, consultants, certain types of 
knowledge-intensive business service firms, banks, ICT platform operators, 
advertising agencies, and so forth (Howells, 2006; Stewart and Hyysalo, 2008; 
Williams et al., 2005). 
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The role of intermediaries becomes at once challenging and crucial, especially when 
the market for the product is nascent; thus, uncertainties about potential uses and 
users prevail, and the link between the supplier and the user is not yet present or 
fragile. In such circumstances, intermediate actors need to “create spaces and 
opportunities for appropriation and generation of emerging technical or cultural 
products by others who might be described as developers and users” (Stewart and 
Hyysalo, 2008, 296p). Stewart and Hyysalo termed these actors innovation 
intermediaries and identified them as follows: 
Innovation intermediaries can be identified by their engagement in activities 
in which they gather, develop, control and disseminate knowledge, collect 
and disseminate financial, technical and institutional resources such as the 
support of users and sponsors, and attempt to regulate uses, developments, 
participation and the actions of others in the innovation networks. … These 
intermediaries can be organisations, or individuals grounded in an 
institutional, technical and often physical context that facilitates their 
activities. 
(Stewart and Hyysalo, 2008, 297p) 
The concept of intermediaries drawn from the framework of social learning in 
technological innovation includes a wide range of intermediate actors in innovation 
processes, and provides a rather holistic picture of the intermediaries while offering a 
space for detailed analyses of the interactions in which they are involved. Innovation 
intermediaries thus can be those who have the ability (to differing degrees) and 
interests to coordinate and align different knowledge, expertise, visions, and interests, 
while they position themselves as both suppliers and users of innovative 
technologies, as well as bridging the two separate yet connected spheres of 
development and use. 
The concept of intermediary and intermediation can thus be helpful tools to map and 
analyse complex interactions involved in the process of development and diffusion 
of emerging technologies, which entail a degree of uncertainty of actual use and 
uptake. It especially enables us to observe how the meanings of technologies are 
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created, translated, and transferred between the development and the user sphere by 
following the intermediate actors who constantly mobilise themselves as facilitators, 
brokers, or configurers over multiple cycles of innovation and diffusion. Scholars 
examined a wide range of intermediaries who are placed in a broad sphere of 
innovation systems (Howells, 2006) or appropriation spaces (Stewart and Hyysalo, 
2008; Williams et al., 2005). This thesis applies the concept mainly to explicate the 
process of making choices upon appropriating mobile-network infrastructures 
through which the core and component technologies get implemented and used to 
provide particular applications and contents of mobile services. 
Further linked to emerging technologies, the need for a distinctive role of 
coordination emerges that would effectively create and arrange alliances of diverse 
arrays of players who take part in the innovation process. The knowledge and 
information necessary for the development and commercialization of an innovation 
transcends the boundaries of individual firms, industries, and countries. Thus, an 
individual firm can seldom manage the whole process on its own, but needs to ‘run 
in packs’ with other cooperating and competing firms (Van De Ven, 2005). Aligning 
expertise and interests that are both intertwined and divergent is a crucial process for 
successful innovation and diffusion of emerging technologies. Although the 
collective move may lead to creating institutions that may serve as a coordinator 
(Van De Ven, 2005) covering the broadest level of multiple players, the 
collaboration is often driven through active roles of innovation intermediaries 
(Williams et al., 2005). Coordination—organising or mediating the collaboration of 
such networks of heterogeneous players—has been one of the key concerns of 
social-learning process, whereas the intermediaries also play crucial role as 
coordinators by linking and maintaining the networks. 
However, challenges accompany coordination, especially where technologies rapidly 
advance along multiple layers of interconnecting and complementing technologies 
and services. Different interests, commitments, scales, and technical capacities and 
strategies may bring varying degrees of intensities and shifting modes of linkages 
and engagements to coordinated networks. Furthermore, the diversity of 
backgrounds for collaborating and building alignments is likely to endorse a 
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multilevel game among participants: the multilevel game becomes significant, 
especially where there is a formally stated shared goal for collaboration, and yet 
more or less covert goals are carried by individual participants (Williams et al., 
2005). The covert goals are likely to lead to differing commitments and interests 
towards a collectively pursued innovation process, from which certain conflicts and 
tensions may arise. 
Meanwhile, bringing about seamless networks and alignments has been a frequently 
visited theme for bringing new technologies to be embedded in society. Eventual 
embedding of a new product in an environment, per se, would be built upon the ‘web 
of alignments’, whereas the alignments always tend to be partial, carrying various 
challenges and risks from pursuing particular alignments (Deuten et al., 1997, 140p). 
Alignments have also been viewed as normative means to bring about 
‘sociotechnical constituencies’, seen as crucial for successful implementation of a 
new technology (Molina, 1997, 604p). However, building alignments, often 
requiring coordination, do not always carry multiple interests monolithically aligned, 
preparing a smooth pathway to the designated destination. The purported goals and 
visions of alignments and coordination seldom carry identical means and options for 
heterogeneous players who are nevertheless positioned as more or less committed 
members of such alignments and coordinations. This thesis therefore applies the 
concept of alignment where there are strategic linkages among the innovation actors, 
yet accompanied and further scrutinised by the notion of multilevel game (Williams 
et al., 2005). The thesis thus considers the inherent sources of conflicts and tensions 
that arise over the course of building particular forms of alignments. Therefore, 
deeper scrutiny of the process of innovation and uptake is expected to contribute to 
furthering understanding of technological pathways and contingencies in the process 
of technology shaping. 
Yet, the innovation process is observed not through a narrowly confined and well-
defined problem space of technological development, but through an emergent space 
that accommodates divergent processes in the making: the notion of a ‘development 
arena’ provides an analytical framework to discern such a cognitive space: 
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a ‘development arena’ is metaphor for the cognitive space where political, 
social and technical performances related to a specific technological problem 
takes place. It is a spatial imagery that brings together heterogeneous 
elements that seem distant in geographical and conventional cultural space. It 
resembles the idea of the ‘patchwork’ of technology stories. … The imagery 
is spatial, but it is not bound to any specific geographical location. The idea 
is that the metaphor makes it possible to visualize the many different 
heterogeneous elements that compete for attention and power in the arena. 
(Jorgensen and Sorensen, 1999, 412p) 
Dispersed and disparate processes are thus held together by certain linkages that 
bring about a conceptual development arena. The development arena further 
proposes to offer a broad perspective that includes the processes of reconfiguration 
of technologies and the domestication of technology. This arena is, to a degree, 
related to concepts such as ‘sociotechnical ensembles’, ‘technological regime’, and 
‘actor networks’ in that it assumes certain linkages and interactions among 
heterogeneous sociotechnical elements. However, the ‘development arena’ has been 
further characterised by its analytical scope for the processes of ‘becoming, shaping 
and structuring’, which stresses the processes in the making (Jorgensen and Sorensen, 
1999, 417p). It has also been differentiated from the actor networks and actor worlds 
of ANT by availing the space with a scope to describe the processes of competition 
and cooperation (Jorgensen and Sorensen, 1999). 
An arena, therefore, can be seen as a cognitive yet emergent space where multiple 
engagements and interactions are held together by certain linkages that are built on 
varying relations including coordination, cooperation, and competition. However, 
such linkages are not to be understood as being set by particular social structures that 
are predetermined by certain external parameters (Abbott 2004). Linked to 
Abbott(2004)’s ecological thinking of a space of interactions or a social world, it is 
“the process of constructing the relations between actors and locations that in fact 
constitutes and delimits both the actors and locations” (Abbott 2004, 248). The 
concept of an arena thus offers a space to observe the processes with a boundary 
unlimited by or unfixed around a prefigured or prescribed set of interactions. The 
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emergent characteristic of the space defies prescription, but allows an analytical 
frame to grow, as it incorporates diverse arrays of interactions over multiple and 
heterogeneous processes of innovation. 
2.3.4. Summary 
This section has brought together multiple concepts and frameworks to set the 
groundwork to analyse complex interactions involved in the development and uptake 
of complex and often networked, infrastructural ICT technologies. Studies on 
standards and standardisation demonstrate varying sources of innovation coming 
together to shape technology and technological pathways: anticipation, vision, 
knowledge, alignment, as well as coordination and competition operate at different 
levels of interaction that are recognised through the process of design, development, 
and implementation of interoperability standards. 
Additional insights from the studies of social learning in technological innovation 
offer the grounds on which to observe contingencies of use. They thus highlight 
pitfalls of design involving representations of use and users. The inherent gap 
between design and use is then incorporated in the cyclical learning process that has 
been emphasised to culminate in the shaping of technologies and technological 
pathways. 
Finally, the complex interactions leading to multiple and cyclical processes of design, 
development, implementation, and use have been mapped for analysis through the 
concepts of intermediaries, the multilevel game, and development arenas. 
Intermediaries represent the roles played by actors that bridge the domains of supply 
and use, whereas there may be multiple layers of supply and use relations in the 
areas of complex technologies such as ICTs. Coordination and building alignment 
often have been considered to be crucial processes to integrate diverse interests and 
knowledge towards bringing about technological innovation and change. Yet, the 
concept of the multilevel game highlights differing commitments and interests, as 
well as shifting goals and objectives in the dynamics leading to certain degrees of 
alignment and coordination. Through these diverse arrays of interactions over 
multiple cycles of innovation arises the development arena; whereas the arena 
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represents a space where multiple engagements and actions together emerge and 
evolve through certain linkages. 
2.4 Conclusion 
This chapter began with an inquiry into how and to what extent the diffusion of a 
large-scale technological innovation could be managed or directed. The initial 
problem that led to this inquiry was the gap between vision and the actual uptake of 
innovations in many technological areas. The problem was conceived as a diffusion 
problem, often predicated on measuring, predicting, and assessing. Diffusion 
theories based on economic and sociological points of view have produced models to 
observe the patterns, modes, and rates of adoption of new technological products and 
other types of innovation. These have served as useful tools to predict and assess 
aggregate levels of adoption over time. However, a static view of technology 
resulted in a partial view of the complex process of technological diffusion. 
Although diffusion studies focused on the gap between initial predictions and actual 
mode and rate of adoption as a problem to be overcome, the SST perspective has 
rather highlighted the gap between the design and use by offering a stance to look 
into the complex interactions among the diverse factors and actors that shaped 
technology to particular use. Thus, the gap represented the inherent source for 
uncertainties and contingencies of technological innovation and use. Meanwhile, 
attempts to counteract such uncertainties accompanied efforts to explicate 
sociotechnical dynamics. Conceptual tools and frameworks including the CTA, 
SNM, and MLP have been much discussed and advanced with an aim of steering 
technological innovation and change. Despite the usefulness of these concepts and 
frameworks in tracing and explicating the process of innovation and diffusion, they 
fail to demonstrate effectiveness for their prescriptive use. The retrospective mode of 
describing the aggregate level of interactions refrains from observing individual-
level interactions, leading to choices that shape technologies and technological 
pathways. 
In the field of ICTs, the choices are often pursued through building alignments 
among diverse interests. Standardisation in ICTs highlights such tendencies, as 
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standards and standardisation are pursued to bring about compatibility and 
interoperability between technologies, components, operating systems, software, and 
more. This interoperability implies the need for coordination of multiple interests, 
while the coordination poses further challenges. Although alignment may be formed 
through standards, the standardisation process itself entails not only cooperation but 
also conflict and competition among those who pursue their particular aims and 
goals in the collective frame of the standard-setting process. Furthermore, 
implementation and use of standards brings challenges for aligning broader and 
much more diverse actors and settings towards particular choices. 
The social-learning framework lends insight to link supply-side dynamics (e.g., 
design) with that of the user side (e.g., use), by offering a cyclical model of the 
process involving design, development, implementation, and use. Although it 
highlights the gap between design and use, the gap represents a space to learn 
through the cyclical process of innovation, leading to societal embedding of new 
technological products and services. Innovation occurs through adoption, and thus 
through the process of diffusion. The analytical sphere offered by the social-learning 
framework brings attention to the mediating actions and choices negotiated through 
the cyclical process of design and use. These actions and choices can be further 
elaborated through the role of intermediaries and their interactions involved in 
bridging the domains of development and use. However, varying layers of supply 
and use can be examined in relation to ICTs, which bring further complexities and 
uncertainties in the implementation and use of technologies. Yet, the concept of the 
multilevel game enables mapping of diverging perceptions of the players involved in 
the process of intermediation. Therefore, not only the interactions leading to certain 
choices can be scrutinised, but also the perceptions linked to their past choices, 
present relations, and future outcomes may be examined. This broadens and deepens 
the scope of analysis whereas the broadened scope is mapped onto an emergent 
cognitive space that has been conceptualised as the development arena. The complex 
interactions leading to technological innovation and change may thus be examined 
through an analytical sphere of which the boundaries are not yet fixed but emerge 
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and evolve with the diverse linkages that are formed in the process of design, 
implementation, and use of emerging technologies. 
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Chapter 3. Research Design and Methodology 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter discusses the research design and methodology: how I designed the 
research to conduct the empirical study, what choices I made in research strategy and 
method, and how I collected and analysed the data. I delineate the process of 
designing and conducting the research and justify my choices. Justification of those 
choices also includes reviewing the strengths and weaknesses of the research design. 
Following the introduction, I discuss the research strategy along with the conceptual 
framework. The choice of research strategy has largely been guided by the SST 
perspective. SST provides the groundwork on which to carry out a detailed 
examination of the interactions among the actors and factors that co-shape the 
process of innovation and uptake of an emerging technology. The detailed 
examination is further guided by the conceptual framework built on an integrated 
view of interactions leading to standardisation and domestication of innovation 
through social learning. The methodological choice led to a single case study on the 
emergence and evolution of WiBro; I identify the specific case sites accordingly. 
The chapter then reviews the processes that led to choosing the methods of data 
collection as well as the process of collecting and analysing the data. Interviews 
follow a semi structured method to provide flexibility in the contents of the inquiry. 
For triangulation of data, interviews were accompanied by analysis of documents as 
well as observation of seminars and conferences where WiBro was largely addressed. 
The chapter ends by detailing the process of analysing the data with some reflections 
on difficulties encountered and how they were managed. 
3.2 Research Strategy and Methodology 
3.2.1. Research strategy and conceptual framework 
This research was inspired by the tradition of STS, and SST in particular 
(MacKenzie and Wajcman, 1985; Williams and Edge, 1996). The SST perspective 
guided me to examine the particular processes of innovation and uptake of an 
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emerging telecommunication technology by scrutinizing the interactions among the 
various actors and factors involved in the process. I investigated how actors at the 
selected research settings act, perceive, and engage themselves with their 
surroundings and the social world, and how this shapes and is shaped by their 
engagement with the process and the content of technological innovation. I 
especially considered meanings and interpretations and how they are constructed. 
For the research to capture meanings and interpretations the actors give to and take 
from the artefacts, I adopted qualitative methods involving close contact and 
interaction with participants in the study. Being a qualitative research, theory can be 
used as a ground for choosing the methodology and the epistemologies underlying 
the methodology (Crotty, 1998; Denzin and Lincoln, 2003). Rather than applying a 
single theory to designing the research, however, I employed a number of theoretical 
concepts and frameworks in science and technology studies to build a conceptual 
framework to guide the research. A conceptual framework is useful for delineating 
the main entity to be studied (Miles and Huberman, 1994). However, the study 
method may yet be rudimentary and may be refined and further developed along the 
empirical research. 
Based on a critical review of the literature, I developed a conceptual framework to 
study the process of design, development, and uptake of emerging 
telecommunication-technology standards and services. This research is built on three 
major theoretical frames, whilst the SST perspective serves as an overarching 
framework for the study. The conceptual framework brings together the dynamics of 
supply-side (e.g., alignments and competition) and user-side (e.g., domestication and 
appropriation) economics. Although supply-side and the user-side dynamics are 
conceptually divided into two separate domains, these are integrated by applying the 
concept of the development arena that holds together the interactions among 




Figure 1 Framework for the Study of WiBro. 
(Unless otherwise indicated, figures included in this dissertation were created by  
Jee Hyun Suh © University of Edinburgh 2014) 
I provide an integrated view of the interactions involved in the standardisation of 
ICTs and social learning in technological innovation. Activities linked to 
standardisation including coordination, alignment, and competition, observed vis-à-
vis the processes of domestication, intermediation, and multilevel games that 
constitute social learning in technological innovation. Through this approach, I 
examine the processes of design, development, and uptake of WiBro, leading to 
service evolution. Such a framework brings into view initial intentions of varying 
interests, their strategic alignments towards the development of an emerging 
standard and technology, as well as the shifting choices and relations towards the 
adoption. The framework thus guides the reader through a journey toward the 
evolution of next-generation telecommunication standards and services. 
Although it may have been ideal to consider the wide range of players, including 
developers, suppliers, and end-users, this research has sought to explore how this 
chain of actual and potential users were represented in the development process by 
focusing upon the nested chains of intermediate users such as network operators, 
application developers, and other service providers who made use of the 
technological components and systems of WiBro. This decision is due, in part, to the 
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limited scope of time and space given to this doctoral research, which gave little 
scope to focus down on the appropriation of the technology by ‘final 
users’/consumers in a context in which the main objective has been to observe and 
examine the varying choices that have shaped the WiBro technology, standard, and 
service. But more importantly, I seek to broaden the scope of what has often been 
regarded as supply-side dynamics. 
In the field of telecommunications, and in mobile communications in particular, a 
massive scale of infrastructural development and implementation is necessary, 
requiring vast investments and knowledge inputs from a diverse arrays of players. 
Although the dynamics involved in such processes have been widely studied by 
scholars in varying fields including technology and innovation studies as well as 
standardisation, these were often regarded as supply-side dynamics. This research 
employs a more flexible and dynamic view of these interactions by applying the 
concepts that describe not only the supplier but also the supplier and user relations 
and aligns the user dynamics with the interactions involved in the process of 
intermediate-level adoption of the WiBro technology and standard. 
3.2.2. Case study 
This research applies a case-study method that allows an in-depth examination of the 
subject matter in relation to its context (Yin, 2009). According to Yin (2009), a case 
study is “an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within 
its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and 
context are not clearly evident” (p.13). Further, Michell (1983) defined a case study 
as a “detailed examination of an event (or series of related events) which the analyst 
believes exhibits (or exhibit) the operation of some identified general theoretical 
principles” (p. 192). In this regard, the case-study method should be useful, as the 
research is based on an empirical inquiry that requires a detailed examination of the 
lifecycle event linked to the emergence and evolution of WiBro service. 
Yet, the aim of this research has been to bring a theoretical inference from the in-
depth study of WiBro, thereby contributing to knowledge about managing or 
addressing innovation and evolution of an emerging technology standard and service. 
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Generalisation through a case study, however, has been a debated issue among 
scholars. Although the case study has strength in terms of the depth and intensity of 
observation, the quantity of data about a particular case this is achieved at by 
limiting the numbers of cases. The method has often has been criticised on the 
grounds of its weaknesses in generalisation to a larger population (Blaikie, 2000; Yin, 
2009). However, other scholars have argued that the uniqueness of situations can 
offer the groundwork for logical inference or analytic generalisation (Donmoyer, 
2000; Gomm et al., 2000; Stake, 1998). Researchers under the tradition of social 
construction and SST have resorted to case studies that enabled them to bring about 
generalisations or general lessons in certain scopes through in-depth analyses of a 
single or a few observed cases (Russell and Williams, 2002). 
Following the key objective of this research study—examining how a collectively 
driven, large-scale technological innovation could meet or respond to evolving user 
evolvement—this study required a long time frame (more than ten years) to include 
the lifecycle of the technology from its birth to its evolution. It thus took on the 
characteristics of an in-depth single-case study. The rationale for a single case as the 
subject of this research was on the premise that the South Korean WiBro case is a 
unique case in that it allows the researcher to observe a phenomenon in relation to 
the particular history, policy, technology environment, and more. Furthermore, an in-
depth examination of the lifecycle of WiBro over time brings the case under the 
method of longitudinal study, such that changes in the participants in the study may 
be observed over time. Given the limited time and space for this doctoral research 
and thesis, the single unit of study in such a depth and length should better serve the 
purpose of this research, bringing findings that contribute to knowledge and possible 
interventions in real-life complex situations. 
3.2.3. The case selection 
To conduct the case study, I selected the single case of the emergence and evolution 
of WiBro; the definition of the case is equivalent to the unit of analysis (Yin, 2009) 
encompassing the process of design, development and uptake of an emerging 
telecommunication technology, and the evolution of technology-based services. The 
problem space is filled with varying interests including those of the manufacturers, 
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government, telecommunications-network operators, and application developers. I 
examined and analysed the interactions and relations among these players based on 
the conceptual framework discussed in the previous section. 
For analytical purposes, I divided the case into three domains according to the 
timeline of the emergence and evolution of WiBro service: the initial stage of design 
and development during 2001~2005; the commercialisation and service uptake 
during 2005~2009; and the evolution of WiBro services during 2009~2013/the 
present. I divided stages to reflect the processes of design and development, 
commercial system and service deployment, as well as the on-going evolution of 
WiBro services. However, such a division may be somewhat arbitrary, as I made that 
choice deliberately based on my view of the lifecycle of WiBro. In other words, the 
choice does not indicate that the design and development process ended in 2005. 
However, the year 2005 marks the end of the three year R&D project of High-speed 
Portable Internet (HPi). Also, the spectrum licensing for commercialisation of 
WiBro occurred in 2005. Thus the focus shifts from the stages of research and 
development to commercialisation, following the key incidents that occurred in the 
commercialisation. 
 
Figure 2 The case of the emergence and evolution of WiBro. 
 
3.2.4. Case sites 
The major contribution to technological development of WiBro came from the 
collaboration of a government research institute, ETRI (Electronics and 
Telecommunication Research Institute), Samsung, and the two major network 
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operators, Korea Telecom (KT) and SKT. Although technological development was 
carried out through a government coordinated R&D program that began as a three-
year initiative in 2002, WiBro service was further promoted through the 
government’s IT strategy project IT839 since 2004. The current WiBro service 
providers are SKT and KT, the two largest telecommunication service providers in 
Korea. Service providers at the level of applications and content have also taken part 
in attempts to bring out advanced WiBro services. Furthermore, standardisation has 
been closely linked to the development of the technology and the provision of 
services. Standardisation was carried out by Telecommunications Technology 
Association (TTA), whereas standardisation was later extended to international 
standard setting through the harmonisation of WiBro with the international standard 
for WiMAX. 
Based on this brief overview of WiBro, the sites for an in-depth case study of WiBro 
could be broadly categorised into four: i) Hardware Systems and Devices; 
ii) Standardisation; iii) Network and Platform Operation; and iv) Applications and 
Content Services. Key innovation players were mapped into relevant areas. The 
mapping, however, does not suggest clear cut boundaries in the players’ roles and 







Figure 3 Overview of case sites for WiBro. 
 
3.3 Data collection 
Supporting the use of case studies, scholars noted the importance and benefits of 
using multiple sources of evidence (Blaikie, 2000; Yin, 2009). Multiple sources of 
data collection included documents, archival records, interviews, observations (direct 
and participant), and structured interviews and surveys. For this case study on the 
emergence and evolution of WiBro in South Korea, data collection relied on 
documents from various sources including government and industry reports, archival 
records of news articles from 2001 to 2013, 25 semi structured interviews, and direct 
observation in conferences and meetings that directly addressed WiBro-related 
issues. Data triangulation enhances the validity of accounts of a particular 
phenomenon (Yin, 2009). The data from the multiple sources were triangulated to 
bring valid accounts of the emergence and evolution of WiBro technology as a 
mobile standard and mobile service. 
3.3.1. Semi structured interview 
Interviews are regarded as one of the most important sources of data in a case study. 
Well-informed and well-conducted interviews can provide insights into certain flows 
of events, as events are composed of human interactions (Yin, 2009). Furthermore, 
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interviews allow people to “share the world of others to find out what is going on, 
why people do what they do, and how they understand their worlds” (Rubin and 
Rubin, 1995, 195p). They may also lead to important sources of data that would not 
have been identified without insider’s knowledge and networks. Therefore, the 
primary goal for using the interview method is to gain insight into how and what 
people perceive, learn, adopt, exclude, compromise, or associate themselves with the 
external environment. For this case study in particular, it was important to discern 
how different players yielded differing perceptions, understanding, and learning with 
regard to a subject matter. The several ways to conduct interviews include structured, 
semi structured, and unstructured interviews. Although consistency is often sought 
through structured interviews that strictly standardise a set of questions, a case-study 
interview tends to be better placed with a degree of fluidity in the stream of 
questions (Rubin and Rubin, 1995; Yin, 2009). In a semi structured interview, a set 
of questions have been prepared beforehand to guide a consistent line of inquiry, but 
the questions do not strictly confine the scope of the interview. Therefore, I designed 
the interview questions for this case study to allow a degree of flexibility to the 
contents of interviews, while preparing a set of questions in advance to guide the line 
of inquiry during the interview. 
Interview design 
Interviews are an interactive process that take place only if there is a respondent who 
agrees to sit for an interview. This was a primary concern in gaining access to 
possible relevant interviewees. In the beginning, I made modest attempts to reach 
people who belonged to any of the case sites I had identified and mapped through 
personal contacts: friends, colleagues, and family. As most case sites represented 
major vendors in South Korea, it was not difficult to find a number of personal 
contacts who were either staff members themselves, working for vendors, or had 
some relationships with people in the companies and organisations. I arranged a 
couple of interviews through these contacts in the beginning. I then realised it would 
be important to gain access to people whose knowledge and experience were directly 
linked to the case of WiBro. Furthermore, although I assumed a snowball sampling 
would be ideal, interviewees were generally reluctant to introduce or recommend 
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others to be interviewed. Upon realising this, I began identifying potential 
interviewees from WiBro-related publications, newspapers, and government reports. 
I contacted those who were authors or key references by e-mail. Some replied with a 
positive response. Others had a negative response to interviewing due to certain job-
related reasons. Further, gaining access to key players in the field of WiBro was 
accompanied by some fortunate encounters while searching and contacting people. 
Through these processes, I interviewed 22 people, leading to 24 interviews. Among 
them, at least 15 could be regarded as key players in the field of WiBro who were 
exceptionally informative, as they were currently or had been actively involved in at 
least one area associated with WiBro. Interviews with these participants lasted 2 to 3 
hours. For others, interviews normally took an hour. I conducted interviews in 2009–
2010 and 2011–2012. As there were much fluctuation in corporate strategies and 
government policies during these years, it was important to trace the views of the 
players in relation to time. Yet, changing views were clearly revealed as I collected 
additional data and triangulated the information with other sources of data. I decided 
to keep all names confidential, but reveal the positions people held, for those who 
agreed. Twenty interviews were voice recorded whereas four participants either did 
not allow me to make a voice recording or their interviews took place in an informal 
setting. Where I did not make a voice recording, I wrote up the interview content 
during and immediately after the interview was completed. 
The interviews conducted in the field study are listed as follows: 
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Table 1 Interviews conducted for the case study 
Interviewee by Affiliation Position Field of Expertise1 Interview Date of interview 
Samsung Electronics Executive director Marketing 1 4 Mar 2010 
Samsung Electronics Head of dept. Mobile device 1 2 Sep 2009 
Samsung Electronics Manager Mobile device 1 2 Sep 2009 
Samsung Electronics Manager Mobile device 1 2 Sep 2009 
Samsung Electronics Senior researcher Standardisation 1 29 Sep 2009 
Samsung Electro- 
mechanics Deputy head System R&D 2 
16 Aug 2009/ 
12 Feb 2012 
ETRI Director System R&D 1 31 May 2010 
University (TTA)2 Professor (Head) Standardisation 1 15 Oct 2009 
KT Director Standardisation 1 16 Oct 2009 
KT Manager Network R&D 1 2 Apr 2010 
KT Assistant manager Network R&D 1 2 Apr 2010 
KT Senior researcher Network R&D 1 10 Sep 2009 
KT Director Marketing 1 27 May 2010 
SKT Director Corporate policy 1 13 Sep 2010 
RAPA3(Thrunet) Director (Director) Spectrum licensing 1 26 May 2011 
Department of 
Knowledge & Economy 
(MIC4) 
Secretary Government policy 1 14 Oct 2009 
National Assembly 
Research Service Head of Dept. Government policy 1 21 Dec 2012 
Hyundai Heavy Industry Head of Dept. Application 1 10 Feb 2010 
Hyundai Heavy Industry Deputy head Application 2 
5 Feb 2010 
10 Feb 2010 
Hyundai Heavy Industry Staff Application 1 10 Feb 2010 
Hyundai Motor Company Manager Application 1 19 May 2010 
MODACOM CTO Mobile device 1 15 Jul 2010 
SeAH(POSDATA)  (Chief engineer) System R&D 1 28 May 2010 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Field of expertise generally complies to the role or departments the interviewees belonged to while 
the fields were re-categorised by the researcher. 
2 Former affiliations and positions were written down in brackets. TTA stands for 
Telecommunications Technology Association. 
3 Korea Radio Promotion Association. 
4 Ministry of Information and Communication.	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22   24  
I prepared an interview guide of guiding questions in the beginning, prior to 
conducting interviews. I modified the guideline at least three times during the early 
stage of interviews, changing the questions, clarifying the questions as more 
interviews took place. Based on the guiding questions, I reselected and expanded the 
content of questions depending on the interviewee’s main area of expertise and 
interest. The following table shows the initial categories of questions and the list of 
questions that guided the interviews. 





- Introduction to interview 
- Would you please explain your current role? 
- What is your relation with WiBro? 
Organisation  
- What are your organisation’s roles with regard to WiBro? 
- How and when was your organisation first involved with WiBro? 
- What was the initial aim of your organisation with regard to WiBro? 
R&D 
- What area of R&D are you/your organisation involved in? 
- What were the key visions of WiBro, and what are they now? 
- What are your perspectives about the key drivers of R&D? 
- What are your perspectives about “home-grown” technology?  
Commercialisation 
- What were the attempts and interests of your organisation regarding the 
initial launch of commercial product/service? 
- How are your products/services being prepared and what are your 
strategies? 
- What is your perspective on the current mode of market adoption of 
WiBro? 
- How would you respond to the government’s “WiBro Vitalisation 
Policy”? 
Standardisation 
- How is your or your organisation’s role related to standardisation? 
- What are your perspectives on standardisation of WiBro/IEEE802.16e? 
- How would you describe the relationship between WiBro and Mobile 
WiMAX(IEEE802.16e)? 
- Have you participated in any of the standard setting meetings (e.g. TTA, 
IEEE, WiMAX Forum, ITU) and what were your experiences? 
Technology & Service 
Evolution 
- How is WiBro technology/service evolving? 
- What is your/your organisation’s present and near future plan regarding 
WiBro service? 
- How do you expect WiBro technologies/service will evolve and why? 
- What are your perspectives on the role of government with regard to 





Seeking and matching relevant interviewees was not an easy process, yet 
interviewing various people who work in different fields of expertise and have 
differing views required careful planning and sensible decisions on what to ask and 
how to ask. However, much of this skill was acquired through the process of 
interviewing, especially by reflecting on previous interviews. Interviewing is a 
conversation involving questioning, listening, and answering in a dynamic and 
iterative process (Rubin and Rubin, 1995; Warren, 2002). The iterative process 
involved ongoing feedback and adjustment. However, when interviewing people 
around the issue of WiBro, of foremost importance was to discern participants’ 
views aligned with the turbulence of the rapidly changing environment of 
telecommunications. 
Most interviews took place in 2009–2010, when expectations about the evolution of 
WiBro technology and standard were further heightened, yet faced with varying 
challenges in the commercial domestic market of WiBro. WiBro was generally being 
weighed against two different values: the commercial uptake of WiBro service in the 
domestic market, and its ongoing success in international standardisation and its 
future outlook as the fourth-generation technology standard. Because of its low 
market diffusion, questions ensued about WiBro about past, present, and future 
decisions: What caused the low adoption rate of WiBro? and What are the policy 
measures for driving the diffusion of WiBro? However, these societal issues were 
hotly debated, I sensed these questions should not be asked directly during the 
interviews. It also seemed important as an interviewer to keep a neutral stance 
toward the debated issue. Although having a “neutral” stance in interviewing is also 
a debated matter in qualitative methodology (Holstein and Gubrium, 2004; Rapley, 
2001), I tried to resolve this problem by focusing interview contents on interviewees’ 
areas of expertise and knowledge. However, I refrained from using some key terms 
such as “low diffusion” and “failure of WiBro” to avoid bringing the interview to a 
mode of debate. 
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My identity as a student seemed to carry more advantage than disadvantage in 
delving into matters that were most actively debated. Although interviewees seemed 
to be careful about the subject of inquiry, they tended to greet a student who wanted 
to learn about WiBro. Some clearly stated they were willing to help a student 
although WiBro carried some sensitive issues in corporate strategy. As this research 
addressed issues related to varying fields including research and development, 
standardisation, policy and the market, it was indeed helpful to discern their views 
and perspectives without having a particular affiliation that could limit the scope of 
inquiry and their answers. The strength of collecting data through interviews was 
increasingly realised as the interviews progressed. 
The iterative process of learning through interviews included bringing knowledge 
and information from other sources to make the learning process more productive. 
This was done by building up a chronological order of events related to WiBro, 
based on news articles published online during the period 2001–2010. I followed up 
with the news beyond 2011 as the research process continued. Because the case 
study focused on a contemporary topic, I benefited a great deal from being able to 
meet the participants of the ongoing development and commercialisation of WiBro, 
as well as those who had taken an active role in the near past. Also, I interpreted the 
interviewees’ sincere responses and involvement in often time-consuming interviews 
as reflecting their concerns about the past, present, and future of WiBro and beyond, 
based on each person’s knowledge, expertise, and occupation. 
3.3.2. Documents and news archives 
In this study of WiBro, documents were quite an important source of data, especially 
to increase the reliability of the methods by triangulating the data (Yin, 2009). I 
collected documents from various sources including Internet websites, online 
databases provided by government institutes, and national libraries. The National 
Library of Korea in particular, has been a key data-collection site, particularly for 
government publications. A few important publications, especially those about the 
early stages of WiBro development, were unavailable as online documents and could 
be accessed by visiting the National Library of Korea. 
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The initial gateway to document sources, however was the Internet. Using the major 
search engines of the Internet, I found and bookmarked WiBro-related websites, 
webpages, formal reports, and informal articles such as blogs. By first reviewing 
these data, I gradually gained information on WiBro and initiated more focused 
searches as I acquired knowledge about WiBro. I searched for and identified 
documents that help build more credibility for the information I had initially 
gathered. If informally written information seemed important, such as official 
records of related issues or events, I searched and collected them. I collected 
documents in three categories: government reports including reports published by 
government institutes, official documents and articles provided by the industry, and 
special-section journal articles mainly addressing key issues of WiBro. I describe 
these in detail below. 
Official reports from the Government and Government Institutes 
I collected officially published WiBro policy reports and research reports from 
government websites as well as websites of major institutions including the 
Electronics and Telecommunications Research Institute (ETRI) and the Korean 
Information Society Development Institute (KISDI). ETRI and KISDI played key 
roles in yielding information on WiBro-related issues including the future prospects 
of WiBro service, spectrum licensing policy, and promotion of WiBro 
commercialisation. ETRI reports were focused on economic analysis of future 
prospects of WiBro service, linked to the R&D activities carried out by R&D 
departments at ETRI. KISDI’s reports related more to issues for policy making; its 
research outcomes were generally used to make policy decisions at the level of the 
Ministry of Information and Communication, and later, the Korea Communication 
Commission, after the restructuring of the government organisation. Earlier official 
documents on the initial conceptualisation of WiBro during the years 2001 and 2002 
were accessed in the National Library of Korea in onsite visits. 
Industry reports and society journal articles 
Industry reports comprised a small portion of document data. Industry reports that 
could be accessed online were only those reports published by consultation firms and 
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banks. However, two major organisations published opinions and plans by industry 
members related to the development and commercialisation of WiBro: the Korean 
Institute of Communications and Information Sciences (KICS) and TTA. KICS is a 
journal society in the field of ICTs. In particular, key documents related to industry 
plans for spectrum licensing have been very valuable in this research, collected from 
the journal database of this organisation. KICS-published journals include a number 
of publications related to WiBro, and the organization held major conferences on 
WiBro. TTA is a nongovernment and nonprofit organisation for ICT standardisation, 
a key standard-setting organisation in South Korea. TTA publishes reports and 
journals on standardisation in addition to organising standard-setting meetings and 
many other domestic and international activities related to standardisation. Articles 
on WiBro standardisation written by the members from the industry could be 
accessed on TTA websites. 
News archives 
Although the major issues of WiBro could be studied through reports and journal 
articles, it was indeed important to follow up with the general history of WiBro. 
Although the empirical case study of this research began in 2009, initiation of WiBro 
dates back to 2001, the year when the initial report on conceptualising WiBro 
technology was published. To track down the history of WiBro, I collected news 
articles from two major news publishers on telecommunications: The Digital Times  
and The Electronic News . Initially, I searched articles at each online news site using 
several key words relevant to WiBro: Portable Internet (the former name of WiBro), 
IEEE802.16e, and WiBro. However, not only did search results number beyond the 
scope of this research, but also it was too time consuming to consider reviewing and 
selecting the articles that would meet the purpose of the search. Thus, instead of 
directly searching the original news sites, I used the database of electronic 
technology-related news provided by the Electronics Information Center operated by 
Korean Electronics Technology Institute. During the fieldwork, I retrieved more than 
900 news articles, searching on the keywords WiBro and Portable Internet. Based on 
the articles, I put major decisions, events, and activities related to WiBro in 
chronological order. Through this process, I prepared a chronicle of WiBro that 
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played a crucial role in this research, providing an overall history of WiBro 
including activities, policy decisions, and events held by key innovation players from 
the beginning of the conceptualisation of the technology and service. I updated it 
continuously over time to include the current news and events related to WiBro. 
Thus, it was a key source for getting information and knowledge about current 
situations and trends of WiBro-related issues during the research. For accuracy, I 
triangulated information on important events and decisions with other documents 
and newspaper articles. 
3.3.3. Observation in symposiums and conferences 
Another key method for collecting data was a form of direct observation by 
attending meetings and conferences where the issues of WiBro were directly 
addressed by key innovation players. During 2009–2011, WiBro was one of the key 
issues in the evolution of mobile technologies and mobile services. Issues were also 
addressed through public conferences, symposiums, and seminars. Following is the 
list of conferences and seminars that were particularly relevant to my research and 
that provided helpful resources. 
Table 3 List of conferences and meetings attended for research 
Event name Date Organised by 
Next-generation Mobile Communication 
Technology and Industry Trend Seminar 20 August, 2009 
Korea Electronics Technology 
Institute (KETI) 
The 3rd Communication Vision 24 September, 2009 MegaNews, ZDNet Korea 
4G Communication Technology Core 
Technology and Evolution Strategy 
Symposium 
29 October, 2009 
Korea Institute of 
Communications and 
Information Sciences (KICS) 
The 4th WiBro Convergence Service 
Technology Workshop 4-5 March, 2010 
Korea Institute of 
Communications and 
Information Sciences (KICS) 
The 5th Communication Vision: Outlook 
on the changes in Mobile Ecosystem and 
Business in the 4G era 
27 September, 
2011 MegaNews, ZDNet Korea 
 
I was invited to two meetings by two interviewees they thought would be relevant 
for my topic of interest. The meetings primarily addressed issues related to WiBro. 
At these sites, key industry players publicised their current and future strategies. 
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Oftentimes panel discussions also provided valuable sites for observation. Panels 
were comprised of speakers from key vendors, operators, and government institutes 
that were deeply involved in the development and the commercialisation of WiBro. 
Discussions were normally led by a convener, asking a set of questions to the panel; 
responses led to other responses and active discussions. Questions were also asked 
from the floor and answered by the relevant panelists. I tape recorded, transcribed, 
and translated panel discussions; the data provided valuable information and insights 
about the players from varying fields. 
3.4 Analysis of Data 
3.4.1. The process 
The process of analysing the data began with the interview and observation data that 
were normally recorded, transcribed, and translated from Korean to English. To 
retain feelings and senses from the original interviews, I kept Korean versions side 
by side with English versions as I coded. As I collected the primary data through 
interviews, symposiums, and conferences, I transcribed data on the day of the event. 
While reading the transcript, I also noted nuances such as a particular term or a 
particular moment, sites for further inquiry, and evaluative comments. This was a 
process of brainstorming from the data before placing them into a form appropriate 
for structured analysis such as coding and categorising. 
The process of analysing the data did not follow any strict form of data analysis, as 
there was no clear rule that directs and guides the analysis of qualitative data 
(Spencer et al., 2003). The analysis, however, was heavily involved in a conceptual 
process and thus resembled the method of grounded theory (Turner, 1981). Several 
rounds of applying concepts and categories to data took place that would have 
represented the process of coding. A sequence of the process follows: 
1. Prior to entering into the process of coding, all the data collected from the 
interviews and observations were put into one place: a single file that 
would allow a continuous flow of data, yet unaltered by additional 
categorisation, other than their original boundaries, as individual 
interviews or observations. I highlighted parts of data, wherever 
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comments were added. I read these data several times, adding and editing 
my comments. This served as a brainstorming process which prepared me 
for coding. 
2. Then, I coded the highlighted parts by applying certain labels, concepts, 
or categories. Many of these reflected the concepts from the theories on 
which the conceptual framework had been built, as well as the research 
questions. Where an immediate application of these conceptual labels and 
categories seemed inadequate, I included a simple description or 
summarising term. 
3. The third process involved what Dey (1993) explained as the process of 
classification. The labels, concepts, and categories coding were 
recategorised into fewer groups. Such a grouping required a careful 
recategorisation process so as not only to meet certain criteria for 
allocating data, but also to place categories in certain directions in my 
mind. This was a complex iterative process as the direction itself was also 
being formed through categorising, although it was also guided by the 
research framework and the research questions. 
During this process I did not directly include the data from the documents. The 
documents however, provided context to devise interview questions and relate the 
answers to certain contexts. Once the categorisation of the data was completed, I 
used the documents data as important resources to further enhance clarity and 
validity in the logical flow of analysis. 
Documents included government policy reports such as whitepapers published by 
the former Ministry of Information and Communication, project reports submitted to 
the government by the organisations that had undertaken WiBro-related research 
projects, industry reports, and TTA and KICS journal articles that served as 
important resources for industry strategies. The contents of these documents could 
be regarded as “social facts” that “are produced, shared and used in socially 
organized ways … and construct particular kinds of representations with their own 
conventions” (Atkinson & Coffeey, 1997, 47p). Thus, although many of the “social 
 
 61 
facts” were contained in documents, they were triangulated with other sources of 
data to build the credibility of the findings of the case study. Furthermore, the 
documents were particularly helpful in analysing the changes in various aspects of 
WiBro over a little longer than a decade’s time. The contents reflected the particular 
state of time, marked by their publication dates, and in some aspects, they were more 
reliable than some retrospections made by interviewees about past incidents. 
Nonetheless retrospective comments by interviewees were credible. Oftentimes, 
interviewees’ comments on past incidents and about the changes they acknowledged 
had the powerful role of confirming what could have only been conjectured through 
documents. 
3.4.2. Reflections and managing difficulties 
Studying a contemporary issue undergoing continuous, yet rapid changes in its status 
made it difficult to see at which point the data analysis should stop. One of my main 
interests in the research had been to observe how WiBro service developed along the 
evolving technologies and society as a whole. It was difficult to discern when and 
how the research could be detached from the field for the complete analysis of the 
field data. Rather, the data analysis seemed to be continuously influenced by the 
incoming data, even until late 2012. Although formal data collection was completed 
by 2011, major events were still occurring during 2012 and 2013 – although much 
infrequently than before - that seemed to have a degree of impact on the evolution of 
WiBro service. Inclusion of these latest data would indeed make a significant 
difference to the research; I took them for further analysis and wrote the last section 
of this thesis based on the analysis. 
In fact, the “end” or “outcome” of WiBro was an issue from the inception of the 
project. From 2009 on, many had already concluded that WiBro was a “failed” 
technology, successful in its development yet failed in commercialisation. Many 
interviewees during 2009 and 2010 were interested in seeing this research on WiBro 
play a role in either finding the causes for the failure of a large-scale government-
driven technological innovation or in suggesting the direction for future innovation 
policy. During the process of analysing data, it was indeed difficult to justify keeping 
the research stance away from the largely presumed “result” of WiBro. It was by 
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strengthening the theoretical framework and making it more robust through data 
analysis that the research could overcome the dominant discourse on the failure of 
WiBro. 
The following quote seems to suggest the value of research that does not share a 
common ground for the search but seeks to find a coherent set of relations and 
interactions: 
The goal is not to produce a standardized set of results that any other careful 
researcher in the same situation or studying the same issues would have 
produced. Rather it is to produce a coherent and illuminating description of 
and perspective on a situation that is based on and consistent with detailed 
study of that situation. 
(Ward-Schofield, 1993, 202) 
Many potential readers of this thesis may indeed be seeking findings that may be 
rather generalisable to their concerned field of interest. Thus, I shall seek the 
juncture to eventually communicate with these potential readers about the findings 
and the implications of this research. 
3.5 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I discussed various choices that led to designing and conducting this 
research, from the choice of its theoretical grounding and research scope to various 
methodological choices. Both conscious choices and a degree of serendipity have 
shaped the path for the research. Therefore, this research design has been the result 
of choices shaped through the process of this research. 
The general framework for this research design was built on the SST perspective, 
which guided the detailed examination of the process of emergence and evolution of 
WiBro technology standards and service. Conducting a single case study provided 
the width (length of time) and depth (detailed examination) of this research and has 
thus enabled me to explore the complex dynamics of the process involving the 
design and the appropriation of the emerging technology of WiBro. 
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A single-case study may have inherent weaknesses that may be practically applicable 
to the current concerns linked to the case of WiBro. However, this research design 
has been primarily aimed at explicating unrecognized dynamics while seeking to link 
what could be observed to enhancing understanding about the co-shaping of 
technology and society. 
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Chapter 4. Emerging arenas of coordination towards technological 
innovation and change 
 4.0 Introduction 
This chapter discusses emerging arenas of coordination towards technological 
innovation and change. Emerging arenas are observed through the lens of the social 
shaping of technology (SST) perspective, which offers a basis to observe the 
complex interplays and evolving relations among the diverse array of players. The 
term arena, in a sense, alludes to the ‘development arena’ (Jorgensen and Sorensen, 
1999; Jørgensen and Sørensen, 2002) that “holds together the settings and relations 
that comprise the context for product or process development” (Jørgensen and 
Sørensen, 2002, 198p). It is a cognitive space where a number of actors and factors 
are involved in dispersed activities that reflect the relational, unstable, and 
heterogeneous character of the space. In this thesis, emerging arenas involve various 
interactions and relations that lead to the design and the development of an emerging 
wireless broadband technology, WiBro (Wireless Broadband)5 in South Korea. The 
scope of an arena has been extended beyond a metaphor that implies a single 
physical location, to encompass a number of linked sub-arenas that emerge through 
interactions among diverse players with differing backgrounds and knowledges 
towards a particular vision or visions. The process of formation and the evolution of 
a development arena of WiBro is thus explicated through the emergence of sub-
arenas that evolve to together constitute the development arena of WiBro. 
WiBro emerged as one of the key candidates for a next generation mobile 
communication technology and service around the early 2000s in South Korea, 
especially marked by features directed towards the transition to fixed and mobile 
convergence in telecommunications. The dissertation as a whole looks into the 
dynamics involved in the process of the design and development towards the 
commercial uptake and the evolution of the emerging communication technology 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 WiBro was originally named Portable Internet. MIC changed the name to WiBro meaning 
Wireless Broadband, as it was promoted through its innovation policy in 2004. Throughout 
the thesis, names correspond to the time of its use. Thus, Portable Internet is used during 
2001–2004, WiBro from 2004 on. 
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and services. This chapter mainly focuses on the initial formation of the momentum 
that enabled and evolved towards the development and the uptake of an innovative 
technology. Momentum is observed through a processual approach that follows a 
series of interactions among the involved actors and factors. In particular, the 
emergence and shaping of alignments are observed as they are coordinated and 
evolve through a particular path of technological innovation. The term alignment 
describes the coming together of and forming close relations and interactions among 
the players in pursuit of a particular vision or visions. Alignment has been used by 
Molina (1997) along the concept of sociotechnical alignment to denote a process 
involving interactions of technical and social factors and actors, of which quality and 
effectiveness become the key factors for successful technological implementation 
(Molina, 1997, 604p). However, in this research, the term alignment does not 
necessarily imply such normative means for successful technology implementation, 
whereas its impacts may be pursued at the level of individuals who pursue 
alignments. The processual approach to WiBro case rather demonstrates 
incompleteness of an alignment: an alignment that is formed and sustained through 
multiple players while their immediate goals and commitments vary. Alignment thus 
denotes a form of strategic relations and interactions which evolve as players adapt 
to and learn through complex and contingent processes of technological innovation. 
This chapter is comprised of three main sections, each examining the coordination of 
alignments that have emerged and evolved through interactions among diverse actors 
and factors towards the development of an emerging telecommunications technology 
in the early 2000s in South Korea. The first section examines the dynamics that led 
to the initial conceptualisation of the technology through the shaping of spectrum use 
in the 2.3GHz frequency band. The second section observes the initiation of a large-
scale national R&D program in which WiBro system technologies were designed 
and developed. In the third section, an emergence and the shaping of WiBro standard 
is examined as it coevolves in relation to other emergent arenas of spectrum and 
R&D, as well as extended relations towards global standardisation. 
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4.1 The reshaping of spectrum use: The 2.3GHz frequency band 
The story of WiBro begins with the rapid diffusion of fixed-line broadband Internet 
in South Korea around the year 2001. The number of subscribers for the fixed-line 
broadband Internet increased from 370,000 in 1999 to 4,020,000 in 2000, and to 
7,810,000 in 2001, exceeding ten million subscribers by October 2002 (MIC, 2002, 
p17). The rapid diffusion of fixed-line broadband Internet and its use gave rise to the 
industry’s demand for wireless data-communications services, whereas the trend 
outlook suggested gradual shifts from voice to data, and from wire-line to wireless 
services. An ultimate vision was then the convergence of fixed-line and the wireless6 
(MIC, 2002, p18). 
The reshaping of the spectrum in the 2.3GHz frequency band occurred in such 
exigencies of the telecommunications market and industry in South Korea. The 
spectrum in the 2.3GHz frequency band, which had low use, was problematic, and 
was redesigned for other uses to raise the level of efficiency and finally reallocated 
to Portable Internet (WiBro) use. This section delineates the process of such 
reshaping of the spectrum in the 2.3GHz frequency band; the process led to the 
conceptualisation of an emerging wireless broadband service along the regulatory 
decision, upon reallocation. First, the chapter discusses the process of interactions 
among various players that led to the emergence of coordinated alignments towards 
the shaping of the 2.3GHz frequency band. Second, it examines how the generic 
vision of WiBro was shaped through interactions among involved actors. Third, it 
further observes the conflicts and disputes among differing interests and how they 
were addressed. 
4.1.1. Initiation of a coordinated arena 
The dominant service in the ‘wireless’ market had then been the mobile telephony, 
whereas issues related to wireless LAN-based Internet access were slowly arising 
and driving changes in certain regulatory and industrial fields of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 In the Report (MIC 2002), the term wireless in Korean largely denoted mobile 
communications while including the wireless LAN. 
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telecommunications.7 The wireless LAN-based Internet operated on the 2.4GHz 
frequency band. The International Telecommunications Union Radio communication 
Sector (ITU-R) defined the band as relegated to industrial, scientific and medical 
(ISM) applications. In Korea, commercial wireless LAN-based Internet access 
services were officially launched in 2002 as the Ministry of Information and 
Communication (MIC)8 allowed for the unlicensed operation of commercial wireless 
Internet service by telecommunications service providers in June 2001. 
Subsequently, major broadband carriers, including KT and Hanaro Telecom, began 
preparing for commercial wireless LAN-based Internet services on the 2.4GHz ISM 
band. Yet, Thrunet,9 then the third largest fixed-line broadband carrier in the market, 
initiated a plan for a new wireless business addressing certain limits and challenges 
on the ISM band. Thrunet’s intention was to overcome the limits of the existing 
wireless LAN service and provide wider coverage of wireless Internet access with 
higher performance(Chung and Lee, 2002). It was expected to complement fixed-
line broadband Internet access service while leading to the generation of new 
revenue with fixed mobile convergence (Back, 2001). In pursuit of such advanced 
wireless LAN-based Internet service, Thrunet searched for an available frequency 
band, which ultimately led to the request for reallocation of a poorly used frequency 
band adjacent to the currently available ISM band (Interview with former team 
leader at Thrunet, 26 May 2011). 
In line with an attempt to secure a new spectrum band, Thrunet raised an issue to the 
government about the inefficient use of the spectrum resource at the 2.3GHz 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 The Korean government, Ministry of Information and Communication allowed for 
commercial wireless Internet service in the unlicensed ISM band after a degree of debate on 
the possible use of the band by telecommunications network operators. 
(http://www.etnews.com/news/detail.html?id=200106260260 ) 
8 The Ministry of Information and Communication (MIC) and Korean Broadcasting 
Commission (KBC) were later consolidated to form the Korea Communications 
Commission (KCC) in 2008. This thesis has followed the names of the organisation in 
accordance with the corresponding dates. 
9Thrunet was the first high-speed Internet service provider in South Korea, starting service 
in July 1997 followed by trial service in November 1996. Thrunet merged with Hanaro 
Telecom on 1st January 2006. The interviewee served his position as a team leader in 
Thrunet until he moved to Korea Radio Promotion Association (RAPA) in 2003. 
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frequency band that had been allocated for Wireless Local Loop (WLL) 10 service. 
Although the 2.3GHz band was already in use, the band had attracted Thrunet’s 
attention for a number of reasons. These were openly mentioned by an interviewee 
who had been involved in the initial stages of conceptualising WiBro. First, unlike 
the ISM band, only a small shift of 100MHz towards the licensed 2.3Ghz band 
would allow wireless access to Internet with high-powered, low-cost wireless LAN 
equipment. Second, there was additional space of 40MHz available in the 2.3GHz 
band, which had been set as the guard band between the bands allocated to KT and 
Hanaro Telecom. Thrunet could have aimed at this guard band. Third, despite the 
spectrum being an invaluable resource for radio communications, the 2.3Ghz 
spectrum band was being underused, as the actual market demand for the WLL 
service had been quite low. Fourth, it seemed the 2.3GHz band was relatively higher 
band than those preferred by mobile operators, thereby carrying little possibility of 
unnecessary competition with mobile operators (Interview with former team leader at 
Thrunet, 26 May 2011). 
Having been attracted for a number of reasons, Thrunet first submitted a document 
in the form of a civil complaint, raising an issue of inefficient use of the frequency 
band (Interview with former team leader at Thrunet, 26 May 2011). The focus was 
on the spectrum resource being far too wasted by WLL service, which had secured 
only a small number of households as subscribers to the service. The interviewee 
from Thrunet recalled as follows: 
KT and Hanaro were using 60MHz and there was the 40MHz guardband. We 
could have asked for the 40MHz since KT, Hanaro, and Thrunet were the 
three major broadband carriers, and Thrunet was the only one that had no 
spectrum resource allocated. However, we thought only 130 households 
using the 100MHz bandwidth wasted the spectrum, and requested that the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 WLL had been offering wireless service between the subscriber and the landline telephone 
network—the public switched telephone network (PSTN)—thereby bringing efficiency to 
the deployment and the implementation of the fixed-line network. However, WLL service 
was limited to voice and low-speed data communications, which made its use less viable for 
wide diffusion in the mass market due to the already saturated market for telephones as well 
as the emergence of advanced high-speed network systems and services including ADSL 
and CATV (MIC 2001, 4p). 
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spectrum be returned and reallocated. … I think it was around July 2001, we 
submitted a document in a form of a civil complaint to the government. It 
was a bit risky to do that, as a telecommunications service provider to submit 
such a document and request to the government to reallocate the spectrum. 
Anyway, we did, and it was reviewed through research groups. … At that 
time, the officer in charge of spectrum at MIC had a great interest in this, and 
he suggested that a research group be formed and seriously go over the 
matter and carry out research on how to make efficient use of the spectrum. 
(Interview with former team leader at Thrunet, 26 May 2011) 
Initial alignment was thus formed between Thrunet and MIC towards considering the 
regulatory decision on the use of the 2.3GHz frequency band. Yet, Thrunet’s main 
interest was in securing the spectrum resource whereas MIC’s objective had been to 
enhance efficiency of spectrum use. 
Upon MIC’s approval in reconsidering the existing use of the 2.3GHz band, a 
research group was organised through and facilitated by the Korean Radio 
Promotion Agency (RAPA)11 whose main role included ensuring and promoting 
effective use of radio resources, based on the Korean Radio Act for efficient 
management and promotion of the radio spectrum. MIC had an advisory role 
whereas participants were relevant industry players including KT, Hanaro Telecom, 
Thrunet, and system manufacturers. The research group was given the role of raising 
suggestions on possible ways to promote efficient use of the 2.3GHz frequency band. 
Yet, the research group was immediately divided into two groups: one group 
comprised of existing 2.3GHz band license holders for WLL service: KT, Hanaro 
telecom, and a WLL system manufacturer, LG Electronics; the other group included 
Thrunet and wireless LAN-related system manufacturers. As the report commented, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Korea Radio Promotion Association(RAPA) was founded in 1990 based on Korea Radio 
Legislation Act #66. RAPA is a legal entity representing affiliated members of the Korean 
Radio Industry. RAPA works with businesses, academics, institutes and government 
agencies on various fields including R&D and technology standardization, and has a great 
role in supporting the government in making its radio-related policies by providing relevant 




the separation of the research group into two differing discussion groups was 
intended to efficiently reach a resolution between the two differing positions in the 
short period of 2.5 months (MIC, 2001a). In fact, the two groups represented 
incumbent fixed broadband carriers whose positions and concerns differed to a 
degree. KT and Hanaro Telecom were keen to secure their existing rights on the use 
of the 2.3GHz band whereas Thrunet was trying to enter the licensed band. However, 
the task of the research group was to provide a unified optimal solution to bring 
about efficient use of the 2.3GHz frequency band spectrum. 
Each group had six consecutive meetings during which two different proposals were 
prepared. At the seventh meeting, the separately prepared proposals were merged to 
produce formal recommendations by the search-project group. The recommendations 
did not produce a concrete vision of the service to be implemented in the 2.3GHz 
frequency band. However, they suggested the basic framework for a next-generation 
telecommunications service on which the fixed broadband carriers came to agree. 
Recommendations included the following: i) the use of the band should not be 
limited to voice and low-speed data service, but needed to be extended and transition 
towards high-speed data service, including voice; ii) the system should enable semi 
mobile12 service, whereas the technical solutions should include Time-Division 
Duplex (TDD) to enhance spectrum efficiency (MIC, 2001a, 72p). 
4.1.2. The negotiated space: Towards the shaping of a generic vision 
The recommendations produced by the research group were a partial vision of future 
wireless service, incomplete in the conceptualisation of new wireless service that 
would bring about efficient use of the 2.3GHz band. In fact, the competing 
perspectives of the existing license holders and Thrunet had not yet been fully 
reconciled, despite the recommendations reached as a result of the coordination of 
the research project through RAPA. Thrunet was the third-largest fixed broadband 
carrier, yet it had not secured any spectrum resources through a license. Thrunet’s 
main intention was thus to seek a licensed spectrum band for its use on the existing 
wireless LAN standard. Such a path seemed to Thrunet as the most cost-effective, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 ‘Semimobile’ service would allow limited mobility to the end-user terminals up to the 
vehicle speed of 20Km/h (MIC 2001, 51p). 
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practical, and immediate solution for offering more advanced, high-performance 
wireless Internet access service. More importantly, it would lead to what they 
regarded as fixed-mobile convergence. 
We went with this concept in the beginning. Fixed line broadband (in Korea) 
was the world’s best. The backbone network had been implemented in 
double or triple layers that it could have been too much of a waste. But with 
regard to the wireless network, mobile communications could provide only a 
kilo bps data rate, whereas even this wasn’t properly used, due to the high 
cost of use. So if we provided the last-mile solution by connecting AP to the 
backbone network, this could be one way of fixed-wireless convergence. 
(Interview with former team leader at Thrunet, 26 May 2011) 
However, KT and Hanaro’s approaches were different. They were the current license 
holders of the frequency band as well as the leading broadband carriers whose 
interests lay in securing their license rights by conforming to the government’s 
intention, while suggesting a service that would shed light on the future fixed-line 
broadband industry. KT, the nation’s leading fixed-broadband carrier entered the 
coordinated arena of the 2.3GHz frequency band with the following intention: 
KT was centered on fixed-wire business. So there had always been the 
potential necessity for going towards the wireless business. At that time there 
existed a technology or service called BWLL—2.3GHz Broadband Wireless 
Local Loop. It was kind of a wireless high-speed Internet as a kind of 
substitute for wire-line high-speed Internet. KT was providing the service. 
But the usage was low. There was only a small number of subscribers. The 
government probably thought it was a waste of spectrum. So instead of idling 
the BWLL band, WiBro … a wireless technology using advanced 
technologies such as OFDM [was introduced]. KT played a leading role in 
suggesting to the government the technology initially named Portable 
Internet. 
(Interview with Director at KT, 27 May 2010) 
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KT, as the incumbent largest fixed-wired broadband carrier, was indeed more keen 
on securing the spectrum for advanced wireless service that would lead to future 
fixed-mobile convergence. Although the three leading fixed broadband carriers’ 
interests were aligned towards expanding and initiating the wireless business, their 
interests did not fully coincide in the methods of using the spectrum. KT and Hanaro 
Telecom wished to bring the spectrum for advanced yet more challenging service 
with enhanced mobility that would lead to the next generation of fixed-mobile 
convergence service, whereas the current licensees of the frequency band and 
leading fixed-broadband carriers KT and Hanaro Telecom were more inclined 
towards a service conceptualized and proposed as the ‘Next-generation fixed-mobile 
Convergence System’ (MIC, 2001b, p36). The concept of the Next-generation 
Fixed-mobile Convergence System was a technology solution based on an IP 
(Internet Protocol) network where the data packets would be transmitted along the IP. 
Also, limited mobility could be provided through portable terminals. Using TDD as 
the transmission scheme, the maximum transmission speed would be between 
2~5Mbps (MIC, 2001a). 
Although Thrunet’s vision had initiated the dialogue for better use of the 2.3GHz 
band, differences and opposition to the initial envisioning of the spectrum’s use 
emerged during the course of reshaping of the spectrum band: 
The initial business proposal we had in mind began with the thought that 
there was no wireless high-speed data service, despite the presence of a wire-
line high-speed network. At that time, 2G could only provide some Kbps 
speed. It could only enable messaging service. We suggested we go with the 
service model based on IEEE802.11b. At that time, even IEEE802.11a had 
not been completed. … The system cost was low, and if we could shift just 
100MHz towards 2.3GHz there would be no problem with radio frequency. If 
operators could use this, we could bring the low-powered wifi system to 
high-powered (low-power meant 10MW per MHz, which could be used 
without the government’s permission). Then, existing AP could be used for 
indoor use, and for outdoor use high-power systems could be implemented to 
provide extended coverage up to 300 to 400 meters, whereas the low-power 
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system permits only around 100-meter coverage. The fixed-line high-speed 
network had been very nicely built with optical cables and others, but people 
still had the inconvenience of having to find the wire-line all the time. As a 
solution to the inconvenience in the ‘last mile,’ we proposed the service 
while positioning it as ‘nomadic’ type, enabling wireless access to the 
Internet at a speed range still to the low speed of a moving vehicle such as 
buses. In the beginning this was quite persuasive. But Hanaro and KT’s 
thoughts were different. Because they had the license to the frequency band 
they wanted to bring the service further towards the mobile communications. 
They thought low-tier service would not be very helpful and thought they 
should approach high-tier service. Differing positions began to emerge then. 
(Interview with former team leader at Thrunet, 26 May 2011) 
Going towards wireless had provided a common thread among the fixed-broadband 
carriers, yet how to pursue this drew differing concerns: the thread had been linked 
to different histories, backgrounds, positions, and visions towards the future. 
Although the initial research on the use of the 2.3GHz band had produced a partial 
agreement on what the incumbent fixed-broadband carriers regarded as future 
wireless service, a consecutive research group was formed in RAPA with additional 
participants. This time the research group included not only the fixed-line broadband 
carriers but also the mobile operators, public research institute, system vendors, and 
academics. The coordinated arena of the 2.3Ghz frequency band thus became at once 
a negotiated space where various players, including the fixed broadband carriers, 
mobile operators, and system manufacturers were engaged to define their future 
wireless-access service, ultimately headed towards fixed-mobile convergence. 
In the mean time, the telecommunications market was seen to evolve from circuit-
based voice telephony to IP-based data service, as well as from fixed-line 
communications to wireless communications. Furthermore, the evolution was 
expected to move towards the convergence between the fixed and the mobile, 
thereby enabling high-speed Internet access, unhindered by time and location (MIC, 
2001a). Although such a vision was more or less shared among the players, the 
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challenging task lay in defining the new wireless infrastructure and service to run in 
the 2.3GHz band. With the leading mobile operator’s entrance to the negotiated 
arena of the 2.3GHz band, the locus of the coordination to solve the problem of 
inefficient use of the spectrum resource evolved towards further embracing the 
shaping of the future high-speed wireless-access service, involving players from 
fixed and mobile communications. 
4.1.3. Redefining the wireless : Fixed vs. mobile 
The players’ visions had been aligned towards the future convergence of fixed and 
mobile with their approaches yet to be integrated. The key issue lay in redefining 
wireless service of which the existing boundary had been marked clearly between 
the fixed and the mobile: the wireless LAN and the mobile telephony. Disputes 
increased, especially with regard to the positioning of the emerging service in 
relation to the existing services for wireless and mobile access to the Internet. 
Although the fixed-broadband carriers intended to expand their fixed service 
boundary by approaching wireless service with added mobility and voice function, 
exploring how to differentiate the service from the existing mobile service had also 
been a key issue linked to service conceptualization: 
As the dispute between Wifi and WiBro13 was being settled (among the fixed 
broadband carriers) to a certain extent, there was another matter: Wifi would 
have been clearly differentiated from mobile communications service but if 
we were to go with WiBro, which service positioning should we have? Then 
it was said to be datacentric service. But then mobile communications would 
also provide data service, and how should it be differentiated from mobile 
data service? It was much disputed. Many gathered to find a solution and 
then decided to remove the voice service. It would have been the 
differentiating point from mobile telephony if it did not have the voice 
function. Another concern was about limiting the moving speed: to what 
extent should the speed be limited? This was set at 60km/h. It should be 
usable at least in buses. … The service had to be provided through laptops or 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 “WiBro” in this interview indicates the service which was then a conceptual service 
proposed by KT and Hanaro. 
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other data terminals rather than voice, so we concluded it should go with 
mid-position while being datacentric and that it should support the moving 
speed of 60km/h. 
 (Interview with former team leader at Thrunet, 26 May 2011) 
The boundary between the fixed and the mobile was disputed, especially with regard 
to the extent of mobility the service would allow. Although mobility had been one of 
the major concerns for the fixed-broadband carriers in enhancing their wireless 
service, it was at the same time unsettling for the mobile operators, since mobility 
had hitherto been the distinctive feature of mobile services. As the fixed-broadband 
carriers, especially KT and Hanaro, were approaching the concept of the new 
wireless-access service to include voice and mobility, South Korea’s leading mobile 
operator, SKT, saw the service increasingly tending to cross the boundary of mobile 
service. The mobile operator had thus been prompted to participate in the negotiation 
process towards next-generation wireless service, yet with a motivation that largely 
differed from that of the fixed-broadband carriers: 
SK Telecom began to participate in the project (discussion) since the 
government decided that the 2.3GHz wireless arena would form a new 
service area. At that time it was regarded as being in the middle of fixed and 
mobile communications. … We could see it as wireless mobile telephony 
business as well as seeing the fixed wire-line broadband Internet business 
extended to the wireless business. So it used to be regarded as being between 
the fixed and mobile as well as fixed-mobile convergence. … At that point, 
our company concluded that although it evolved from the fixed-line Internet, 
it is a wireless14 business, and that it would have a great impact on our 
company’s business. So we participated since then. 
(Interview with Director at SKT, 13 September 2010) 
In fact, uncertainties in the evolution of wireless services were at once an 
opportunity and threat to existing players who had been placed in the formerly 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Although the term “wireless” is now most popularly used for the wireless access services 
including WiFi, the “wireless” mentioned by interviewees often seemed to mean “mobile 
communication,” differentiated from fixed services. 
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differentiated wireless field, separated by the boundaries of the fixed and the mobile. 
Although the fixed-broadband carriers approached the new service as a bridge 
towards their enhanced future wireless service, the mobile operator was concerned 
about possible cannibalization15 of their existing mobile services: 
In fact, from SKT’s point of view, … we did participate very actively from 
the stage of writing up business plans for WiBro, but there was a dispute 
from the beginning with matters concerning cannibalization. There was an 
extent of overlap between mobile telephony and WiBro. 
(Interview with Director at SKT, 13 September 2010) 
Positioning the new service entailed conflicts in the negotiated arena for the 2.3GHz 
band, especially between fixed-broadband carriers and the mobile operator. The 
boundaries of what had been firmly separated as fixed and mobile were disputed, 
redefining the features of wireless. The fixed carriers’ attempt to expand their service 
boundary towards wireless prompted the mobile operator’s involvement. As to 
cannibalization, the mobile operator’s motivation was seen to include a degree of 
having to defend and safeguard their own boundaries of existing mobile services, 
revealed through the issues of voice and speed of mobility to support wireless 
service. 
If the service positioning had been set as Wifi, it would have had a clear 
difference, and if the service had stayed with the last -mile solution through 
the higher power radio device, it could have been resolved among the three 
fixed-broadband carriers. But KT and Hanaro wanted to go further and 
insisted on the service positioning mobile data-access service. At that time 
KTF was separate from KT, and Hanaro also had the intention to acquire 
some mobile communications service, so they wanted a service closer to 
high-tier service. And then the mobile operator participated mainly to oppose 
whatever seemed to cross their service boundary, as they kept monitoring. 
They opposed certain positioning by arguing it would harm current mobile 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 The Online Oxford Dictionary defines “Cannibalize” as “(a company) reducing the sales 
of (one of its products) by introducing another similar product.” 
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communications. … As such, the speed (wireless supported vehicle speed) 
was limited, and voice was excluded to go with data-only services and so on. 
 (Interview with former team leader at Thrunet, 26 May 2011) 
The shaping of the concept of emerging wireless service thus involved existing fixed 
and mobile carriers having to simultaneously exploit and defend what they deemed 
as opportunities and threats to their present positioning in the face of emerging future 
wireless service. The emerging ‘wireless’ service was increasingly blurring the 
existing boundary between fixed and mobile, whereas the boundary of ‘wireless’ 
was being reshaped to encompass fixed-wireless Internet access and cellular data 
service. At the core of the negotiated arena lay issues linked to differing evolution 
paths of the ‘wireless Internet’: the wireless LAN enabled WiFi and other evolving 
services from the mobile telephony. 
Closure was, however, reached as the coordinated arena of the 2.3GHz band 
spectrum was eventually reframed by regulatory decision. In December 2002, the 
Ministry of Information and Communication made an official announcement of the 
change in use of the 2.3GHz spectrum band from previous WLL use. The spectrum 
band between 2300~2400MHz was reallocated as a band for Portable Internet16 
under Spectrum Law, Article 9.17 The Portable Internet was formally defined as 
‘Portable type Internet service that provides high-speed wireless access to Internet 
anytime and anywhere at standing still or moving state’ (MIC, 2002, p6). It was 
offered as the generic vision shaped through the coordinated yet negotiated arena of 
the 2.3GHz frequency band. It was a generic vision to be further explored and 
applied in a diverging and evolving market for telecommunications service. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16The report further elaborated on the terms and the phrases used in defining the service: ‘at 
standing still or a moving state’ meant guaranteeing low-speed mobility covering standing 
still to a nomadic state, yet providing high-speed mobility when necessary; ‘Anytime and 
anywhere’ was defined as providing seamless Internet access not only indoors, including 
homes and offices, but also outside such as in parks, streets, and roads; Finally ‘high-speed’ 
was to denote the data-transfer speed of high-speed fixed-line Internet (1~2Mbps per 
subscriber), able to support higher speeds when necessary (MIC 2002, 55p). 
17Ministry of Information and Communication Notification No. 2002-53: Announcement on 
the change in the Korean Table of Frequency Allocations (14 October, 2002) under 




The process of initiating coordinated efforts to shape WiBro service was constituted 
by diverse players and their interactions; their aims, objectives, and visions differed 
to a degree. The coordination of working groups by MIC had been aimed at 
producing recommendations for efficient use of the spectrum in the 2.3GHz 
frequency band, and resulted in bringing about a set of recommendations to enhance 
the efficiency of use. However, participants represented competing visions and 
diverging interests, yet to be realised into a particular type of commercial 
telecommunications service. The generic vision of Portable Internet had been 
reached through the formal establishment of negotiating spaces through RAPA. The 
generic vision was then relayed to another coordinated space for negotiation of a 
single standard for Portable Internet service, as required by MIC upon reallocation of 
the 2.3GHz frequency band. 
This section has demonstrated the formation of a coordinated arena, filled with 
competing visions and diverging interests towards the shaping of an emerging 
telecommunications service. It discussed how the specific frequency band of 
spectrum came to be problematised by a fixed-line broadband carrier whose interest 
had been to expand its business towards advanced wireless broadband Internet 
service by securing spectrum resources. The problem then resulted in coordination of 
several consecutive meetings whereby diverging interests negotiated to produce 
recommendations to support regulatory decisions about reallocation of the spectrum. 
MIC made the final decision on the reallocation of the 2.3GHz frequency band for 
Portable Internet use, whereas the concept of the Portable Internet provided a generic 
vision for next-generation wireless broadband Internet service. 
The following section examines additional dynamics that arose in relation to the 
coordinated activities that resulted in securing the availability of an additional 
spectrum resource for an emerging telecommunications service. 
4.2 The coordinated R&D: The High-speed Portable Internet (HPi) 
By the time MIC made an official announcement on the reallocation of the 2.3GHz 
frequency band for Portable Internet use, the Information and Communication Policy 
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department18 at MIC had coordinated an R&D project on Portable Internet through 
the largest and leading government-funded research institute in telecommunications, 
ETRI (Korea Electronics and Telecommunications Research Institute). ETRI was a 
research institute funded by MIC and it had played important roles in initiating new 
and large-scale telecommunications infrastructures throughout Korean 
telecommunications history. ETRI had played a key role in developing the digital 
electronic telephone-switching system, TDX, as well as the digital mobile 
telecommunications system, CDMA. These were generally regarded as foremost 
successes that had been achieved through coordinated R&D programmes by the 
government in the nation’s telecommunications history. 
ETRI coordinated the national R&D programme for the development of an HPi 
system as a three-year R&D programme to be undertaken between January 2003 and 
December 2005. This section discusses the diverging interests and interactions 
involved in the coordination of the R&D programme, as well as the varying 
motivations and commitments that shaped the development of Portable Internet. First, 
it examines the early interactions and motivations that have come to build links 
between the R&D programme and the 2.3GHz frequency band. Second, it discusses 
the key motivations and drivers that enabled coordination of a national R&D 
programme on HPi. Third, it further explores differing goals, priorities, and 
commitments towards the development of the HPi system. 
4.2.1. Encountering the 2.3GHz frequency band 
An occasion was recalled by an interviewee where the leading telecommunications 
research institute, ETRI came to learn about what the fixed-line broadband carriers 
were envisioning for near future telecommunications service. The interviewee from a 
network carrier recounted an event in which ETRI invited KT and Thrunet to 
introduce each of their own visions about the future service to be implemented in the 
2.3GHz frequency band: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 MIC’s Information and Communication Policy department (1999-2006) was in charge of 
the three-year HPi R&D project (2003–2005) whereas spectrum issues were managed by the 
Spectrum Department at MIC. (Interview, Secretary at Ministry of Knowledge and Economy 
positioned at MIC prior to the restructuring of the Ministries in 2008) 
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KT had suggested a service similar to mobile communications whereas 
Thrunet proposed a WiFi with higher output, namely Public WLAN. As it 
was difficult to know which of these would be more adequate, ETRI prepared 
a place where the representative from KT and Thrunet were invited to give a 
talk on each of the technologies. … The two types of technologies were 
discussed with the master’s and doctorate-level researchers from two 
departments at ETRI: one was the mobile-communications department and 
the other was the wireless LAN-related department. 
 (Interview with former team leader at Thrunet, 26 May 2011) 
It was not until 2003 that the technology research teams at ETRI formally 
participated in the research project on the efficient use of the 2.3GHz frequency band, 
which had been coordinated through RAPA. This meant the formal negotiation 
involving the network carriers and ETRI regarding Portable Internet had begun in 
2003. However, ETRI had encountered the issue of spectrum reallocation in the 
2.3GHz frequency band by 2002 when ETRI had just begun to pursue the research 
and development regarding fourth-generation mobile communications. ETRI soon 
found a link between their R&D activities on 4G and the additional spectrum band to 
be reallocated. An interviewee from ETRI explained their involvement as having 
been prompted by the reallocation of the 2.3GHz frequency band: 
In 2002, we were undertaking research related to 4G mobile communications 
using OFDM. At that time 2.3GHz band had been allocated for WLL but 
there were only a small number of subscribers to the service, and then there 
were requests for resolving (inefficiency). It was the period when ADSL was 
being widely implemented by fixed-broadband carriers. Then the Director, 
Mr. Han, suggested we try ADSL in wireless. So the project was planned in 
2002 targeting the 2.3Ghz band, and was initiated in 2003. 
(Interview with former Director at ETRI, 31 May 2010) 
The main motivation for initiating the coordinated ETRI R&D on the HPi system 
was explained by two key issues: i) There was a rapid increase in the use of the 
fixed-line broadband Internet and mobile telephony. Domestic fixed-line broadband 
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Internet users amounted to 25,650,000 (50% of the population as of June 2002) and 
mobile telephone subscribers were 30,880,000 (65% of population; (Ahn, 2009); ii) 
Despite increasing demands for mobile-based wireless Internet, there were limits in 
providing low-cost mobile Internet. Therefore, there was sufficient need to develop 
an HPi system that would overcome the limits of the existing wireless LAN by 
having a larger cell radius and would support low- to mid-speed mobility for using 
the high-speed Internet (Ahn et al., 2003; Song et al., 2003). Portable Internet was 
thus regarded as a service positioned between wireless LAN and mobile telephony 
that would eventually overcome the limits of both technological offerings and 
provide high-speed Internet access at any time and anywhere (Ahn et al., 2003). 
ETRI’s involvement in the development of a candidate system for Portable Internet 
also had bearing on technological issues. Although similar types of advanced 
technologies were being developed by foreign companies intended for high-speed 
wireless Internet access, none had yet fully entered the telecommunications market 
and required further technological developments to meet actual market needs: 
Where would it go after W-CDMA. We thought it would be OFDM. In 2002, 
OFDM-based systems, developed by companies including Flarion, were 
introduced in Korea, but the systems had limitations, and the 
telecommunications operators found problems in commercializing them. So 
our intention was to make improvements from those technologies that were 
available then. 
 (Interview with former Director at ETRI, 31 May 2010) 
Such recognition of the market needs for Portable Internet as had been envisioned 
through the reallocation of the 2.3GHz frequency band, as well as the rationale for 
developing OFDM-based systems were linked to initiate an R&D programme on the 
development of a candidate technology and system for the Portable Internet. 
ETRI had been pursuing research beyond IMT-2000 since early 2002. The vision of 
Portable Internet that had been shaped through the spectrum arena was then linked to 
the vision of 4th-generation mobile communications. In 2002, ETRI had planned two 
R&D paths towards 4G: one leading to what they envisioned as ‘low-tier’ 
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technologies to support ‘high-speed, low-cost, hot-spot area wireless mobile Internet 
services’ and the other to develop ‘high-tier’19 technologies to support ‘high-speed, 
wide-area wireless mobile Internet services’ (Vice President Ki-Chul Han, A Study 
on Systems Beyond IMT-2000 in Korea, ETRI 28 May 2002). They initiated the 
High-speed Mobile Internet (HMi) project in 2002 to develop a candidate system for 
the ‘low-tier’ 4G. The HMi project was then extended to a three-year national R&D 
programme on HPi to be carried out during 2003–2005. 
HPi thus represented a programme of new opportunity shaped through availability of 
the spectrum resource in the 2.3GHz frequency band. The following section 
discusses the merging of multiple interests aligned towards shaping the HPi system, 
yet based on their differing histories, current needs, and future visions. 
4.2.2. Coordinated R&D: towards a ‘home-grown’ next generation mobile 
communications 
In 2003, a large-scale national R&D programme was launched to be undertaken for 
three years. It was named the “2.3GHz High-speed Portable Internet System (HPi) 
Research and Development,” led by ETRI and joined by Samsung Electronics, 
Hanaro Telecom, KT, KTF, and SK Telecom. Participants were the collaborative 
funding source for the programme. Total funds amounting to 38.5 billion KRW20 
were fully provided by these participating industry players. Samsung was the major 
investor in the programme and a major player in actual R&D activities, tightly 
coupled with ETRI: Samsung invested 27 billion KRW with 350 research staff 
members participating in the collaborative R&D with ETRI (Song et al., 2007). 
Samsung’s leadership in the coordinated R&D was also reflected in an interview 
with the project’s former Director at ETRI : 
The WiBro programme was industry led, and there was much dispute with 
regard to who would take responsibility for managing it (within ETRI). At 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 “High-tier systems feature high-power transmitters, base stations with coverage ranges on 
the order of kilometers, and subscribers moving at vehicular speeds. Low-tier systems, 
serving subscribers moving at pedestrian speeds, have low-power transmitters with a range 
on the order of 100 meters (m)” (Computer Science and Telecommunications Board, 
National Research Council, 1997 The Evolution of Untethered Communications, 31p) 
20 Approximately 22.8 million GBP (1GBP ≒ 1,700 KRW). 
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that time, no one had expected it would be very successful; there was much 
dispute since it was a large scale project, and a joint project with Samsung 
meant it should directly lead to commercialization. … It was a bit risky at 
that time so it was much disputed whether or not it was a feasible programme. 
(Interview with former Director at ETRI, 31 May 2010) 
In fact, coordination of a collaborative R&D between Samsung and ETRI was also 
built on previous relations and experiences with successful development of 
telecommunications technologies and systems: 
Samsung Electronics was also a collaborator for W-CDMA, which was 
funded by the government. We had worked with Samsung for a long time, 
also in the TDX case. It seemed there were not many years that we’d worked 
without funding from Samsung Electronics. The projects that I was in charge 
of always had Samsung involved. So I think [the director of the research 
centre] had thought I could mediate well between Samsung and ETRI.” 
(Interview with former Director at ETRI, 31 May 2010) 
This time, as a leading manufacturer of mobile handsets in the global market, 
Samsung had the aim of amplifying its present status as a manufacturer developing 
and producing handsets. Through the development of HPi, Samsung would pursue 
expanding its business boundary as a mobile-device and equipment vendor in the 
global market (Radha et al., 2008). Furthermore, Samsung’s huge success of 
developing CDMA(Code-Division Multiple Access) phones had accompanied a 
critical lesson about the importance of securing intellectual property rights (IPRs) as 
huge royalty fees were paid to a foreign company, Qualcomm (Song et al., 2007). 
Samsung’s R&D team for the development of the HPi had thus been given the 
mission of developing a technological system that would not require huge royalties 
to be paid to a foreign company. A quotation taken from an interview in Hankyung 
magazine with the Executive Director of Samsung indicated this mission that was 
given to him by Samsung’s then President, Lee Ki-tae (Jang, 4 September 2006): 
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Let’s do something that we wouldn’t need to pay royalties to a foreign 
company. Find some way to do this. We will invest as much money as 
needed” 
 (Interview quotation from Hankyung magazine21 with Samsung Executive 
Director) 
Such a mission was then aligned with ETRI’s vision for developing a ‘home-grown’ 
system for a next-generation wireless system. ETRI had aimed to take the lead in 
securing intellectual property rights for the development of OFDM-related 
technologies, driven, to an extent, by OFDM-related research being carried out in the 
United States and Japan (e.g., Flarion’s Flash-OFDM, NTT DoCoMo’s 100Mbps 
enabling OFDM based high-speed data transmit technology; (Song et al., 2003). 
The two organisations—ETRI and Samsung—had visions and aims once again 
closely aligned towards developing the new home-grown wireless system and 
service (Lee et al., 2006). In fact, such a vision had been aligned especially with and 
promoted by the innovation policy of the Korean government. By the year 2003, 
MIC had prepared a policy to promote ‘9 IT New Growth Engines’ to advance its IT 
industry. The key objective for developing next-generation mobile communications 
had been set for the development of basic and source technology for securing 
property rights for domestic industry players (Ji et al., 2004). HPi, thus, was included 
as the key technology promoted through MIC’s IT policy, as it was a domestically 
initiated technology in comparison with other possible candidate technologies for 
Portable Internet, being developed by foreign companies. 
The development of HPi was thus driven by the alignment of visions and aims of the 
Ministry, ETRI, Samsung, and others. The rationale for the collaborative 
development of the HPi system included reducing investment fees, reducing unit 
cost by realising economies of scale, and by reducing the burden of paying royalties 
(Ahn et al., 2003). Each represented the main interest and aim of participating 
players whereas each player had a different roles to play in fulfilling their aims and 
visions. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Hankyung Magazine, Business 560 (28 August 2006). 
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4.2.3. Diverging roles and commitments towards the development of an HPi 
system 
The R&D programme of HPi had thus been initiated, coordinated as an arena where 
the next generation high-speed wireless Internet access technology was to be shaped 
through the collaboration of multiple players. From the outset, collective roles were 
seamlessly allocated to participants. The government, academia, manufacturer, and 
telecommunications operators each had roles to play that together would fulfill the 
functions necessary to drive technological innovation. ETRI was responsible for the 
development of the core technology and experimental system for the HPi system, 
whereas Samsung’s role spanned developing core technology and commercial 
systems. Operators were expected to identify service requirements while the 
government’s role generally fell into the regulatory arena of spectrum and standards 
(Ahn, 2009). 
The alignment formed through the R&D programme of HPi was only partial in 
incorporating shared goals and aims towards commercialisation of the technology. 
Although the generic vision of the Portable Internet had been formed and applied in 
the shaping of HPi, what was being envisioned through the technological innovation 
differed to a degree. For ETRI, HPi was regarded as one of the major pathways to 
build its global competency by taking the technological leadership in the next-
generation mobile communications field. For Samsung, the strategy of securing IPRs 
in core technologies for next-generation communications was further linked to the 
company’s aim to leapfrog from its current position, subject to foreign vendors, as 
well as to extend their role from handsets to systems manufacturer in the global 
market.22 
While Samsung and ETRI’s missions and interests had been nonetheless closely tied 
to each other to form a synergistic alliance in R&D, other participants in the HPi 
Programme, namely KT, SKT, and Hanaro Telecom had rather differing concerns 
and interests with regard to the R&D of the HPi system. Although the HPi 
programme included the major telecommunications operators as cofunding 
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organisations and participants, their views towards the technology system differed 
based on their positions in the current market for telecommunications. 
Fixed-broadband carriers, including KT and Hanaro Telecom, preferred to adopt 
currently available systems developed by foreign vendors, as they wished to make a 
time-to-market strategy to overcome the near-saturated market for fixed-broadband 
Internet. Although they were jointly venturing on the development of the HPi system, 
they were, at the same time exploring different types of wireless broadband 
technologies such as Flarion’s flash-OFDM and Broadstorm’s i-Burst. Early 
implementation and commercialisation were the key issues for the fixed-broadband 
carriers whose intentions were to enter the high-speed wireless data market (Kim, 
2003a). 
However, SKT, the largest and leading mobile operator, was more laid back with 
regard to early commercialization of high-speed wireless broadband. As a mobile 
operator, implementing a high-end innovative technological system was less their 
concern than securing compatibility with their existing mobile infrastructure. From 
the mobile operator’s perspective, there was still an issue of compatibility 
unresolved with the HPi system: 
In fact, WiBro (Portable Internet) technology was not compatible with 
existing mobile telephony. What mobile operators require is that new 
technologies being developed have compatibility with existing systems and 
equipment as the technology evolves. This would minimize the investment 
fee. On the other hand, from the perspective of fixed broadband carriers, 
while being purported as being between the fixed-line and the wireless, it was 
in fact crossing the boundary of the wireless arena. So, because they did not 
own mobile infrastructure, they wanted a technologically superior system 
without providing compatibility. WiBro (Portable Internet) was in fact in a 
way born out of the fixed carriers’ needs, and that’s why it was built upon the 
most leading, the most high-end technologies. 
(Interview with Director at SKT, 13 September 2010) 
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Rather, faced with issue of compatibility and the evolution of mobile 
communications, SKT’s concern regarding the HPi system was more aligned with 
the manufacturer and the developer’s interests of securing ownership of core 
technologies for the next-generation communications service by setting an 
international standard. 
There were technologies that could be viewed as Portable Internet in the first 
place, such as Flarion’s Flash-OFDM and so on. American companies such 
as Navini owned many technologies. An issue for KT was to commercialise 
those technologies immediately, while the government and our positions 
were to secure core technologies by standardising in Korea to drive the world 
market. In fact, KT had the need to enter the wireless market as soon as 
possible. But, our company was more inclined towards standardization and 
the global market, since we already had a firm position in the wireless area. 
(Interview with Director at SKT, 13 September 2010) 
SKT, thus being aligned with Samsung and ETRI, insisted that the domestic-driven 
indigenous innovation of HPi should not be hindered by adopting foreign technology 
systems, and therefore they would wait for the development of home-grown 
technologies and systems for commercialization (Lee, 2003a). 
The development of an HPi system was thus linked to various issues spanning the 
time-to-market strategy, IPR procurement for next-generation mobile 
communication, securing global technology leadership and making a seamless 
transition towards next-generation mobile communications. Differing urgencies were 
at play for players from different backgrounds and positions, which resulted in not 
only differing roles but differing degrees of commitment towards the development of 
the HPi system. Although the players had generally been aligned towards the generic 
vision of Portable Internet, shaped through the spectrum arena, their alignments 
towards the HPi system were rather partial in commitment to the future outcomes of 
the coordinated R&D. In April 2004, HPi was selected as a single baseline 
technology for setting the standards for Portable Internet. In December 2004, the 
first trial service using the prototype of a Portable Internet system was carried out by 
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ETRI and Samsung. By June 2006, commercial systems were deployed at several 
hotspots for early stage WiBro service. 
4.2.4. Summary 
This section has discussed the process of varying interests aligned towards the 
development of an emerging technology through the coordination of an R&D 
Programme on HPi. The R&D programme was coordinated in conjunction with the 
shaping of the generic vision of Portable Internet, which took place through 
reallocation of the 2.3GHz frequency band. Yet, coordination of the R&D 
programme was not formally linked to the spectrum of the 2.3GHz frequency band 
from the outset. The players involved in the R&D on the HPi system targeted the 
2.3GHz band whereas only one of the candidates would realise Portable Internet 
service. Although the spectrum arena had been coordinated through RAPA following 
the interests of the fixed-line carriers to use the 2.3GHz frequency band, the R&D 
arena was coordinated through ETRI, whose interest was aligned with those of the 
leading manufacturers and the governments (MIC in particular) towards developing 
a home-grown technological system. 
Under the auspices of MIC, the coordinated R&D programme was led by ETRI in 
close collaboration with Samsung, whereas further collaboration involved major 
network operators as participants in the programme. The coordinated arena of R&D 
thus, in part, represented a seamless alignment of varying interests, driven towards 
the development of a home-grown technological system, enabled by past relations 
and experiences that had resulted in successful cases of technological innovation. 
However, whereas the collaborative R&D resulted in the successful development of 
commercial Portable Internet system in three years time, this section has further 
described the differing aims and interests among participants in the coordinated 
arena. 
In the following section, the coordination of a standard-setting arena is discussed. It 
examines how differing interests and their alignments were further reconfigured 
through the standardisation of Portable Internet, later renamed WiBro. 
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4.3 Standardisation: From domestic to global standard setting 
Following the reallocation of the spectrum in the 2.3GHz frequency band, the 
regulatory decision had directed, coordinated by a standard-setting group at the 
Telecommunications Technology Association (TTA)23, the organisation for ICT 
standardisation in South Korea. The single standard for Portable Internet was to be 
set whereas no specific technology immediately suited the vision of Portable Internet. 
The generic vision of Portable Internet was thus to be realised through the process of 
standardisation amongst the technologies that were emerging in the market for 
wireless broadband systems and service. 
This section examines the process from the emergence to the evolution of a 
coordinated arena aligned with interactions through the process of standardisation of 
Portable Internet. First, it discusses the emergence of the coordinated arena of the 
domestic standardisation of Portable Internet: how and for what purpose the project 
group on standard setting of Portable Internet was formed. Second, the discussion 
follows the extended relationships in the project group at TTA with a working group 
of an international-standards-development organisation. Third, it observes how the 
relations and interactions in the coordinated arena evolved through the process of 
‘globalisation’ of the Portable Internet standard. It also reflects on the changes in the 
meaning of a home-grown technology in relation to globalisation. 
4.3.1. The coordinated arena of standardisation 
The regulatory decision to reallocate the spectrum in the 2.3GHz frequency band 
was accompanied by a decision to follow a single standard approach to commercial 
Portable Internet service in South Korea. The decision on the single-standard setting 
for Portable Internet was decided in a meeting organised by the Director of Spectrum 
and Broadcasting Planning Department, Ministry of Information and 
Communication in October 2002 (Kim 2007). The decision stated that a single 
standard for Portable Internet would be selected through TTA of Korea, whose main 
role included planning, establishing, and distributing ICT standards in close 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Telecommunications Technology Association (TTA) of Korea is an organization for 
standardizing cooperative group standards in electronics and information and 
communications (ICTs). TTA was established in December 1988 to promote private-led 
standardisation related to electric-communications. 
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cooperation with companies, organizations, and others concerned with information 
and communications24 (MIC, 2004a). Therefore, among the candidate Portable 
Internet systems that were competing in the market for early commercial deployment, 
the choice was to be made through the standard setting of the Portable Internet. 
In the six months since MIC had announced the reallocation of the 2.3GHz 
frequency band for Portable Internet use, the Project Group for Portable Internet 
(PG05)25 was inaugurated in TTA. The Radio and Broadcasting Bureau at MIC was 
responsible for overseeing the process of standardisation whereas standard setting 
was coordinated through TTA. The Radio and Broadcasting Bureau was in charge of 
managing spectrum resources, visions, and missions that had been shaped through 
the spectrum arena, then extended to guide the standard setting of Portable Internet. 
The generic vision of Portable Internet was thus rephrased in the standardisation 
arena as service providing ‘high data rate wireless Internet access with Personal 
Subscriber Station (PSS) under the stationary or mobile environment, anytime and 
anywhere’ (Hong et al., 2004b). The general requirements for Portable Internet 
standards were further identified as follows: i) enable high-speed Internet use 
indoors and outside at the data-transfer speed of fixed-line Internet; ii) maximize the 
efficiency of the allocated spectrum use; iii) minimize the fees (e.g., for network 
implementation) and end-user price; iv) minimize the burden of IPR-related fees; v) 
enable time-to-market introduction and support adequate mobility and hand-off 
capability (Hong et al., 2004a). 
The alignment of varying interests, which had been initiated through the 
coordination of the spectrum arena for the reallocation of the 2.3GHz frequency 
band, were further extended to include much more diverse players towards 
standardisation. The fixed-line, wireless and mobile-communications-related 
vendors, operators, and service providers, as well as academic and research institutes, 
came to participate in the standard-setting process. At the inaugural meeting, 253 
individuals participated from 52 organisations including manufacturers, developers, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24‘Policy Scheme for 2.3GHz band Spectrum Use’ <October, 2002> quoted from ‘WiBro 
Licensing Policy Scheme’. 
25 PG05 was later changed to PG302 due to a change in organizational structure. 
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network operators, service providers and academics, marking the largest and the 
widest ever participation in the domestic standardisation in telecommunications 
history (TTA, 2008a). 
Table 4 Basic frame of Standard Setting of Portable Internet  
Service definition - Portable Internet service enabling high data rate wireless Internet access under stationary or mobile environment, anytime and anywhere 
Objective of 
standardisation 
- Secure technology and service which are of high marketability and 
competitive. Seek global standardisation. 
Methods and 
procedures - Parallel use of top-down method and business verification, standardisation 
Scope of 
standardisation - Agreed upon achieving a single national standard (June 2004) 
International 
standardisation - Drive international standardisation 
Intellectual 
Property Rights 
- Secure technology leadership through the development of proprietary 
technology, and minimise royalty 
(2008 Information and Communication Standardisation Handbook Appendix) 
Although the vision of a Portable Internet standard was closely linked with the vision 
shaped through the spectrum arena, the technical specifications for the Portable 
Internet standard had yet to be defined. In fact, various choices and preferences for 
Portable Internet standards were only emerging in the domestic market following the 
reallocation of the 2.3GHz frequency band for Portable Internet use. A wide array of 
technologies were being promoted market players as candidates for a Portable 
Internet standard, including Ripwave by Navini, i-Burst by ArrayComm, flash-
OFDM by Flarion and BroadAir by BroadStorm. Some were at the verge of entering 
the market, and others were being developed for commercial implementation. HPi 
was also one of the candidates while it was being developed by a consortium of 
Korean players: ETRI, Samsung, KT, Hanaro Telecom, KTF and SKT (MIC, 2003). 
Along with initiation of the standardisation on Portable Internet, a number of sites 
were coming together to bring the candidate technologies to near commercialisable 
products. The network operators, developers, and manufacturers of technologies 
actively collaborated in implementing several test beds, as well as perform 
demonstrations and field tests. KT built test beds with i-Burst (ArrayComm), flash-
OFDM (Flarion), Ripwave (Navini) and BroadAir (Broadstorm) (Chung, 11 
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December 2003). Hanaro Telecom also actively sought wireless broadband 
technology to pursue adoption by testing and demonstrating flash-OFDM, BroadAir, 
and Ripwave (Song, 20 May 2003). SKT, the leading operator, held several 
performance tests with related technologies, especially focusing on the functions of 
handover and access rates. Meanwhile, LG Electronics, one of the leading 
manufacturers in Korea, was developing an i-Burst-based system aiming for 
commercial production by 2004 (KOIC, 5 January 2004). Emerging as candidates 
for Portable Internet service, however, the technologies were to compete through the 
process of standardisation to become the single standard for Portable Internet service 
in Korea. 
However, another approach to the standard setting of Portable Internet was a ‘top-
down’ approach. Due to the tight schedule that had been allocated for the 
standardisation of Portable Internet, the standard setting would employ the top-down 
approach by first deciding on key technologies, parameters, and requirements for 
wireless access. Then, through the bottom-up process of application of candidate 
technologies that met the requirements, a baseline specification for Portable Internet 
would be selected through a technical-evaluation process (Hong et al., 2004b). 
During the process of setting requirements as a top-down approach, discussions and 
debates were held in the Radio Access working group in PG05 aimed at defining the 
required system parameters and radio-access requirements for domestic Portable 
Internet service. The final decision was to be brought through agreements among the 
participants. The Time-Division Duplex (TDD)26 type of duplexing scheme was 
chosen by agreement, as it was commonly considered to enhance the efficiency of 
spectrum use. Issues related to radio-access requirements such as the frequency-
reuse factor, mobility speed, service coverage, and spectral efficiency were generally 
agreed upon by participating members of PG05. However, regarding multiple access 
and channel bandwidth, further disputes and disagreements arose among the industry 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26TDD(Time Division Duplex) is a duplexing scheme that requires one channel for 
transmitting downlink and uplink sub-frames at two distinct times lots. TDD therefore has 
higher spectral efficiency than another duplexing scheme, FDD (Frequency Division 
Duplex). FDD is commonly used in cellular networks as it occupies a symmetric downlink 




members, as various organizations had different opinions about the choices for a 
multiple-access scheme including OFDMA27, and 5MHz and 10MHz for the channel 
bandwidth. After delays in the decision-making process, the choice was finally put 
on vote, where 49 industry members had one vote each (Back, 2004). 
However, the disputes were also seen by many as competition between foreign 
technologies and HPi technology, which was mainly being developed by Samsung 
and ETRI as a home-grown technology for Portable Internet (Ahn, 2004; Chung, 
2003b). In fact, HPi was being built on OFDMA using 10MHz channel bandwidth, 
whereas additional solutions using MC-TDMA and MC-STDMA as well as 5MHz 
channel bandwidth were supported by foreign companies including Flarion and 
ArrayComm. The choice was finally made by vote, choosing OFDMA for multiple 
access and 10MHz as the channel bandwidth. The result of producing system 
parameters and radio-access requirements for selecting the baseline technology was 
thus regarded by many as HPi having been selected over the foreign technologies 
(Choi, 15 January 2004; Kim, 3 February 2004). 




Multiple Access OFDMA 




Frequency Reuse Factor 1 
Mobility =60 [Km/h] 
Service Coverage =1 [Km] 
Spectral Efficiency 
[bps/Hz/cell(sector)] 
Max. DL / UL = 6/2 




Max. DL/UL = 3/1[Mbps] 
Min. DL/UL = 512/128[Kbps] 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 Orthogonal Frequency-Division Multiple Access (OFDMA) is a cellular air interface 
based on OFDMA for multiple simultaneous users which assigns each user a subset of 
OFDM subcarriers. (http://encyclopedia2.thefreedictionary.com/OFDMA) 
28Hong, D. H., C. G. Kang, and Y. S. Cho, 2004a, Current Progress of Portable Internet 
Standardisation Information and Communication (in Korean), v. 21. 
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Following TTA’s top-down approach to set the system and radio-access 
requirements, three candidate technologies remained for the selection of the baseline 
technology: HPi, developed by Samsung and ETRI; another by POSDATA (in 
collaboration with Wellbell technologies); and one submitted by Orthotron (in 
collaboration with Netford). The large field of competition among the varying 
technologies, including those developed by foreign companies, had been reduced to 
involving three Korean vendors (Song, 30 March 2004). In May 2004, the 
assessment of three candidates by TTA finally resulted in the selection of HPi, 
submitted by Samsung and ETRI as the baseline technology for the standard setting 
of Portable Internet. 
The process of domestic standardisation of Portable Internet that resulted in selecting 
HPi as the baseline technology, however, caused a degree of dispute and complaint 
among the foreign companies that had attempted to enter the Korean market for 
Portable Internet. U.S. companies in particular, such as Navini, Flarion, and 
Arraycomm, raised the issue with the U.S. government regarding the exclusion of 
their technologies from the Korean market. The issue was conveyed to the Office of 
the United States Trade Representative (USTR) whose response brought the 
following statement: 
Several U.S. suppliers are interested in supplying equipment for 2.3.GHz 
services, but it appears that the standards process, under the influence of the 
government-funded research institute ETRI, is being manipulated to exclude 
foreign technologies and promote a technology developed by a particular 
Korean company. USTR will closely monitor developments in both these 
areas to ensure that Korea’s practices do not run afoul of its trade obligations. 
(USTR, 2004, p5) 
In summary, the coordinated arena of standardisation of Portable Internet was thus 
filled with alignments, competition, conflict, and dispute. The coordination of a 
standard-setting group for Portable Internet had initially brought together varying 
interests towards the standardisation of Portable Internet, of which the generic vision 
had been shaped through the spectrum arena. Yet, the process leading to choosing a 
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single standard resulted in confining the alignment to be built around a single 
standard technology: HPi. This caused disputes with regard to choosing a domestic 
technology while excluding foreign technologies. Although the decision had been 
reached through a formal process of standardisation in the standard-setting group at 
TTA, the dispute was not resolved in the process of domestic standardisation. It was 
further brought to an international-level dispute by foreign vendors that had been 
involved in developing and producing near commercial Portable Internet systems. 
However, the story of the standardisation of Portable Internet does not lead to a 
discussion of conflicts between domestic and international fora. In fact, the 
coordination arena of standardisation of Portable Internet centered on the vision of 
“globalisation.” The globalisation of the domestic standard was the key mission 
defined from the outset by the standards group at TTA. 
The following section discusses how the coordinated arena of domestic standard 
setting of Portable Internet was further extended to involve and merge with 
international innovation players. It further examines how the extended alignments 
reshaped or reconfigured the coordinated arena of domestic standardisation of 
Portable Internet. 
4.3.2. Extended alignments: From domestic to global standardisation 
Among the initial motivations that had led to the standardisation of Portable Internet, 
however, a key mission was set by the standards group at TTA: globalisation. The 
goal of the standardisation of Portable Internet at TTA had been set at developing 
marketable and competitive technology and service, while pursuing global standard 
setting (Hong et al., 2004b). The standard setting of Portable Internet targeted the 
domestic market and the global market while pursuing an unprecedented attempt to 
develop a national standard before the existence of an international standard. The 
former chair of the Project Group for Portable Internet at TTA expressed the strong 
desire for globalisation in an interview: 
In the Portable Internet project, 235 people from 52 organisations 
participated. It targeted the world’s leading technology, and research 
institutes, industry, and universities collaborated for the first time. It was 
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thought that the technology must be standardised as the domestic market was 
small. The intention was to have a successful market introduction in Korea 
and then succeed in the global markets. We had been always using an 
international standard, but this was the first time that a national standard was 
to be set when there wasn’t even an international standard. 
 (Interview with Former Chair of Working Group at TTA, 15 October 2009) 
The initiative of setting the standard for Portable Internet had been linked to the 
vision of leapfrogging from a standard user to a standard setter. Also, it aimed to 
bring the market for Portable Internet beyond the national boundaries (Song et al., 
2007). To this aim, the domestic development and implementation of the Portable 
Internet standard was regarded as a prerequisite to achieve the goal of globalisation 
of Portable Internet service. Also, the aim was closely linked to securing IPRs and 
integrating them into the standards29. Thus, an IPR Ad hoc Group was established in 
PG05 to oversee issues related to IPRs, promoting and regulating IPRs related to the 
standardisation (Lee, 2004a). Regarding the aims of securing IPRs along with 
pursuing the global standard, the following comment by an interviewee reflected the 
significance of IPRs that was drawn to the standard-setting process: 
The aim of the project was to secure 20% of IPR. In the case of CDMA we 
had to pay vast amounts of royalty to Qualcomm, and our intention here was 
to secure cross-licensing, so we would not have to spend too much on the 
royalties. Not to pay the royalty rather than earning from royalties was our 
objective. 
 (Interview with Former Chair of Working Group at TTA, 15 October 2009) 
Royalty-related issues had been under serious debate, not only in the industry but 
also among the wider public and at the level of government innovation policy since 
the wide penetration of CDMA phones in Korea and beyond. Despite the successful 
development of CDMA systems and handsets, commercialisation and subsequent 
diffusion had brought out the issue of huge royalty payments to a foreign company: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 A study on the relationship between standards and intellectual property rights (IPRs) can 
be found in Blind et al. (2009). A study on the Interplay between standards and intellectual 
property rights (IPRs) is the Final Report by the Fraunhofer Institute. 
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Qualcomm (Kang et al., 2009). Therefore, the objective of globalisation through the 
standardisation of Portable Internet was closely linked to activities aimed at 
reflecting and securing IPRs in the global standards. This aim was especially pursued 
by Samsung, which had also been involved in the development of the HPi system 
with ETRI. Meanwhile, Samsung’s role in linking the domestic standard to a global 
standard seemed to have been crucial: 
From the beginning, the global market was the goal. If it was just a national 
standard, companies like Samsung would not have been interested. … 
Samsung first contacted the international telecommunications operators to 
whom Samsung had been selling the mobile handsets. Then the 
telecommunications operators introduced Intel. At that time Intel was 
carrying out the development and the standardisation of WiMAX technology 
as the next generation for WLAN. 
 (Interview with Former Chair of Working Group at TTA, 15 October 2009) 
Samsung’s efforts to promote the development and implementation of their HPi 
system in the global market had led to approaching the major global network 
operators and WiMAX developer Intel. Samsung reaching out for international 
collaboration had begun with the development of the HPi system through the R&D 
programme, which eventually brought Samsung and Intel to collaborate on the 
standard setting of WiMAX technologies, developed through IEEE802.16 standards 
(Song et al., 2006). Samsung’s collaboration with Intel and its subsequent 
involvement in the development of IEEE802.16 standards was thus regarded as a 
major opportunity to project domestic IPRs to a global standard (Kim, 2004d). In 
February 2004, a formal agreement was made regarding the collaboration between 
Samsung and Intel’s development of HPi system and 802.16 standards. 
In parallel, yet in relation to the efforts of Samsung in building industry-level 
alliances, TTA, the domestic standard-setting organisation, sought to build a 
relationship with global standard-setting bodies. Although TTA had been monitoring 
and participating in several standard-setting groups including IEEE 802.16 and IEEE 
802.20, preference for technical specifications of Portable Internet in TTA had 
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gradually given more weight to IEEE 802.16 group activities (Choi, 2003a). 
Following the decision to align the standard-setting activities of PG05 of TTA with 
those of IEEE802.16, communications about the collaboration were carried out 
through formal letters between the groups. In January 2004, the International 
Coordination Ad Hoc group at TTA sent a formal letter to the IEEE 802.16 group 
aiming at “future possible collaboration” stating that “[r]ecognizing the mutual 
interests between our two organizations, we propose to begin dialogue for possible 
discussion and collaboration” (TTA PG05, Liaison letter to IEEE, 12 January, 2004) 
(Lee, 2004b). In response to TTA’s letter, IEEE 802.16 responded by noting they 
hoped for “compatibility between IEEE 802.16 standards and any overlapping 
regional standards” and suggested a document exchange for review and comments 
(IEEE 802.16, Letter to TTA on 26 January 2004)(Marks, 2004a). 
On 20 May 2004, after several letter and document exchanges, as well as a face-to-
face meeting of the people in charge from both groups, the IEEE 802.16 Working 
Group proposed “the goal of reaching full alignment between TTA PG302 standards 
and a subset of the IEEE 802.16 standards, including the future 802.16e amendment” 
(Liaison letter from IEEE802.16 WG to TTA on 20 May 2004)(Marks, 2004b). TTA 
PG302 and IEEE 802.16 standards finally entered into a process of harmonization 
resulting in the revisions of each of the established standards and further 
harmonization efforts during the evolution of each standard (Joo and Son, 2006; Kim, 
2007; Song et al., 2006). 
The coordinated arena of the domestic standardisation of Portable Internet was thus 
reshaped through extended alignment with international innovation players and 
eventually the international standard-setting arena. In line with the globalisation of 
Portable Internet, MIC renamed Portable Internet WiBro (Wireless Broadband) in 
April 2004 (2008 Information and Communication Standardisation Handbook 
Appendix). MIC further included WiBro as one of the core “new growth engines” 
that MIC had defined as key innovation areas in its innovation policy. The alignment 
and harmonisation of TTA PG302 and IEEE802.16 further brought closure to the 
dispute that had been raised through USTR on possible exclusion of foreign 
technologies. In the process of resolving disputes and harmonising with an 
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international standard, WiBro was officially redefined as conforming to the 
IEEE802.16 standard with five additional requirements, set as mandatory 
requirements by TTA. The name for the TTA PG302 standard, WiBro, was also 
limited for use as the name for the service in the domestic market of South Korea 
(Kim, 2007). 
4.3.3. Shifting alignments towards the evolution of standards 
The process of harmonisation of the two initially separate standards, TTA PG302 
and IEEE802.16, further led to often shifting relations and interactions among the 
innovation players in the coordinated arena of the domestic standard setting of 
WiBro. Although integration of certain technical issues involved achieving 
agreements at the organisation level between the two standard-setting groups,30 
participation of the members of TTA in the standard-setting process in IEEE 
gradually blurred the boundary between the TTA PG302 standard and the 
IEEE802.16 standard. 
Many industry and organisational members of TTA, including Samsung Electronics, 
LG, ETRI, KT, SKT, and Hanaro Telecom, actively participated in the IEEE802.16 
standard-setting process through individual participation as members of the working 
group.31 Their participation as individuals in the standard setting of IEEE802.16 
indeed brought a shift in their former relations in the standards group at TTA. At 
certain times, one could also sense rising conflicts between Samsung and ETRI, the 
two major collaborators for the development of the HPi system, in the process of 
standard setting at IEEE: 
Tens of people (from Samsung) participated (in IEEE). ETRI also, for the 
same purpose. … We went there and collaborated a lot. In the beginning 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 e.g., IEEE802.16 had chosen OFDM for the multiplexing scheme whereas TTA PG302 
was built on OFDMA as a multiuser version of OFDM. The protocol for mobile broadband 
wireless access was agreed to be OFDMA for improved multipath performance in non-line-
of-sight environments, after going through in-depth technical evaluations on OFDM and 
OFDMA between the two groups. 
Song, J.-y., P.-y. Joo, and Y.-k. Kim, 2006, Process toward the making of WiBro-
International standard: TTA Journal, v. 103, p. 191-194. 
31 In IEEE802.16 Session #35 and #36, the rate of TTA participants in IEEE802.16 was over 
25%. (Son et al_IEEE802.16)	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there were also some conflicts. It was complicated because if the technical 
solutions prepared by Samsung were different from ours, then how are we to 
manage this. There is Samsung’s proposal and do we have to oppose to it or 
cooperate? Likewise, our proposals were different from Samsung’s. There 
were conflicts and tensions because of them. 
 (Interview with former Director at ETRI, 31 May 2010) 
There were also shifts in the mode of setting standards at TTA PG302 in relation to 
the standard setting at IEEE. Although the standards had been harmonised, members 
still participated in two separate standard-setting processes: one at the domestic level, 
the other at the international level. Yet, gradual changes were brought to standard 
setting between the two separate standards groups. An interviewee reflected on this 
process: 
At some point, domestic standardization was getting delayed. It went the 
opposite way. At first, the domestic standard was set, but then it became 
different from IEEE. If it’s different, it doesn’t fit in the global standard. 
Were we going to change to the global standard or our standard. Mostly we 
changed ours. Later, why do it twice. Let’s go to IEEE first. We face it and 
standardise it, and if it gets adopted we reflect it as the domestic standard. In 
the beginning, the TTA standard was set first, and if there were any changes 
in the IEEE standard, we made modifications mostly. At a later stage, we 
went to IEEE first, made proposals there, and if they get confirmed we 
reflected it on the domestic standard. Actually, the internal process has been 
very complex. Regarding the problem of going the best possible way, 
depending on the situations. … In the actual process, situations kept changing. 
So we had to keep changing directions. 
(Interview with former Director at ETRI, 31 May 2010) 
The process of harmonisation of the standards between WiBro (TTA PG302) and 
Mobile WiMAX (IEEE802.16) thus resulted in gradual changes in the process of 
domestic standardisation. Domestic standard setting was no longer confined to the 
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interactions among domestic innovation players but was being shaped as a result of 
extended alignments and interactions of innovation players in the international fora. 
Furthermore, the coordinated arena of standardisation of WiBro was then linked to 
multiple layers of standard-setting processes involving two additional 
standardisation processes: WiMAX Forum and International Telecommunication 
Union (ITU). WiMAX Forum had the role of certifying and promoting the 
compatibility and interoperability of products, based on the IEEE 802.16 standard32. 
Standard setting at the level of ITU was initiated as the IEEE802.16 Working Group 
submitted a proposal to ITU regarding the inclusion of its mobile WiMAX Release-1 
profile, designated IP-OFDMA33 in the IMT-200034 family of standards. Thus, 
WiMAX Forum was further involved in the role of supporting the inclusion of 
IEEE802.16e-based Mobile WiMAX35 in the IMT family of radio-interface 
technologies.36 The proposed technology that had been derived from the IEEE802.16 
standard was finally and formally recognised as the sixth terrestrial IMT-2000 radio 
interface by the ITU Radio communication Assembly (RA-07) in October 2007,37 
named OFDMA TDD WMAN. 
The Korean system manufacturers, network operators, and others actively 
participated in these multiple fora of related standard-setting processes, yet not in a 
monotonous way. Each played a role with differing priorities, goals, and 
commitments to different processes of standard setting. For example, securing IPRs 
in the set of global standards was one of the greatest concerns of the manufacturers 
in relation to international standardisation, whereas network operators’ key 
objectives related to reaching the interoperability of standards, conveyed by an 
interviewee from SKT, the largest mobile network operator in Korea: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 http://www.wimaxforum.org/about 
33 IP-OFDMA as consistent with the mobile WiMAX Release -1 profile, specifying TDD 
with 5 and 10 MHz channel bandwidths. IP-OFDMA was later renamed as “OFDMA TDD 
WMAN” (http://www.ieee802.org/16/liaison/itu/ip-ofdma/) 
34 http://www.itu.int/md/R03-WP8F-C-1065/en 
35 Mobile WiMAX is based on the IEEE 802.16e-2005 amendment to the previous. 
36 http://www.wimaxforum.org/technology/downloads/WiMAX_and_IMT_2000.pdf 
37 “ITU defines the future of mobile communications: ITU Radio communication Assembly 




Taking part in standard-setting activities at various standards-development 
organizations is in fact quite important. … Actual benefits of standardisation 
accrue to manufacturers, especially those that hold intellectual properties. … 
They are interested in how much of their contributions are reflected in the 
standards. … Activities in organisations such as IEEE and 3GPP are indeed 
very important for the manufacturers, as the specifications are discussed and 
selected in those groups. … TTA is the organization of national standards so 
all the (domestic) industry should participate. Yet, the current status of TTA 
seems a bit formal as an actual standard is being developed in IEEE … and 
then reflected in TTA. WiMAX Forum is also important, especially for 
network operators. WiMAX Forum is important because the operators 
gathered at the WiMAX Forum and decided which of the developed options 
through IEEE should be commercialised. The Forum also provides 
certifications on commercial products … so WiMAX Forum became very 
important for network operators. 
 (Interview with Director at SKT, 13 September 2010) 
Yet, there was the resounding vision of home-grown technology still operating at the 
level of standardisation at ITU where the nation state was given membership38 to 
participate in the process of standard setting. From the perspective of the Korean 
government, the inclusion of IEEE802.16 standard-based technology (WiBro 
included technology) in the IMT-2000 family of radio-interface standards was 
regarded as the foremost opportunity to gain and secure the nation’s technology 
leadership in next-generation communications. The Korean government, as a 
member-state participant of ITU, was thus deeply involved in the process of 
standardising as well as coordinating the efforts of national innovation players in 
setting the sixth technology standard for IMT-2000. 
In August 2007, the ITU-R WP8F Special Meeting was held in Seoul, hosted by 
MIC and organized by TTA, aimed at drawing international consensus for inclusion 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 ITU membership is categorized by Member States, Sector Members, Associates and 
Academics. The Member States consisted of the Ministries and Administrations that 
represented the participating nations. 
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of Mobile-WiMAX in the ITU-R M.1457 Recommendation on IMT-2000 family of 
standards.39 WiBro was demonstrated, showcasing the world’s first commercialized 
Mobile WiMAX, which provided various functions of the technology, conforming to 
the requirements of IMT-2000 standards. When the OFDMA TDD WMAN was 
finally recognized as the sixth IMT 2000 standard, it was praised and greeted as one 
of the nation’s greatest achievements in its telecommunications history, paving the 
way for the nation to take leadership in the development and worldwide diffusion of 
WiBro (Mobile WiMAX). Also, the evolution of Mobile WiMAX was further 
expected to open the opportunity to secure leadership towards the 4G standard (Joo, 
2007a). 
The visions, relationships, and alignments of the innovation players had indeed 
shifted along the varying levels of standardisation, whereas their shifting relations 
and interactions were simultaneously rooted in the collaborative efforts of the 
innovation players in the coordinated arena of standardisation at TTA. However, the 
coordinated arena of domestic standard setting had evolved and was evolving in 
relation to the diverging interactions that were led through the processes of 
international standard setting, which were related to a particular specification of a 
technology being regarded as a home-grown standard. Along the landscape of 
evolving networks of telecommunications technologies and services, the vision and 
meaning of home-grown technology were also evolving. In fact, the term had 
increasingly become contextual along the history of telecommunications in Korea, 
conveyed through an interviewee’s explanation of WiBro as a home-grown 
technology: 
The TDX: … Our intention was to develop a ‘made in Korea’ TDX system. 
The switching system at that time was very expensive:200 to 300 USD per 
line. We aimed at cost reduction: through domestication. TDX was the case 
where we developed a made-in-Korea system product based on foreign 
technologies. In the CDMA case, … there was much dispute with regard to 
using the well known technology GSM or CDMA. … Many people said 
CDMA was 3G not 2G. Qualcomm then entered. … But Qualcomm had only 




wireless technology, not technology for a switching system. So, we 
integrated our switching technology with Qualcomm’s wireless technology 
and successfully developed the base station and the base-station controller. It 
can be viewed that we adopted Qualcomm’s wireless technology and then 
completed it by adding our own system technology—base station and base-
station controller—as well as our own MSC (mobile switching center) 
technology. So, it was in part adopted and in part we used our own 
technology. But in this case of OFDM-based WiBro, there was no technology 
transfer through a foreign contract. We wrote the specifications ourselves 
from the beginning to the end, although we of course made reference to the 
specifications developed by 16 (IEEE802.16); at least we didn’t pay for 
royalties (as before). We participated in the global standard-setting process, 
and developed the system in accordance with the international frame, and we 
reflected the technologies that we developed in addition to them. So, in the 
respect that we developed systems by competing for technologies in the field 
of global standard, it could be said it was home-grown. Now there is nothing 
that can be done individually. Could it become a global standard if done 
individually? It would only become a domestic standard. It should be 
understood in this respect. I’ve added the story of TDX and CDMA as I 
thought it would be easier to understand if compared it with those cases. 
 (Interview with former Director at ETRI, 31 May 2010) 
The vision of home-grown technology indeed evolved along the process of the 
standardisation, which had been initiated as a domestic standard setting of an 
emerging telecommunications technology, yet merged with and evolved as an 
international standard. Having been recognized as the Profile 1A40, the significance 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40WiBro has been recognized as Mobile WiMAX Profile 1A. In October 2005 WiMAX 
Forum published a WiMAX Forum Backgrounder clarifying the WiBro/Mobile WiMAX 
issue under the title ‘The Relationship Between WiBro and Mobile WiMAX’. The document 
states that ‘WiBro is the service name for Mobile WiMAX in Korea’ as was publicly 
announced by the MIC on 29 July 2004, and that it ‘uses the same standards, system and 
certification profiles and certification processes as Mobile WiMAX’. Among the multiple 
certification profiles designated by the WiMAX Forum, WiBro meets all the requirements of	  
one of the designated Mobile WiMAX certification profiles using TDD and occupying 
8.75MHz of the spectrum on the 2.3GHz frequency band. (WiMAX-Forum, 2006, The 
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of WiBro was seen from a developer’s point of view to lie on the degree of 
autonomy that the manufacturer had achieved, especially with regard to being able to 
configure the technology: 
It is not a ‘bought’ technology any more, and we could take pride in 
ourselves for developing the system product based on our own developed 
technology. Not only the manufacturing but also by securing IPRs we could 
have the technology leadership. This enables optimization at the cross-layer 
parts of Mobile WiMAX, being able to work beyond the mixing and 
matching of components. 
(Interview with Senior Research Engineer of Mobile WiMAX in Samsung, 
29 September 2009) 
Indeed, the meaning of developing home-grown technology had, to an extent, moved 
away from stressing the development of a self-sufficient technological system for 
use inside the boundaries of the nation state. It evolved towards meaning a degree of 
autonomy in configuring the technology for national use while pursuing 
collaboration as well as competition in the global market. 
4.3.4. Summary 
The coordinated arena of standardisation of Portable Internet emerged in response to 
a regulatory decision, whereas it evolved through shifting relations and interactions 
in the course of bringing the domestic standard towards globalisation. Although 
coordinated, it was not an arena driven by static objectives and aims towards the 
realisation of the generic vision of Portable Internet. The objectives and aims of the 
individual players were further shaped along the process of interactions and building 
relations involving diverging players. 
This section has thus observed how a coordinated arena of standardisation of 
Portable Internet emerged in relation to other emergent arenas to shape the next-
generation wireless Internet technology and service in South Korea. Further, it 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  





examined how the players in the coordinated arena came to extend alignment with 
global players. It then discussed how the coordinated arena was reshaped and 
reconfigured in evolving relations and interactions in the course of building 




The birth of WiBro as system technology, standard, and service involved complex 
interactions of building alignment, competition, and conflict among diverse interests. 
At the same time, these interactions emerged through coordination of alignment 
towards shaping the generic vision of Portable Internet, initiated by consideration of 
the reallocation of the spectrum resource in the 2.3GHz frequency band. 
In this chapter, coordinated alignments were regarded as representing coordinated 
arenas of interaction through which the dynamics of shaping relations and 
interactions were observed. The initial alignments, brought together through 
coordination often based on regulatory means or policy structures, were further 
scrutinised to examine the complex interactions that resulted in the emergence and 
the coevolution of the arenas. 
First, it examined how the diverse interests came to be aligned to shape use of the 
spectrum resource in the 2.3GHz frequency band. Although alignments were 
coordinated through the government decision upon reconsidering the use of the 
spectrum band, the arena was filled with competing visions and conflicting aims of 
diverse interests towards the shaping of spectrum use in the 2.3GHz frequency band. 
The generic vision of Portable Internet was, however, shaped through these 
interactions in the arena, reaching closure through the regulatory decision upon 
reallocation of the spectrum band. Further specification of the generic vision of 
Portable Internet was to be defined and shaped through the process of standard 
setting at TTA, the organisation for the standardisation of ICTs. 
 
 107 
Second, it discussed how coordination of the R&D programme emerged, linked with 
the availability of the new spectrum space in the 2.3GHz frequency band. Multiple 
interests were aligned towards the development of a home-grown next-generation 
wireless broadband system, the HPi. Yet, among the aligned interests, differing roles 
and commitments to the development of the HPi system were driven based on 
organizations’ histories, current needs, and future expectations and goals. 
Third, it further observed and explicated the process of coordination of a domestic 
standard-setting process as well as its evolution towards globalisation. The Project 
Group for standard setting of Portable Internet was coordinated following the 
regulatory decision made in relation to the reallocation of the spectrum in the 
2.3GHz frequency band. The visions and objectives were closely linked to those of 
the spectrum arena, whereas the process of standardisation led to the choice of 
specification of HPi as the baseline of the Portable Internet standard. The vision of 
globalisation of the Portable Internet standard was thus linked to the vision of 
developing home-grown technology, which together evolved to envision reflecting 
and securing IPRs owned by national players in the standards being developed in the 
international fora. In the process of merging interests and extending alignment 
towards globalisation, the relations and alignments in the coordinated arena of 
domestic standard setting shifted and were reconfigured in relation to evolving 
relationships and interactions in global standard-setting processes. 
This chapter has therefore explicated the dynamic interactions among the diverse 
array of innovation players involved in the coordination of, as well as the 
coevolution of the emergent arenas of spectrum, technology R&D, and standard. 
Although the coordination of alignments towards particular aims and visions played 
a key role in initiating, mediating, and promoting interactions, the process of 
coordination and its further evolution were shaped by complex interactions involving 
varying levels of alignments: alignments involving multiple players towards a 
generic vision, alignments between technological developers and system 
manufacturers, alignments between fixed-line broadband carriers, alignments 
between domestic and international players, and many more. These alignments were 
accompanied by competition, conflict, and shifting relationships that brought about 
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the reshaping and coevolution of the coordinated arenas, further driven towards 
spectrum licensing, the development of HPi system, and the global standardisation 
towards the commercialisation of WiBro and Mobile WiMAX. 
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Chapter 5 From alignments to divergence: Towards commercialisation of 
WiBro 
5.0 Introduction 
This chapter extends the story of the technological development and the 
standardisation of WiBro in the commercial uptake. The interactions that constitute 
the process of commercialisation discussed here do not begin where the process of 
technological development ends. Rather, the interactions involved in the 
commercialisation of the emerging telecommunications service took place 
concurrently with the processes involving coordination of alignments towards the 
shaping of the generic visions of WiBro through the spectrum allocation, R&D, and 
standards setting. This chapter demonstrates the differing dynamics that occur in 
relation to coordinated alignment: the complex interplays among the diverse arrays 
of interests involved in a ‘multilevel game,’ where particular participants carry 
‘certain more or less covert goals, which [are] not necessarily shared’ while having 
the ‘formally stated shared goals’ (Williams et al., 2005, 87p). Furthermore, the 
concept of appropriation from the social-learning framework has been applied in 
delineating the processes leading to adapting the generic vision, technology, and 
standard of WiBro to specific local contexts and use (van Lieshout et al., 2001; 
Williams et al., 2000; Williams et al., 2005). 
In the first section, I observe the emergence of alignments upon allocation of the 
2.3GHz frequency band for Portable Internet use, which are then reconfigured in 
response to the standard setting of the Portable Internet. Yet, the reconfiguration of 
alignments through standardisation did not lead to a coherent interplay of interests in 
the deployment of the single standard of Portable Internet. Upon players’ pursuit of 
spectrum licenses, diverging visions were competitively projected by the players 
with regard to strategies of appropriating the spectrum resource and the single 
standard, along with the generic vision of WiBro, for the commercial deployment of 
an emerging telecommunications service. 
In the second section, I further examine the divergence and discrepancies that arose 
in the course of appropriating the generic capabilities of WiBro into specific services 
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by the players involved in the process of commercialisation. I highlight the differing 
urgencies between the manufacturer and the operator, differing concepts of 
applications between operators, as well as differing perspectives on prioritising 
commercialisation in the domestic and global markets. 
In the third section, I discuss the interactions among the committed players whose 
trials and errors in the process of appropriating generic technological offerings into 
specific services led to finding certain niche areas of WiBro services. In these niche 
areas, innovation took place in appropriation and use whereas the players were 
actively committed to developing and deploying WiBro service into commercial use. 
Last, I conclude with a discussion on the observed divergence and discrepancies that 
arose during the process of appropriating the single-standard technology into specific 
commercial service products. These products represent inherent complexities and 
uncertainties in the innovation process, especially involving large-scale 
infrastructural innovation. 
5.1 From alignments to competition: Towards the regulatory decisions-making 
This section discusses how multiple interests have been aligned, realigned and 
configured towards the commercial deployment of WiBro systems and services. The 
time range included in this section falls between the reallocation of the 2.3GHz 
frequency band for Portable Internet (WiBro) use in 2002 and the licensing of the 
spectrum in January 2005. As the spectrum was allocated for Portable Internet use in 
October 2002, separate alignments emerged among the players including system 
vendors and network operators who sought to prepare for the commercial launch of 
the systems they regarded as appropriate and competitive for the emerging 
telecommunications service market. Their attempts to deploy commercial Portable 
Internet systems were, however, subject to the single-standard setting through TTA, 
whereas the network operators were to be selected through spectrum licensing. 
In this section, I examine the emergence and further configuration of these 
alignments. First, I discuss the initial alignments that were spontaneously formed 
towards the commercial deployment of Portable Internet systems and services upon 
reallocation of the spectrum resource in the 2.3GHz frequency band. Second, I 
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discuss how the alignments were further reconfigured in accordance to the 
specifications chosen through the standardisation of Portable Internet. Third, despite 
the degree of closure reached at the level of standardisation, I examine how the 
competing and diverging visions of WiBro services were incorporated in the network 
operators’ visions and plans for future WiBro service. 
5.1.1. Emerging alignments towards the commercialisation of Portable 
Internet service 
In December 2002, the South Korean government reallocated the 2.3GHz frequency 
band for the use of a single national standard-based Portable Internet service. This 
was very much the result of coordinated discussions and debates about the efficient 
use of the spectrum at the 2.3GHz frequency band, which involved diverse interests 
from industry, government, and academia. The generic vision of Portable Internet 
service was shaped through coordinated discussions as a portable type Internet 
service providing high-speed wireless access to the Internet, with a degree of 
mobility added to the Internet service. The major telecommunications carriers, 
including the fixed-line broadband Internet, mobile operators, and systems 
manufacturers, had thus been largely committed to the vision of an emerging 
Portable Internet service, which was renamed WiBro in 2004. The vision had been 
generic, carrying various future choices and solutions to be made by the involved 
players towards commercialisation. 
Alignment and competition then arose towards the commercial deployment of the 
future service, which was subject to further regulatory decisions over spectrum 
licensing and standards setting. In fact, multiple interests were aligned to the generic 
vision of Portable Internet, carrying each one’s own interests, concerns, views, and 
positions towards the implementation of Portable Internet service. Upon MIC’s 
decision on the reallocation of the 2.3GHz frequency band for Portable Internet use, 
the leading fixed-line broadband carriers and mobile operators began preparing for 
the implementation of Portable Internet service by organizing their own teams and 




The domestic and foreign system manufacturers also undertook the development of 
Portable Internet systems to be deployed for trials, competing against each other to 
set a single standard for the Portable Internet. Initial approaches by these players 
differed to a degree in technology choice and the alignments they formed. Samsung 
Electronics collaborated with ETRI to develop and implement HPi technology. LG 
Electronics collaborated with ArrayComm, the U.S. company developing a wireless 
access system, to develop the next-generation high-speed wireless access system, i-
Burst (Choi, 2003b). POSDATA collaborated with Broadstorm to develop a 
commercial Portable Internet system (Lee, 2003b). Although the development of 
HPi technology was coordinated through the government research institute, others 
were emerging in the market as near commercialisable products. 
Separate alignments were also formed by the existing fixed-line broadband carriers 
and mobile operators as they projected differing goals in implementing Portable 
Internet service. The fixed-line broadband carriers including KT and Hanaro 
Telecom were eager for early commercialization of the Portable Internet service, 
based on foreign technologies that were readily available: Time to market was their 
key concern (Kim, 2003c). Although KT and Hanaro had sponsored a government-
coordinated R&D project on the development of High-speed Portable Internet (HPi), 
this did not prevent them from pursuing the technology they preferred for Portable 
Internet service. Furthermore, failing to meet the time to market seemed to carry 
risks, including overlapping investments on fixed wireless Internet with the diffusion 
of the 2.4GHz frequency-band-based Wireless LAN service. The fixed-line carriers, 
KT and Hanaro Telecom, thus teamed up to request early licensing of the spectrum 
resource to the government. LG Electronics joined their alignment to pursue early 
implementation of the service, based on foreign technological systems on which the 
company had been collaborating (Kim, 2003b). However, SKT, the leading mobile 
operator, insisted on seeking technology leadership prior to spectrum licensing. SKT 
was thus aligned with Samsung and ETRI, the key developers of the HPi system, 
whose interests lay in matching the time for spectrum licensing with securing IPRs, 




The concurrent rise of alignments towards the commercial deployment of Portable 
Internet systems and services thus represented the multiple interests whose concerns 
and aims were diverging as they approached the commercialisation of Portable 
Internet. Despite their initial alignment towards the shaping of the generic vision of 
Portable Internet, separate yet concurrent alignments were formed to compete 
through standardisation and spectrum licensing. For spectrum licensing, disputes 
arose on such issues as who among the fixed and mobile carriers would be more 
eligible and better capable of providing Portable Internet service. Regarding 
standardisation, disputes arose around the technological choice between home-grown 
or foreign, and whether to have a single national de jure standard or multiple de facto 
standards initially (Chung, 2003a). 
Such disputes were to be settled through the processes of standardisation and 
spectrum licensing. The competing alignments were to be reconfigured as the 
processes finally reached regulatory decision making. The following section thus 
examines how interests were realigned and how relationships reconfigured in 
response to decisions made in the standardisation of Portable Internet and spectrum 
licensing in the 2.3GHz frequency band. 
5.1.2. Reconfiguration of alignments through regulatory decision-
making 
As HPi was chosen as the base technology through standardisation at TTA, the 
alignment between Samsung and ETRI, the key collaborators in the technological 
development, was strengthened to lay the ground for the Portable Internet service to 
be built on high-speed Portable Internet technology. Others who had intended to 
enter the emerging service market with other technological choices had to either 
forgo or change their goals. The various players, including manufacturers of 
telecommunications systems and handsets, as well as network operators, were thus 
realigned or reconfigured towards the additional specifications of Portable Internet 
service. 
Significant realignments and dealignments took place among system manufacturers 
that had intended to enter the emerging service market by building alliances with the 
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operators. The result of choosing HPi technology as the baseline for a single 
standard brought changes to their relationships with the operators as well as with 
other vendors. The vendors’ relations with the operators in promoting their own 
choice of technology for the service weakened as the need to promote a preferred 
technology base diminished. At the same time, alliances among system vendors 
faced further challenges. Although Samsung, as a core developer and manufacturer 
of the HPi system, had a firm position as the future producer of the system, others 
that had not been aligned with HPi had to undergo significant shifts in their 
relationships with their collaborating partners. POSDATA, which had been aligned 
to the development of the i-Burst system in collaboration with Broadstorm, shifted 
its route by adopting the newly specified technology base. POSDATA began 
collaborating with Walbell Technologies41 to develop a Portable Internet system 
based on the new specifications (Kim, 2004a). Meanwhile, ArrayComm, the U.S. 
company that had collaborated with LG Electronics, gave up the development of a 
Portable Internet system whereas LG Electronics shifted and extended its alignment 
with other developers and manufacturers in the development and implementation of 
a Portable Internet system42 (Kim, 2005c). The system manufacturers were thus 
realigned and reconfigured in response to the standard setting of Portable Internet. 
Such was a significant reconfiguration of alignments resulting from the single 
standard policy. Yet, the degree of closure achieved through the choice of a 
technology standard did not quite limit further choices in appropriating the 
technology: for example, who would provide the service, and how the services 
would be provided. The operators of both fixed and mobile communications came to 
pursue licensing, where they came to compete for a limited number of licenses. The 
major fixed-line carriers, including KT, Hanaro Telecom, and Dacom, and the 
mobile carriers, including SKT and KTF, vied for spectrum licenses for WiBro. 
Subsequently, disputes and debates arose about who would be more eligible and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 Walbell technologies, Inc. was established by researchers from Broadstorm. 
42 LG Electronics, while excluded from the HPi Consortium, built a collaborative 
relationship with Intel for the global standardization of WiBro/Mobile WiMAX, and further 
pursued the development of Portable Internet systems by collaborating with Nortel 
Networks, a Canadian company, which merged with LG in November 2005. (Kim, Taejin. 
“Nortel attacks WiBro market through ‘LG-Nortel’” Digital Daily, 20 September 2005)	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capable of operating the emerging service. The government coordinated and 
conducted research, and held forums and public hearings (KISDI, 2004) to establish 
a framework and specific criteria upon which to make decisions on spectrum 
licensing. Varying knowledge and opinions were gathered, then merged to produce 
certain results and suggestions in shaping a regulatory framework for spectrum 
licensing for the WiBro service. 
Consequently, a regulatory framework was prepared for granting three licenses, 
regardless of the existing service boundary between the fixed-line and the mobile, 
through a comparatively stringent selection process43 (Choi, 2004a). The granting of 
three licenses suggested that the competition would bring infrastructure investment 
as well as the provision of a variety of applications services (MIC, 2004b). Other 
issues relating to licensing were also decided, such as the conditions for licensing 
and the length of time and pricing for spectrum use. Meanwhile, according to the 
spectrum licensing policy of MIC, candidates were to be assessed using preset 
criteria on their capacities and competencies for the future operation of WiBro 
service (MIC, 2008). Candidates were therefore required to effectively demonstrate 
their capacities and capabilities against what had been framed as the WiBro service. 
The spectrum being the critical and yet ‘scarce resource’ requiring regulatory rules 
and frames for allocation and use, the emergent service was to be further shaped 
through competing visions, future anticipations, and regulatory decision making 
about the licensing and use of the 2.3GHz frequency band. 
5.1.3. The competing visions of WiBro towards spectrum licensing 
Since as early as July 2003, MIC had coordinated a working group to prepare for the 
introduction of WiBro service to the market. This consortium included the Korean 
Information Society Development Institute (KISDI) and the Electronics and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 The spectrum licensing policy of MIC in Korea was based on assessing business plans 
submitted by the candidates. MIC first decided on the feasibility of licensing based on 
certain criteria such as benefit to the public. Once the possibility for licensing was 
confirmed, the plans were assessed through quantitative as well as qualitative methods 
(Choi, 2004). This comparative selection was donned ‘Beauty contests’ in which the 
“government invites applications that are rated according to some pre-set criteria. Licenses 
are allocated to those whom the government believes best meet the stated requirements” 
(Xavier, P., 2001, Licensing of Third Generation (3G) Mobile: Briefing Paper, ITU 
Workshop on licensing 3G Mobile, Geneva. 
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Telecommunications Research Institute (ETRI), the two leading government 
institutes in the telecommunications field44 (Ahn, 2009; MIC, 2005a). The working 
group was responsible for bringing forth policy recommendations for the content and 
method of spectrum licensing for WiBro service at the 2.3GHz frequency band. The 
group thus carried out anticipatory research on various issues including the use, 
demands, and positionings of the emerging service. Policy suggestions and 
recommendations were finally prepared in August 2004, and the public hearing on 
WiBro Licensing Policy took place on 12 August 2004, organized by MIC and 
cohosted by KISDI and ETRI (MIC, 2006b). The purpose of WiBro licensing policy 
was to promote WiBro service for the public to enjoy high-quality, low-price 
wireless Internet service; to bring about workable competition45 where the existing 
market could efficiently operate; and to reduce overlapping investment (MIC, 
2004b). 
At the public hearing on WiBro licensing policy, the vision and the concept of 
WiBro service were put forward as a service that would enable high-speed wireless-
Internet access whenever and wherever mobility was at hand. It was positioned 
between the existing mobile telephony and wireless LAN with regard to such aspects 
as data-transfer speed, mobility, and cell coverage (MIC, 2004b). WiBro was 
expected to complement high-speed broadband Internet and wireless LAN by 
providing mobility, and to provide wireless Internet service at lower cost while 
having a higher data-transfer speed than the current mobile telephony. Table 1 shows 
the comparison of WiBro service with the existing wireless LAN and mobile 
telephony as of August 2004. The voice service was regarded as challenging with the 
current technological capability. Also, to support voice application, further 
requirements for supporting mobility, QoS, coverage expansion, and more were 
projected to incur increased unit cost for the system and overall investment fee. 
However, the evolution of WiBro service was further anticipated either to reach a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 The Ministry of Information and Communication organized and operated the “Working 
Group Responsible for Introduction of WiBro Service” from July 2003 to September 2004 
(MIC, Introduction and Promotion of Portable Internet (WiBro) Service. (11 March 2005)) 
45 The term ‘workable competition’ is linked to the role of MIC stated in Electronic 
Communication Business Law as “Establishment of efficient competition system, fair 
competition environment’ (Article 33 Section 4). 
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data-transfer speed of up to 50Mbps while maintaining the current mobility, or to 
enhance the mobility up to the level of mobile telephony (250km/h) to embrace 
applications including VoIP (Voice over Internet Protocol). Thus, WiBro was 
expected to play a complementary role to mobile telephony while competing to an 
extent with W-CDMA (Wideband Code Division Multiple Access) which was being 
introduced for advanced mobile data service along the evolution of the existing 
mobile communications networks in December 2005. 
Table 6 Comparison with Wireless LAN and Mobile telephony (MIC 2004) 
Classification Wireless LAN WiBro Mobile telephony 
Application service Wireless Internet Wireless Internet Voice and wireless Internet 
Data speed/ 
subscriber 1Mbps and up Approx. 1Mbps Approx. 100kbps and up 
Mobility Walking 60km/h and up* 250km/h and up 
Terminal Desktop, laptop, PDA 
Laptop, PDA, Mobile 
phone 
Mobile phone, some 
PDA 
Cell radius Approx. 100m Approx. 1km 1km~3km 
Tariff system Flat rate Volume rate + Flat rate Volume rate 
* Although it is possible to provide seamless wireless Internet service at the speed of 60km/h and up, 
data transfer speed gradually decreases with the increase in mobility. 
 
Yet, such was the generic frame for the future WiBro service. Upon preparing the 
licensing policy for the service, competing visions arose from operators who were 
pursuing the granting of licenses for the commercial deployment of the service. 
Although the candidate network operators had generally been bought into the generic 
vision of WiBro as a service in fixed and mobile convergence, the service 
positioning and further envisionings of WiBro service differed to a degree. Among 
other reasons, visions diverged due to operators’ varying backgrounds including 
their histories, current market positioning, and relations to technological offerings. 
WiBro offered a range of choices from interested operators in its relationship to 
existing services, as well as service types and strategies. However, the differing 
visions and choices were further driven toward competition as various operators, 




By early 2004, KT, Hanaro Telecom, Dacom, the fixed-line carriers intended to 
enter the WiBro market, and three mobile carriers, SKT, KTF and LGT were also 
preparing to commercialise the service (Baek, 2004b). Partly embracing and sharing 
what had been anticipated and estimated by KISDI and ETRI on the use and 
adoption of WiBro service, each put forward its own interpretations and positioning 
of WiBro service in ways that would differentiate their offerings from others and 
build their competencies based on their current resources, past experiences, and their 
future plans. 
KT,46 the largest and leading fixed-line carrier in Korea, regarded Portable Internet 
as a service that was to provide seamless Internet access through a fixed-mobile 
convergence network, ultimately expanding to ubiquitous networking service 
(Hwang, 2004). KT characterized the Portable Internet as a service providing 
Internet access at similar speed to that of the fixed-line ADSL, where the contents of 
fixed-line Internet would be provided (Ko, 2004). Its existing fixed-line and wireless 
infrastructures and WiBro were to be seamlessly connected by applying handover 
and roaming solutions. Through an open-platform policy for the new wireless-
mobile service, the Internet contents available through the fixed-line broadband 
Internet were to be accessed freely, regardless of the terminals, place, and time. 
Therefore, Portable Internet for KT was regarded as an extended service for outdoor 
use of fixed-broadband Internet. While providing a bridging service for fixed-mobile 
convergence, it was expected to form one of the core network services in the 
ubiquitous networking environment in the future. Although KT’s major interest lay 
in entering the mobile market at the verge of market saturation for fixed-line 
communications, it positioned KTF, its mobile subsidiary, as a collaborator for 
building WiBro networks and providing bundled services for the fixed-mobile 
convergence service (Ko, 2005). Through collaboration with KTF, KT planned for 
‘WiBro Swing’ service which would have WiBro service seamlessly connected with 
wireless Internet (Nespot) or mobile telephony (CDMA2000 1x EVDO). The major 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 KT is the leading telecommunication service provider in South Korea. KT was originally 
established in 1981 as a public corporation, and was privatized in 2002 as a carrier and 
operator of wired and wireless telephone and Internet-service networks. It further merged 
with its mobile subsidiary KTF (KT Freetel) in 2009 (http://www.kt.com). 
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concern for KT, however, was to develop outstanding content that would stimulate 
the diffusion of WiBro, while differentiate it from existing mobile services. Services 
such as Multimedia Messaging Service (MMS), Location Based Services, IP game, 
and VoD were considered to have outstanding content, whereas convergence 
services with wireless LAN, Digital Mobile Broadcasting (DMB), and GPS were 
regarded as key pathways to prepare for the convergence market for fixed and 
mobile as well as broadcasting services. Laptops and PDAs were expected to be the 
major terminals during the introductory stage for WiBro service as the early services, 
focused on access to information service via the Internet (Park, 2005). 
Hanaro Telecom, the second largest provider of fixed-line broadband Internet had 
also been concerned with market saturation of fixed-line broadband Internet. 
Portable Internet was thus considered the company’s next growth engine (Byeon, 
2004). However, unlike KT and others, Hanaro Telecom was the only carrier among 
the candidates that had not been aligned with existing mobile operators and service 
in organizational relations. Hanaro Telecom envisioned WiBro as evolving from the 
fixed-line Internet technology carrying some complementary service as well as 
encouarging a greater impact for the existing fixed-line broadband infrastructure. 
WiBro was therefore considered to fall inside the boundary of the fixed-line 
communications service, which the fixed-line carrier should pursue in the evolving 
telecommunications landscape. Furthermore, it viewed 3G and High-speed 
Downlink Packet Access (HSDPA), which were evolving through mobile networks, 
to be competing with WiBro, and insisted that the licenses for WiBro and 
3G/HSDPA should not be held by the same operator (Yoon, 2004). Hanaro, the 
fixed-line carrier, expected WiBro to be evolving towards the high-speed broadband 
Internet with added portability and mobility. The telecom company was pursuing 
enlargement of its market share by acquiring Thrunet, then the third largest 
broadband carrier, which would ultimately bring Hanaro’s broadband market share 
up to 30% with more likelihood and strength to deliver new services related to 
Internet including VoIP and IP-TV (Galbraith, 2005). Hanaro Telecom further 
pursued joint collaboration with existing and leading portal services of NHN and 
Daum communications, planning to rollout ‘NHN WiBro Zone’ and ‘Daum WiBro 
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Zone’ (Kim, 2004c). Furthermore, it planned to provide an open platform through 
which the contents of the existing fixed-line Internet could be shared, while limiting 
the openness for a small amount of outstanding content. Such service positioning 
was intended to differentiate WiBro service from existing mobile services while 
taking advantage of its own IP back-bone networks. Yet, Hanaro’s relative 
independence from the existing mobile services also brought challenges to its 
intention of being granted a license for a fixed-mobile convergence service (Baek, 
2004a). Although Hanaro Telecom’s strategic approach to WiBro was deeply 
grounded in the company’s stable and effective position as a fixed-line carrier, it was 
considered by many others that the company would require close alliance with a 
mobile operator for efficient and effective implementation of WiBro systems and 
service (Baek, 2004b). 
In contrast, SK Telecom (SKT), the leading mobile operator with more than 18.6 
million subscribers as of December 2004, had not been aligned with the fixed-line 
carriers in pursuing the commercialization of WiBro. Other mobile operators among 
those interested in the commercialization of WiBro service—KTF and LGT—had 
aligned themselves with the fixed-line communications-sector organisation under 
their corporate heads. Having been positioned as the leading mobile telephony and 
mobile communications operator, however, SKT envisioned WiBro as a 
complementary service to the existing mobile service for its high-speed data-transfer 
capability with a low subscriber fee (Seo, 2004). SKT therefore planned data-
intensive services such as VoD, file downloading, and other multimedia services at a 
low flat rate, while placing other mobile services of small scale data such as email, 
Short Messaging Service (SMS), and online banking as appropriate for low- to mid-
speed mobile service at volume-rate pricing. WiBro was thus to be provided to more 
than 84 cities with designated ‘hot zones,’ according to their strategic match with the 
demands for large-scale and high-speed mobile data communications. Therefore, 
SKT regarded mobile handsets, rather than laptops, as necessary for the diffusion of 
WiBro service (Baek, 2004a). The contents services for WiBro were also linked with 
those of mobile telephony whereas SKT’s mobile platforms such as Nate and June 
had been providing more than 680,000 mobile customers. Based on its existing 
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mobile infrastructure and service, SKT also planned to develop outstanding 
applications for mobile broadband service that would be operated on closed 
platforms, in contrast to the fixed-line carriers’ open-platform policy towards WiBro 
content services (Kim, 2004c). Thus, SKT asserted its strength as the most adequate 
and competent WiBro service operator, and claimed that therefore it should be 
granted a spectrum license for the operation of WiBro service. For SKT, WiBro was 
viewed as aligned with the existing mobile service as both were built on the 
technologies (e.g. OFDM, Smart Antenna, MIMO47) to be implemented for fourth-
generation (4G) mobile communications (Baek, 2004a). WiBro was therefore being 
positioned in the evolving path towards the next-generation mobile-communications 
service. 
There was also a consortium of fixed and mobile operators that had been formed to 
obtain spectrum licenses for WiBro service. Dacom, the third largest fixed-line 
broadband carrier, had intended to enter the emerging wireless and mobile market 
through an alliance of the fixed-line carriers and mobile operators under the LG 
Group: Dacom, Powercomm, and LG Telecom48 (Baek, 2004a). Based on the 
companies’ infrastructures for the fixed-line and mobile services, LG Consortium 
focused on its strength in efficiency in implementing and operating WiBro, the 
fixed-mobile convergence service. LG Consortium regarded WiBro service as an 
emerging service with an emerging market during a fixed-mobile convergence era. 
Rather than regarding WiBro as a bridging service or as having been extended from 
the existing services, LG Consortium insisted on their conceptualization of WiBro as 
the fixed-mobile convergence service that would ultimately evolve towards 
ubiquitous networking by integrating with the location based service (LBS), 
telematics, home electronics, transportation, broadcasting, and more (Baek, 2004a). 
However, Dacom withdrew from the competition to secure a license for WiBro 
service in October 2004 with its final decision to concentrate on the buyout of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 MIMO: Multiple Input Multiple Output. 
48 Dacom was a fixed-line operator of long-distance telephone service, and had been 
operating VoIP service since 2003. Powercomm had been one of the largest providers of 
high-speed broadband Internet access. Dacom and Powercomm merged with LG Telecom, 
the third largest mobile operator in January 2010. As of 1 July 2010, LG Telecom changed 
its name to “LG U+”.	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Thrunet49 (Kim, 2004b), the first and one of the leading broadband Internet carriers 
in Korea that had been under legal management since 2003. Enlarging their market 
share for telecommunications service was thus prioritized whereas the Consortium 
decided to pursue indirect involvement in WiBro service business through MVNO or 
a business alliance. (http://4g.telecomskorea.com/page/53/) 
Spectrum licensing for WiBro service was approached by competing yet evolving 
interests in next-generation and fixed-mobile convergence communications service. 
Although being framed as an emerging service that would complement and 
overcome limits of existing wireless LAN and mobile telephony, the generic vision 
of WiBro allowed for varying strategies for the implementation of WiBro service. 
Based on the spectrum licensing policy for WiBro, three licenses were finally 
allocated to three operators, KT, SKT, and Hanaro Telecom,50 ultimately allowing 
the differing interpretations and approaches to bring about commercial WiBro 
service. The granting of three licenses to the fixed-line carriers and a mobile operator 
did not quite end the debate on the differing choices, appropriating generic 
technological capabilities to specific service offerings. 
The competition among the candidate network carriers towards spectrum licensing 
was indeed a process of claiming of their own eligibility, capacity and capability for 
operating the emergent service. WiBro service was thus to be shaped based on the 
differing interpretations and approaches by the operators, while their initial 
appropriation of the generic capabilities of WiBro would further depend on their 
relations and interactions with others that were also involved in the development and 
the implementation of the technology and the service. 
5.1.4. Summary 
This section demonstrated the process of reconfiguration of alignments and a degree 
of closure reached through standardisation, vis-à-vis the divergence in additional 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 Thrunet had been registered for legal management in 2003, and merged with Hanaro 
Telecom in January 2006. Hanaro Telecom then merged with the leading mobile operator, 
SK Telecom, in 2008. 
50 Licenses for WiBro service were allocated to KT, SKT, and Hanaro Telecom in December 
2005. KT planned an initial service launch in April 2006, whereas SKT and Hanaro 
Telecom’s commercial services were to launch in June 2006. 
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choices towards the appropriation of the technology into specific services. I first 
observed the concurrent rise of competing interests and alignments that emerged and 
evolved in response to the series of regulatory decisions linked to the 
commercialisation of WiBro. Upon government reallocation of the 2.3GHz 
frequency band for Portable Internet use, multiple interests were mobilised to form 
their own alignments, according to their needs and aims for the emerging service 
market. However, their alignments were partially reconfigured as a result of 
standardisation of Portable Internet, which came to allow only one particular 
specification for the commercial deployment of Portable Internet systems and 
service. 
Despite the degree of reconfiguration of the alignments towards the implementation 
of a single standard for Portable Internet, however, there arose divergent concepts 
and visions for the Portable Internet service to be deployed by network operators. A 
number of players competed for spectrum licensing while each proposed and 
suggested divergent yet competing visions of Portable Internet service. The players 
planned and addressed different applications and business models, whose histories, 
current needs, and future envisionings varied to a degree.. 
Such diverging concepts and ways of appropriating WiBro reflected their own 
current positions, capacities, relations, and future strategies in the 
telecommunications market. KT as the leading fixed-line carrier and a corporate 
head carrying the mobile subsidiary KTF had promoted the vision of WiBro as a 
mobile extension of fixed-line ADSL, which would be complementary to existing 
services on the mobile network. Hanaro Telecom, the second largest and a leading 
fixed-line carrier insisted that WiBro was a service evolving from the fixed-line 
Internet, thus to be operated by the existing fixed-line carriers as the next generation 
telecommunications service. SKT the leading mobile operator, in contrast, 
consistently positioned WiBro as a complementary service to existing mobile-
network-based services, whereas the LG Consortium, formed among the fixed-line 
carriers and mobile operators under the LG corporate group, insisted on the vision of 
WiBro as a fixed-mobile convergence service. 
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Three licesnses were granted to two fixed-line carriers, KT and Hanaro Telecom, 
and one mobile operator SKT, resulting in embracing a degree of divergent visions 
and concepts of Portable Internet service. Indeed, this reflected the variant modes 
and ways of appropriating the generic capabilities of Portable Internet that had 
reached a degree of closure in the technology choice through the single-standard 
setting. Commercial WiBro service was thus to be shaped through differing 
deployment strategies, differing aims, and differing outlooks on the future 
telecommunications service market. 
The following section more closely examines the complex interactions among the 
divergent players in the process of bringing about commercial WiBro service in the 
domestic market. The deployment efforts for WiBro service reflect the complex 
process of appropriating the generic capabilities of WiBro, to be integrated into 
specific WiBro products and services. 
5.2 From competitions to divergence: towards the commercial deployment of WiBro 
services 
In December 2005, the three network operators - KT, SKT, and Hanaro Telecom, 
were granted licenses for the 2.3GHz frequency band. WiBro service was thus to be 
further shaped through the competing visions and diverging ways of configuring 
generic technical capabilities to provide specific services. Furthermore, commercial 
WiBro service, having been scheduled to be launched by June 2006, was approached 
with varying interests, aims, and objectives by diverse players including the 
government, system vendors, operators, content providers, and others. Various issues 
arose, linked to the commercial deployment of WiBro service, which led to certain 
discrepancies among those who were involved in the process of shaping commercial 
WiBro service. 
This section discusses the process of commercial deployment of WiBro service as a 
process of appropriating the generic technical capabilities of WiBro by the operators, 
system vendors, and many others. I particularly examined the conflicts and 
discrepancies that arose among the collaborators of the deployment of the 
commercial WiBro products and services. I focused on the processes that fall within 
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the approximate time range of 2005–2009, during which the struggles to bring about 
commercial WiBro service resulted in many disputes and little market adoption. 
First, the section examines the emerging conflicts upon commercialisation of WiBro, 
alongside the shared goal of globalisation. Then, it further explicates the 
discrepancies that arose between the coproducers of WiBro during the process of 
commercial deployment of WiBro products and services. Last, it examines the gap 
between the domestic and the global market uptake. These observations led to 
addressing the divergence and further uncertainties experienced during the process 
of appropriating the generic capabilities of WiBro to specific service products. 
5.2.1. Towards domestic deployment of a global standard 
By the time the licenses for WiBro service had been granted to the three operators, 
the service had become closely linked to a global standard and service named Mobile 
WiMAX51. WiBro was no longer a service confined to the domestic market. As a 
single domestic standard, the WiBro standard had been harmonized with an 
international standard IEEE802.1652, and a degree of IPRs and technical inputs from 
domestic vendors were included in the global standard (Puthenkulam 2009). 
Subsequently, the Korean innovation players actively pursued further standardisation 
through their unprecedented participation and commitment to the global standards 
fora. In particular, the commercial deployment of WiMAX products, including 
WiBro in Korea, were promoted through the WiMAX Forum53 whose role included 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 Mobile WiMAX is a service name for Worldwide Interoperability for Microwave Access. 
Further information on Mobile WiMAX in http://www.wimax.com/wimax-technologies-
standards/what-is-ieee-80216e 
52 TTA Phase 1 was revised to conform to IEEE802.16TGe Draft v.5 in December 2004. 
The standardisation of IEEE802.16e was approved as an international standard of 
IEEE802.16e-2005 in October 2005. 
 
53WiMAX Forum was established in June 2001 as an industry-led organization certifying 
and promoting the compatibility and interoperability of broadband wireless products based 
on IEEE Standard 802.16. (http://www.wimaxforum.org). Korean industry players including 
Samsung Electronics, KT, POSDATA, SKT, and LG Electronics have participated as 
Members of the Forum since the end of 2004. (Kim, Dae-jung. 2005 ‘WiMAX Forum’ TTA 
Journal 99, 152-159p). TTA of Korea was selected as the First	  WiMAX Certification Lab in 




reaching compatibility and interoperability of the standards, as well as certifying the 
products to be deployed around the world (Kim, 2005d). 
The commercial deployment of WiBro service in the domestic market had thus been 
closely linked to overseas activities and roles played by the national innovation 
players. The domestic WiBro service deployment was regarded by the Korean 
innovation players as an important process and precondition for gaining the 
technological leadership in the global market for Mobile WiMAX.54 An early 
commercialization to implement the first Mobile WiMAX service in the world was 
thus strongly pursued in Korea, towards which the government, system vendors, and 
the developers of WiBro technologies, as well as the operators to an extent, were 
closely aligned. 
Yet, at the same time, the vendors and the network operators perceived differing 
urgencies in the early commercialisation. For the system vendors, including 
Samsung and POSDATA, an initial adoption of the emerging communications 
technology and service was expected to provide a ‘reference site’ upon which the 
potential wider adoption of the technology and service would be reflected and 
projected (Kim, 2005d). Thus, commercialisation was closely linked to their 
attempts at overseas sales of their own products, where time-to-market would be 
critical for successful introduction, as was reflected in an interview with an executive 
director at POSDATA with Electronic News in Korea: 
It’s more desirable to make reference through commercialization first and 
then expand the base rather than distributing time and distracting one’s 
attention for securing interoperability between systems. If we miss the time 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54 In the newspaper interview with a Project Manager for next-generation mobile 
communications in the Ministry of Information and Communication, it was mentioned that 
‘the profile is key to service implementation (of Mobile WiMAX) where only the 
technologies that have actually been implemented could be proposed. … So WiBro is the 
only one that can be proposed as the profile. … In case interoperability is achieved through 
WiBro profile, the countries implementing Mobile WiMAX have to use WiBro 
technologies. Korea can therefore leap from a technology importer to technology leader and 




for presenting the reference, it may become impossible to open up the global 
market (for WiBro). 
(Interview quoted in ‘WiBro, Conditions for Success (4) Let’s go to the 
world’ Electronic news, 31 January 2005). 
However, operators were more keen on securing wider interoperability of standards 
through collaboration among international operators and vendors, prior to or in 
parallel with the domestic implementation of the systems and the service. The 
urgency for early commercialization to provide a ‘reference site’ for successful 
implementation posed certain limits and difficulties for operators. This led network 
operators to request a postponement of the initial launch of WiBro service in the 
domestic market. This tendency was reflected in an interview with the Director of 
SKT, who commented on learning from SKT’s experience during the world’s first 
commercialization of WiBro: 
In fact, from the perspective of telecommunications service providers in the 
process of the world’s first commercialization, with WiBro in Korea, only 
Samsung [and the manufacturers] responded actively. As a result, the initially 
implemented network systems were expensive. If the components were 
standardized as in computers, it would have been easier to [out]source and 
could have made purchases on the components less expensive. But the base 
stations, routers, these were all unstandardised and we couldn’t but depend 
upon Samsung. … For telecommunications carriers, complete 
standardization? And then perfect competition. … Since these didn’t exist in 
the beginning we had to depend upon Samsung, and the prices for the 
systems were expensive. … These were the difficulties during the initial 
introduction. The standards—they weren’t fully standardized like in 
computers. It would have been nice if it had been so, but we could only be 
dependent upon Samsung. 
(Director, SKT, 13 September 2010) 
Along the discrepancies arising from the differing urgencies in the domestic 
commercialization of WiBro, efforts aimed at the commercialization and 
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globalization of the domestic technology and service were coordinated under 
domestic IT policy, IT839 strategy, which was led by MIC (MIC, 2005b). The IT839 
strategy aimed to introduce the world’s first services and products by promoting 
eight service areas, building three infrastructures, and developing nine new growth 
engines. The eight service areas included HSDPA/W-CDMA, WiBro, Broadband 
convergence service, DMB/DTV service, u-home service, Telematics/Location-
based service, RFID/USN application service, and IT service, revised for the u-
IT839 strategy (MIC, 2005b). Upon the development and the standardization of 
WiBro, WiBro was increasingly considered one of the core technologies to fulfil 
such policy aims for the development and the implementation of new ICT-related 
products and services. Under such policy aims and objectives, commercial WiBro 
service was required to take off by the first half of 2006 (MIC, 2006a, 15p). 
An initial milestone for driving the world’s first implementation of WiBro service 
was set by MIC, to showcase WiBro service at the APEC meeting in Busan in 
November 2005. The demonstration of actual services of WiBro to the 
representatives of APEC member countries as well as industry members was 
considered a key site to promote the standardization of IEEE802.16e and the 
worldwide diffusion of Mobile WiMAX, particularly based on the WiBro profile 
(Kwon, 2005). Other objectives were also driven with the goal of demonstrating at 
APEC, such as motivating Samsung and other manufacturers to develop commercial 
WiBro systems in time, which would be critical in the diffusion of the services and 
technologies. KT was selected as the main demonstrator of WiBro service, whereas 
SKT was responsible for demonstrating HSDPA (Lee, 2005). KT, as a sole 
demonstrator of WiBro service, aggressively prepared for the demonstration; the 
intention of the demonstration at APEC was extended to showcase a precommercial 
trial service, prior to the actual commercial launch in the domestic market to take 
place in 2006. The APEC demonstration of WiBro was therefore expected to be the 
prelude for the domestic commercial service as well as the worldwide adoption of 
Mobile WiMAX. 
On 15 November 2005, WiBro was successfully demonstrated to the representatives 
of the APEC member countries, major telecommunications operators, vendors 
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around the world, the WiMAX Forum, other global-standards organisations, and 
many others. Most advanced WiBro handsets were prepared in close collaboration 
with Samsung, and various applications such as multimedia messaging, Video-on-
demand (VoD), video telephony, broadcasting, navigations, and home networking 
were successfully demonstrated. Through Tablet PCs connected to the WiBro 
network, real-time news from CNN and Arirang TV and music videos were shown, 
while P to P video conferencing between multiple sites were demonstrated while 
traveling by bus to and fro the conference sites and a few other destinations. The 
seamless connection and the operation of the services at APEC were then followed 
by positive outlooks and anticipation of the actual implementation and adoption in 
domestic and foreign markets (Song, 2005b). 
Indeed, the seamlessly coordinated showcase of WiBro services presented many 
promises and possibilities in the deployment of next-generation, convergence 
services. It was, to an extent, working proof of the technical performance of WiBro 
as one of the most advanced types of telecommunications services. Yet, the 
concerted efforts to bring about the most advanced services of WiBro were effective 
only to the extent of showcasing their utmost capacities, unhindered by concerns that 
were subject to real market conditions and the environment. 
The following section examines further discrepancies that arose in the course of 
actual deployment of commercial systems and the services of WiBro in the Korean 
domestic market. The discrepancies presented a chasm among the interests of the 
innovation players who together were involved in the process of coproducing 
commercial WiBro service. 
5.2.2. Diverging choices and rising discrepancies: the 
commercialisation of WiBro 
Alongside the rising visions and hopeful attempts towards globalization, there were 
also negative forecasts and perceived challenges in the domestic commercialization 
of WiBro service. In particular, with the advent of HSDPA, which was rapidly 
evolving from the existing 3G mobile-communications network technology, WiBro 
was increasingly anticipated by some to be repositioned as a competing service 
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rather than being complementary to HSDPA (Na, 2005). The future of WiBro was 
therefore increasingly questioned. Adding to this outlook on the emerging service, 
Hanaro Telecom returned its license and gave up its plan for implementation after 
concerns about the considerable investment required with little prospect for a return 
(Song, 2005a). The key reason for Hanaro Telecom’s decision was to concentrate on 
and strengthen their competency in their core business, which was fixed-line high-
speed Internet. Hanaro Telecom had, in fact, been at the forefront with KT of 
securing the spectrum license since the very beginning of the reallocation of the 
2.3GHz frequency band for Portable Internet use. Furthermore, it had recently made 
agreements with SK Telecom to share their base stations and access networks for 
WiBro service deployment in areas countrywide excluding Seoul and six cities, 
which would bring them both an efficient and large amount of savings in investment 
in the implementation of WiBro service (Kim, 2005a). Despite the alliance being 
formed, Hanaro Telecom eventually decided to drop the license as the deadline for 
the payment of the license fee was approaching (Kim, 2005b). 
WiBro service was thus to be implemented by KT and SKT. This was a significant 
change from the original scenario that had been planned out through the WiBro 
licensing policy to promote the service through effective competition in the market, 
by enrolling three operators. Furthermore, the roadmaps for the implementation of 
WiBro differed to a degree. SKT was rather reserved and hesitant about stepping 
into actual deployment of the emerging service since the spectrum license had been 
granted. In fact, while SKT had consistently insisted that WiBro should play a 
complementary role to its own 3G network, the two differing services seemed to 
carry inherent uncertainties towards the future relationship, especially with the rapid 
advancement of the 3G technologies from WCDMA to HSDPA: 
From SKT’s viewpoint, although we actively participated in the WiBro 
business since the writing up of plans for it, there were already disputes 
around the cannibalization issue. As there was a degree of overlap between 
mobile telephony and the WiBro business boundary; we couldn’t really 
actively invest in WiBro. 
(Director, SKT, 13 September 2010) 
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The boundary issues related to mobile telephony and WiBro had been a source of 
concern and much disputed among industry players, especially network operators, 
since the conceptualization of Portable Internet service. Furthermore, HSDPA, with 
its improved capacity for downlink data rates from that of WCDMA was further 
anticipated to be either complementary or competitive to WiBro, depending on 
terminal types, and to compete when applied to handset-type mobile terminals with 
voice service included (Park et al., 2005). Although SKT’s initial service vision had 
been to provide seamless handover between the WCDMA and WiBro networks 
while using the mobile phone-type terminals, the evolving relationship between the 
two networks brought about further challenges to SKT’s implementation of WiBro 
service.  
Meanwhile, KT had planned to take gradual steps, while it foresaw the ultimate 
destination to be the convergence of various types of services, enabling both data 
and voice communication to work in a convergence mode of mobile handsets. The 
future plan for roll out of WiBro service was divided into three stages: Introduction, 
Growth, and Maturity (KT, 2005). At the introduction stage, KT planned to 
implement WiBro-only Personal Computer Memory Card International Association 
(PCMCIA) cards and embedded modems for laptops, and WiBro-only PDAs as well 
as smart-phone-type handsets having dual mode and dual band for voice and data. In 
the growth stage and then in the maturity stage, WiBro would gradually be 
implemented with other services including WLAN, DMB, GPS and CDMA, finally 
reaching converging service through multi-mode, multi-band55 mobile terminals. 
Among the services to be converged with WiBro, voice-communications service 
seemed most critical to KT in the long run, to secure its competitive position in the 
future fixed-mobile convergence service market. Although KT would first 
implement voice through the CDMA network owned by KT’s mobile subsidiary, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55A multi-mode mobile terminal operates across different standards whereas a multi-band 
terminal (also frequently called dual, tri, or quad band) is designed to work on more than one 
radio frequency. KT’s roadmap for WiBro suggested up to a triple-band, triple-mode mobile 
handset that would include a set of standard WiBro, WLAN, and CDMA, or a set of WiBro, 
CDMA, and DMB. (KT Corporation, The Role of Wi-Bro for the Convergence Era. Asia-




KTF, VoIP seemed to be an ultimate solution it should pursue, as was increasingly 
anticipated and suggested by numerous reports and articles on the future of WiBro 
service (Han, 2005). 
Whilst KT’s and SKT’s approaches towards the commercialization of WiBro 
differed to a degree, disputes arose with regard to KT’s plan for the deployment of 
VoIP. SKT firmly opposed deploying VoIP in the WiBro network, asserting that the 
licenses for 3G and WiBro belonged to different classifications of communications 
services:3G for voice and WiBro for data, which had resulted in differing amounts 
for licensing fees.56 However, the regulation governing mobile VoIP had not yet 
been in place to resolve such a conflict, whereas unsettled disputes further brought 
about delays in the development of mobile phones for WiBro. In response to 
ongoing disputes between the incumbent mobile operator and KT, the mobile phone 
industry did not respond very actively to WiBro marketing, although they anticipated 
that mobile phones would eventually lead the service in the future (Park, 2006). 
Under KT’s and SKT’s differing concepts and strategies, WiBro service was finally 
launched on 30th June 2006, as scheduled (MIC, 2006d). There was only one type of 
WiBro terminal available in the market: the PCMCIA card for laptops. Advanced 
terminals including PDAs, dual-mode, and dual-band terminals, combining WiBro 
and other wireless standards, as well as multimedia enhanced mobile-phone types, 
were planned and expected by KT to be introduced in the following months. 
Yet, three years after the initial launch of WiBro service, the development and 
implementation of advanced WiBro devices were still faced with discrepancies 
among the coproducers of the WiBro service. Even the leading manufacturer, whose 
urgency lay in developing advanced WiBro devices, was experiencing certain 
obstacles in pursuing their goal. Among the key obstacles was the network 
operator’s passive approach towards the commercialisation of WiBro service. In 
particular, the lack of commitment by SKT to deploy commercial WiBro service 
caused constraints for the leading manufacturer, whose interest mainly lay in early 
deployment and diffusion of WiBro systems and devices: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56Mobile operators had paid for the 3G license 1.3 trillion KRW while 175 billion KRW had 
been paid for the licenses for WiBro (20060112). 
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Network coverage: … KCC is pushing SKT. SKT is reconsidering its 
marketability, although this is not very explicit. Expansion of network 
coverage should precede terminal launch. Fee is a sensitive issue. SKT’s 
promotion activities have been very slight. … The WiBro team at SKT is 
very small, there are limitation in network coverage, which constrains 
Samsung. SKT is rather dependent on Samsung. Samsung has many 
proposals. However, the dilemma lies in the fact that SKT’s WiBro team is 
too small. 
(Manager A, Samsung Electronics, 2 September 2009) 
Indeed, the manufacturer, in coproducing high-end devices for the new service, was 
facing certain dilemmas as they met operators’ differing plans and strategies towards 
the deployment of commercial WiBro service. Although KT had been more actively 
pursuing implementation of WiBro service, differing senses of urgency emerged 
leading to differing deployment strategies in implementation of WiBro service: 
Samsung is in a leading position. We have been approached with the view 
that WiBro should be implemented with Smartphones. This was our idea 
from the beginning, yet it wasn’t very feasible in the beginning stage. KT is 
preparing Smartphone+WiBro this year. We have been trying to move KT in 
this direction. KT preferred Modem-type services. 
(Manager B, Samsung Electronics, 2 September 2009) 
Although the discrepancies among the coproducers of WiBro services in the 
domestic market were not easily mediated, such imbalances in vision, aims, and 
objectives further brought about conflicts and disputes among the players in the 
commercialization of WiBro service. The differing interpretations of WiBro service, 
differing senses of urgency in deployment strategies, and differing aspects and 
degrees of commitment towards WiBro caused discrepancies in the process of 
coproduction of an emerging telecommunications service. 
In the following section, I discuss the resulting gap between the initial visions and 
anticipations linked to WiBro and actual outcomes in domestic-market adoption. The 
ongoing pursuit of the global diffusion of WiBro-related standards and products by 
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the manufacturers and others are observed vis-à-vis the unmitigated challenges faced 
by the promoters of the wide diffusion of WiBro in the domestic market. 
5.2.3. Global diffusion vs. domestic illusion 
The eventual launch of WiBro service in the domestic market was closely linked to 
the aim of the Korean government and the industry that had been aligned towards 
globalization, especially driven forward through harmonization of the domestic 
standard for WiBro and the IEEE802.16 international standard. The world’s first 
commercial service in the domestic market was regarded and promoted to be the key 
milestone to achieve technological leadership in the international standardization as 
well as in markets abroad (Hong, 2007). Along with efforts linked to globalisation, 
Samsung the leading manufacturer of WiBro systems and devices in Korea, made its 
first entry to export the ‘home-grown’ systems to foreign countries in 2005 (Hong 
and Kim, 2005)57, and further expanded its overseas implementation sites to 23 
countries with 35 network operators by the year 200758(Kim, 2009c). Indeed, the 
adoption of Mobile WiMAX systems and the service in the overseas market did 
seem to increase rather rapidly, whereas the domestic market for WiBro was lagging 
behind. 
Furthermore, a subset of WiMAX, under the name ‘OFDMA TDD WMAN’ was 
approved by ITU as a new terrestrial radio interface for IMT-2000 in October 2007 
(ITU, 2007). This approval meant that as the Korean version of Mobile WiMAX, 
WiBro was technically included as a profile version of a specification of Mobile 
WiMAX into an officially designated IMT-2000 family of mobile communications 
standards. The inclusion of Mobile WiMAX to IMT-2000 had been greatly pursued 
by a collaboration between the Korean government and the industry, as they were 
closely aligned with other members and member countries that were supporting the 
WiMAX standard to be approved as the sixth IMT2000 family standard. Not only 
did the inclusion bring a promising future for further diffusion of the WiBro profile 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57Samsung made contract with BT to export the Mobile WiMAX pilot system and Internet 
Protocol Multimedia Subsystems (IMS) in August 2005. 
58 Among the collaborators,Samsung had contracted with 10 operators over 8 countries for 
commercial service by 2009. Commercial Mobile WiMAX in the United States began on 30 
April 2008 (NARS 2009, 23p). 
 
 135 
as the 3G mobile standard and service, but it also suggested further linkage towards 
the next-generation mobile communications standard and service, namely 4G (Hong, 
2007; Kim, 2007). The eventual line-up of IEEE802.16 in the 3G radio standard was 
thus much praised and greeted in Korea, especially by the developers and the 
manufacturers of WiBro systems and devices. Their aims were then further extended 
to gaining technology as well as market leadership for next-generation mobile 
communications. 
However, despite such progress with the technology and the standard for 
globalization, adoption of actual WiBro services in Korea was lagging far behind 
original expectations in the market (Yoon et al., 2007). As of June 2007, 12,443 
people subscribed from both operators, which was far less than what had been 
anticipated by KISDI and ETRI as well as the industry59. By the end of August 2008, 
there were 188,000 subscribers for KT, and 3,000 subscribers for SKT. The 
penetration rate was only 0.4%, whereas the average revenue per user (ARPU) was 
estimated at USD$10 (Chung, 2008). Being faced with such discontinuity between 
the domestic and the international markets, stakeholders raised the need to promote 
the domestic market for WiBro in close relation with the need to bring about 
sustainable leadership in the global market for Mobile WiMAX (Park and Kim, 
2008; TTA, 2008b). The slow take up of WiBro service was especially regarded as 
an obstacle for manufacturers in keeping pace with the successful landing of their 
products in foreign markets, whereas the domestic market was regarded as an 
important reference site because the manufacturers could bring about further sales to 
their global counterparts: 
There has been a great success in Russia with WiBro. Within 3 months the 
subscribers counted 200,000. We are trying to see the factors from various 
points—Country? Telecom operator? Terminal devices? Samsung’s 
involvement in WiBro entailed the very strong intention to better its position 
compared to other foreign vendors. Samsung has sold around 200,000,000 
terminals, among which only 10% were sold in Korea. The domestic market 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59 The number of subscribers was expected to reach 4.9 million by 2008, and 9.2 million by 
2011. Less optimistic figures were 2.9 million by 2008, and 6.8 million by 2011. 
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is important regardless of the volume. When we sell in countries abroad, we 
often get questions like ‘it must be a great success in Korea’—We can’t say 
anything about this. 
(Head of Dept, Samsung Electronics, 2 September 2009) 
Furthermore, the domestic market, as the home ground for the leading manufacturer, 
was considered to be the ground upon which competencies could be built against 
foreign products and services. Thus, the ‘vitalization of the domestic market’ was 
increasingly called for by the manufacturers and others whose interests had been 
aligned towards the global diffusion of WiBro systems and devices: 
Vitalising the domestic market for WiBro is very important. The competency 
and competitiveness of the domestic technology can be achieved by 
activating [the market]. Foreign business scales are extremely large, so 
Samsung alone cannot cover them all. In such cases, we also introduce our 
domestic-vendor collaborators—It is very important to enhance our 
competitiveness based on the domestic ecosystem. 
 (Song, vice president, Samsung, Interview at 4thWiBro Convergence Service 
Technology Workshop, 4-5 March, 2010) 
However, the domestic market condition did not easily respond to such expectations 
linked to globalization. The market adoption of WiBro service in the domestic 
market remained sluggish. Various problems in services were recognized as reasons 
for the slow adoption of WiBro service in Korean market, which included limited 
network coverage, limited choices of handsets and terminal devices, lack of 
outstanding applications, as well as early commercialization of competing services 
(Kim, 2009c; Yeo and Park, 2010). KCC then contributed various policy measures to 
tackle the problems that had been identified as the major causes for the low diffusion 
of WiBro. KCC called for the operators to actively implement their initial plan by 
reviewing their progress in relation to their implementation plans for WiBro service, 
submitted at the time of spectrum licensing. By deploying the ‘WiBro Activation 
Plan,’ KCC further addressed its plan for additional licensing of WiBro operation 
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along with its decision to allow VoIP and the use of the prefix number of mobile 
telephony, ‘010’ (KCC, 2008). 
KCC’s efforts to promote more active appropriation of WiBro by the operators, 
however, did not lead to a quick remedy for the problem of ‘diffusion lag’. Operators 
indeed worked to meet their official deployment plan of WiBro under a degree of 
pressure from the government. The government’s firm intention was to achieve the 
goal of successful diffusion of WiBro services in the domestic market. Since the 
launch of WiBro service in 2006, network coverage had expanded from the initial 
six small areas in a few restricted regions in Seoul and the suburbs to the whole of 
Seoul and 23 major cities including the metropolitan areas, in 2007 (Ahn, 2007). By 
the end of 2009, KT’s WiBro network had been built over all of Seoul and 19 
neighboring cities, subways, major highways, hot-spot areas of Kimpo airport, and 
universities. SKT had built hot spots around 24 areas in Seoul, 23 areas in the 
suburbs, and 9 areas in other cities (Kim, 2009c). WiBro’s network coverage thus 
expanded, and nationwide coverage was finally achieved by 2011. Yet, this alone did 
not lead to the success of WiBro service. 
Although the government continued to seek additional measures to promote the 
domestic WiBro service market, rising disputes addressed whether to sustain efforts 
to promote domestic WiBro services or to concentrate on enlarging markets for 
Mobile WiMAX abroad (Kim, 2009d; Lee, 2009a). Furthermore, in the report 
published by the National Assembly Research Service in December 2009 on the 
current status of WiBro business and future directions, Kim (2009d) recommended 
that the government revise its strategy and objectives regarding domestic WiBro 
policy. The recommendation included varying directions for WiBro such as 
maximising its use for specific needs in limited areas rather than promoting it as a 
nationwide service, as well as restructuring the telecommunications market to 
promote competition. 
Yet, WiBro service continued to evolve in the South Korean market, along with the 
sustained efforts of the government to promote WiBro service, as well as the 
operators’ ongoing search for niche services in collaboration with other players. 
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Indeed, although the initial projections on the future of WiBro uptake in the 
domestic market turned out to be largely an illusion about new technological 
offerings, the diffusion at the global level seemed to suggest further hopes in the face 
of the uncertainties about the future outcome of WiBro. 
5.2.4. Summary 
In this section, I examined the interactions among diverging interests in the process 
of appropriating the generic capabilities of an emerging technology to specific 
WiBro services in the commercial market. First, I observed rising conflicts in 
attempts to commercialise an emerging global standard in the domestic market of 
South Korea. For vendors of WiBro systems, globalisation brought about an urgency 
to implement their systems in the domestic market so as to provide a reference site 
for further diffusion of their products abroad. The operators, however, were more 
inclined to reach wide interoperability and compatibility of the standards. 
Actual processes leading to commercial deployment of WiBro systems and the 
services involved further discrepancies: the differing positioning of WiBro by the 
two operators against the existing mobile networks and the services, and 
subsequently the differing implementation roadmaps and deployment strategies for 
the commercial market. This divergence created further mismatches in operators’ 
intentions and commitments and those of the manufacturers, who were involved in 
the coproduction of WiBro services in the Korean domestic market. Yet, such 
mismatches were not easily mitigated. The KCC brought various measures to tackle 
the problem of what was viewed as the ‘diffusion lag.’ Indeed, the domestic market 
uptake of WiBro service lagged far behind the anticipated rates of diffusion. 
Moreover, the issues relating to the gap were further heightened by the increasing 
sales of WiBro systems in the overseas market by domestic vendors who argued for 
the urgency of modeling the domestic market as a reference site for successful 
deployment of commercial WiBro service. 
The process leading to the appropriation of the generic vision and capabilities of 
WiBro thus involved a degree of divergence of interests whose interactions created 
conflicts and discrepancies towards the coproduction of WiBro service in the South 
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Korean market. Although efforts were put forth to coordinate varying interests 
towards the early commercial uptake of WiBro, they were effective only in 
showcasing the generic technical possibilities of WiBro. 
5.3 Trial and error: Towards finding the niche service of WiBro 
The purported vision of WiBro services was not easily met while the operators, 
especially KT, struggled to develop, implement, and make the services available to 
users, through various ways of collaborating with other market and innovation 
players. KT had envisioned WiBro service to provide high-speed Internet anywhere, 
any time, especially while on the move, enjoying high-speed data transfer with low 
access costs (Ko, 2005). Yet, when KT and SKT officially rolled out commercial 
WiBro service on 30 June 2006, one type of device was available for the service: 
PCMCIA for laptops enabled an Internet connection to access web browsers (MIC, 
2006c). Although it was anticipated that the major device for WiBro service would 
eventually be mobile phones including smartphones, major WiBro service seemed to 
stabilise around wireless Internet access service for laptop users. 
In this section I more closely observe the process of appropriation of the generic 
technology by the operators and others. I demonstrate how the players—especially 
those committed to deploying WiBro technology and service—struggled to 
appropriate the technology into workable services. I also discuss how the operator 
and committed players came to create WiBro as a niche service. Lastly, it explores 
into the process of appropriation and use during which further innovation took place. 
5.3.1. Facing challenges: Mobile phones and network coverage 
By 2009, mobile devices such as mobile PCs, PMPs, and smartphones were 
available using WiBro,60 in addition to modem-type devices such as PCMCIA cards 
and USB modems (Kim, 2009a; Lee, 2009b). However, they suffered from low 
market adoption and none provided ‘WiBro-only’ service, which would eventually 
bring about the competency of WiBro as a data-intensive mobile service. WiBro had 
been expected to provide data-intensive multimedia services over a high-speed 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60 WiBro Smartphone (SPH-M8100, WiBro+CDMA)) LG PDA phone(LG-KC1, LG&KT), 
MITs (SPH-P9000), ‘full touch WiBro phone’ (SCH-M830, May 2009, SKT). 
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network with low end-user fees to differentiate WiBro from other mobile services 
over the existing cellular networks of CDMA and WCDMA (Choi, 2004b; Kim et al., 
2006; TTA, 2008b). Various challenges were met in developing and deploying 
WiBro products and services that required an effective alignment of various choices 
that were simultaneously operating in existing market structures, consisting of a 
wide range of telecommunications services including 3G, fixed-line broadband 
Internet, and broadcasting services (e.g., Digital Mobile Broadcasting). 
Among efforts to provide WiBro-embedded mobile phones, for example, KT 
struggled over the challenges linked to the wide diffusion of 2G and 3G mobile 
phones. Technical difficulties, mainly due to the limited economies of scale in 
producing WiBro-embedded mobile phones, precluded achieving the same quality of 
service as existing mobile services: 
We actually thought we needed a phone type to enter the mass market. At 
that time voice was on 2G. We developed a 2G+WiBro phone, but it wasn’t 
easy to develop the phone type. There were various technical difficulties and 
bugs, and insufficient design aspects. There were already 45,000,000 very 
nice phones on the market. To make our [WiBro] phones as nice as them, we 
would have to order several hundred thousand or a million phones. But this 
wasn’t possible from the beginning. We did invest a lot in the network but we 
were a bit passive in investing in terminals. We had only tens of thousands of 
phones, and as a result, although the size was big, the design was not very 
nice. The phone got disconnected easily, and the screen would black out. We 
first provided three types: two from Samsung and one from LG. They were 
2G, and at the end of last year we made one more. It was 3W, åincluding 
WiFi, 3G, and WiBro. But there was no significant market response for that 
either. We’ve stopped producing 2G+WiBro phones. We don’t plan to 
produce phones any more. We may be developing phones in the future but 
for now, phones are difficult to develop. Using common sense, it’s really 
good to have WiFi, 3G, and WiBro on one phone. But if they are included, 
the size becomes bigger, there is higher power consumption, the battery 
doesn’t last long, software gets entangled inside, and when using an 
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application, it had to be elaborate as well, and thus difficult technically. It 
would seem nice to have everything included together, but that is not easy. 
(Director at KT, 27 May 2010) 
Indeed, while they struggled to compete in the existing mobile data-service market 
through the advanced mobile phones, WiBro embedded mobile phones were 
regarded as having low quality of service in mobility, stability, battery life, and 
security (Kim and Lee, 2008). 
The lack of competency and the economies of scale were closely linked to the timely 
expansion of network coverage. Nationwide network coverage was a critical 
precondition for early and timely uptake of the generic technical capabilities of 
WiBro by a wide range of telecommunications-market players including device 
manufacturers, applications developers, and content service providers (Jang et al., 
2005). Yet, by October 2010 only all of Seoul and the major cities in the suburbs, six 
metropolitan cities, and major highways had been covered by the WiBro network 
(Seok et al., 2011). The lack of nationwide coverage in the early years of commercial 
service brought about challenges for expanding the user base, and vice versa. 
Although operators had made attempts to put mobile applications on a variety of 
mobile devices, the lack of nationwide coverage and rather slow expansion 
prevented them from attracting a wider array of device manufacturers and module 
makers.61 Furthermore, the preference by the operator itself for the existing 3G 
network and WiBro could only concentrate the development and deployment of 3G 
handsets, considering the limited physical coverage of the WiBro network: 
It’s quite important to see how the network operators develop terminal 
devices. For example, if terminals that could access 3G, WiFi, and WiBro are 
in general use, that would be best, but in fact, operators proposed 
requirements to terminal manufacturers … such as to develop a terminal that 
can gain access to 3G and WiFi. … But the WiBro network is limited and 
now covers 84 cities, so there are limits to developing WiBro-only terminals 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61 Interview, Module maker, and provider : ‘For us as module makers and providers, there 
were many options. Our position is more closely aligned to following the market rather than 
leading, so if there is large demand, it’s worth investing and if it’s not we won’t.’ 
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and making sales to customers. And then operators chose rather to 
concentrate on the development and sales of 3G terminals with nationwide 
coverage, and as a result WiBro could not but fall behind. 
(Director, SKT, 13 September 2010) 
Around 2008, KT attempted to build an ‘ecosystem’ to support the wide adoption of 
WiBro service by forming the ‘KT WiBro Alliance’ (Hwang, 2008). The alliance 
was comprised of manufacturers of WiBro chipsets, netbooks, PMPs, navigation, 
electronic dictionaries, and more. For the content, KT had signed an agreement with 
Freechal Consortium of which the service providers for fixed-line broadband 
Internet were members. These alliances and networks of operators, manufacturers, 
applications developers, and content providers were expected to eventually bring 
about an ecosystem for WiBro service. However, their commitment to implementing 
WiBro service did not last long, nor was it effective, as WiBro failed to meet users’ 
needs in the variety of choices of devices as well as the quality of service over the 
networks (Paik et al., 2009). Although KT had been anxious over data-intensive 
applications and content such as mobile TV/IPTV, games, multimedia messenger 
service, and video-streaming services to be the outstanding applications and services 
for WiBro, these services could not be fully enjoyed by customers due to the limited 
coverage and the limited lineup of mobile devices. 
5.3.2. Finding niche services for WiBro 
Over the years of sustained deployment of WiBro services, a few niche areas of 
WiBro service were generally regarded as the ‘success examples’ of WiBro (Lee et 
al., 2011b). Being faced with obstacles that could not be resolved in a short period of 
time, KT searched for niche service areas where WiBro would eventually build 
momentum for further diffusion. One was a convergence service using a router to 
connect WiFi devices (such as iPod Touch, laptops and netbooks, and Nintendo DS) 
through the WiBro network.62 This did result in a short rise in the rate of adoption of 
WiBro service, along with a rise in the sales of small-sized laptops: the ‘netbooks.’ 
Together with USB WiBro modems to connect to the Internet, the routers provided 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62 Egg, the mobile router for WiFi connection was first introduced by KT in April 2009. 
Equivalent to KT’s Egg, SKT’s Bridge came to market in February 2010. 
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steady sales as a niche service using WiBro (Seok et al., 2011).63.WiBro service, 
thus, seemed to stabilize around mobile Internet-access service: 
Just provide Internet access. Even if we develop specific service [for WiBro], 
it’s not competitive against the galaxy of services in the market, and we 
won’t attempt to go further. We did put much effort into phones—phones 
have their specific services. With the rise of smartphone use, open Internet 
browsing would become popular, but before smartphones—in feature phones, 
closed content was used. So we tried hard to develop services, but the phone 
itself wasn’t competitive, and it became meaningless. So, now there is no 
WiBro-specific service. It’s just Internet-access service. 
(Director at KT, 27 May 2010) 
KT’s WiBro service for the mass market was focused on the provision of WiBro 
USB modems and mobile routers, especially those named ‘Egg,’ first 
commercialised through close collaboration with a small- and medium-sized 
manufacturing company for WiBro devices. From an interview with the chief 
technical officer of the device manufacturer, the strong coupling of the developer–
user relationship was important. The chief technical officer mentioned KT as a key 
user of their product; KT’s preferences and needs were defined and actively reflected 
in the shaping of their WiBro products: 
Network operators are involved in all telecommunications businesses. 
Looking at issues like mobile subsidies, it’s different from the selling 
[manufacturer’s] viewpoint of products to that of general users. So we 
thought operators were our users in the first place. Although we were led to 
end users through collaboration with the operators, the best way is to listen to 
those people who are really responsible for this business, and share concerns 
about prospects and so on. Based on this we make decisions. 
(CTO at MODACOM, 15 July 2010) 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63 By early 2010, the three types of WiBro devices for connecting to the Internet (USB 
modem, mobile router, and PCMCIA) together accounted for 90% of the market share in 
WiBro terminals (Seok et al. 2011, 171p). 
 
 144 
For Moda, KT was positioned as the responsible user who would actively search for 
requirements on which the company would build their product. Although the 
company would also be searching, they could have the best certainty through KT 
about how their products would be appropriated (Interview with CIO, Moda in 2010). 
Through the sustained relationship between the manufacturer and KT, the 
manufacturer was positioned as one of the leading manufacturers among 11 WiBro-
device manufacturers by 2011, with the largest domestic market share of WiBro 
routers (Seok et al., 2011). 
Based on the successful debut of WiBro-enabled mobile routers to connect to the 
Internet, KT extended its service by committing itself to developing business-to-
business solutions through the use of the WiBro network. WiBro was increasingly 
implemented at specific business sites, where it contributed to enhancing the 
business environment. KT’s mobile router, Egg,64 was implemented in one of the 
largest private taxi (‘call-taxi’) companies in Korea, and enhanced their success rates 
for allocation of their taxis upon customer requests for the taxi service. Egg was 
connected with the navigation system in each taxi to provide GPS information while 
it enabled interactive communication with the control center of the company. The 
sales team for WiBro at KT searched for additional diverse uses of WiBro, 
especially in business-to-business areas, as they increasingly faced difficulty meeting 
mass-market needs (Interview, Director at KT, 2010). 
5.3.3. Innovation in use: The making of the ‘digital shipyard’ 
KT’s further struggle for the appropriation of WiBro met efforts from elsewhere, 
bringing a massive shipbuilding site into a WiBro zone where the technology was 
deployed, appropriated, and domesticated. It was a site for innovation through 
WiBro: several groups of innovation players were fully committed to deploying 
WiBro infrastructure over the vast area of the shipbuilding site. This niche area 
consisted of the diverse environment of the shipbuilding sites, covering 5.9 million 
m2 where 47,000 employees were engaged (Cheong, 2009). Fixed and wireless 
communications were critical for the working environment in the shipyard where the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




allocation of huge blocks of ship parts and safety equipment were quite dependent on 
communications among staff. A worker in the shipyard had to carry multiple 
terminal devices to communicate: for example, a walky-talky for ordering a crane, a 
trunked radio system for group-consultations, and a mobile phone. 
This niche area needed an advanced ICT infrastructure. ETRI, one of the core 
developers of the WiBro system, first suggested implementing WiBro65 in the 
shipyard. The deployment of WiBro in the shipbuilding environment was thus 
pursued in close collaboration with ETRI, coordinated through a collaborative 
programme on advancing the shipbuilding industry towards global excellence, based 
on IT (Park et al., 2010). KT and Hyundai Heavy Industry (HHI) signed a 
memorandum of understanding in early 2009 to implement KT’s ‘W-Office (WiBro-
Office)’ system, a solution developed by KT to provide high-speed data service for 
enterprises using WiBro (Kim, 2009b). 
Alongside the building of formal relations between key collaborators, there was a 
strong commitment by the members in HHI. This was regarded by the interviewee 
from the company as a crucial driver for their high-risk-taking innovative attempt: 
We are internal IT experts. We made the decision to do it. We made the 
suggestion, and the CIO of this company thought it reasonable. … I think the 
role of CIO is very important. The CIO has to be the main agent for the 
convergence, to have the leadership to bring IT to be an innovative tool. … 
There is great risk in this so the most important part is that decision making 
must be based on foresight. Then there are followers like us who have the 
capacity to faithfully carry out the project. … Harmony is necessary. 
 (Director at HHI, 24 Feb 2010) 
The IT operation-management team in the company was thus fully committed to 
deploying, testing, and further developing WiBro applications and services in the 
shipbuilding environment. They actively searched and struggled, together with KT 
and ETRI, to successfully deploy WiBro in places where it could be operated and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65 Interview with Director at HHI. 
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used most effectively and efficiently. The harmonious efforts to engage WiBro as an 
innovative infrastructure for their shipbuilding environment resulted in the 
successful deployment of the technology and the service: innovation took place at 
the worksites, bringing wireless communication to areas where they had not had 
even fixed-line communications: 
Inside our drillship—it’s very deep inside—up to 30 to 40m—the whole 
space is surrounded by steel and no communication is possible inside. No 
fixed-line phones, no walky talkies. It’s just a dark underworld. Here we 
brought communication using WiBro. We put in PLC-power line 
communication and on top of this we deployed WiBro. The structure is 
simple. … Nearby, WiFi phones and video phones can be used. Our staff 
member, Mr. Chung, was testing the phone there and the workers thought he 
was crazy and told him that phones don’t work there. If there is a total shift, 
it feels strange. Then, we approached them by explaining, and they began to 
ask for fast deployment. They were eager to use the service. 
(Director at HHI, 24 Feb 2010) 
The innovation led to further innovations as WiBro was implemented, tested, and 
used by IT operators and the shipbuilders. The staff in the IT operation department 
regarded themselves as internal service providers involved in the sales, marketing, 
and deployment, while they were fortunate enough to have committed users in the 
domain of their ‘marketplace’ (Interview, Director, HHI, 24 Feb 2010). In response 
to their efforts in the implementation, shipbuilders provided active feedback: they 
brought additional requests and used WiBro service creatively, bringing about 
further innovation in the applications and use of WiBro: 
New exploration of applications in the actual workplace are much more 
active than technical improvements. ... We’ve given them a set of [Coco] 
blocks.66 We built the kiosk as a model for them. The workers are already 
using it in very many ways—for calibration of the ship’s location and a lot 
more. They develop its use in relation to their own job. WiBro as a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66A type of children’s toy similar to Lego blocks. 
 
 147 
technology is quite advanced, and there are more examples of its innovative 
use than further innovation in the technology itself. We leave the technical 
part to academia, and we concentrate on the applications—there are uses that 
we had not even anticipated. Like, we gave them blocks, and they’ve made a 
tank. 
(Director at HHI, 24 Feb 2010) 
WiBro was thus implemented, tested, and used, leading to creative innovation and 
use in these niche areas, explored through close collaborations among the innovation 
players based on their strong commitment to developing, deploying, and using 
WiBro systems and services. In September 2009, the era of the ‘digital shipyard’ 
opened, based on the successful implementation of KT’s WiBro-enabled 
infrastructures and services (Chang, 2009). 
5.3.4. Summary 
In this section, I explicated the process of finding and creating niche WiBro services 
in the existing telecommunications market. Although the players faced a number of 
challenges especially in relation to the existing mobile phone market, the struggle to 
bring about workable commercial WiBro service led to finding a few niche areas. 
First, I discussed how the players came to identify major obstacles to successful 
deployment of commercial WiBro service in the course of appropriating the 
technology: for example, economies of scale that had been reached by mobile 
phones, and the large-scale investment needed for nationwide network coverage. 
Second, I further discussed how the struggle to appropriate WiBro through 
interactions among the committed players resulted in bringing about niche services 
including mobile Internet access for laptop users and in business-application areas. 
Third, I introduced a particular example of successful application and adoption of 
WiBro in making the digital shipyard, where the collaboration among the committed 
players in the application field brought about further innovation in the use of WiBro 
service. 
WiBro’s niche services, however, did not continue to expand into other areas of use, 
nor did it succeed in scaling-up to provide convergence services in the mass market, 
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as had been anticipated. What was thus regarded as an outcome of a large-scale 
technological innovation did not meet the initial visions and expectations. Despite an 
ongoing search and deployment efforts, WiBro in the telecommunications market 
seemed to stabilise as a niche service that would complement existing 
telecommunications services in limited applications areas. Furthermore, although 
WiBro was expected to compete against Long-Term Evolution (LTE) in the adoption 
of 4G standard, the hopes for the 4G WiBro tumbled as the two WiBro operators—
KT and SKT—chose to adopt LTE as their next-generation mobile standard. 
Subsequently, WiBro was largely positioned as a network and infrastructure to 
support rapidly increasing large-scale data traffic, providing, at best, a 
complementary role in 4G mobile communications (Yeo and Park, 2010). 
5.4 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I examined the complex dynamics that shaped WiBro services in 
South Korea, especially through the process of appropriating the generic vision, 
technology, and standard by the involved innovation players including the 
manufacturers, government, operators, and others. Here, the concept of appropriation 
was adopted from the social-learning framework, where it denotes the process of an 
innovation being adapted to local circumstances or contexts (van Lieshout et al., 
2001; Williams et al., 2005). Although the concept has generally been used in 
delineating the process of uptake by final users of an innovation, the process of 
appropriation in this research has mainly involved intermediaries: the intermediate 
users that have taken up the generic vision, technology, and standard of WiBro to 
produce specific WiBro services for the commercial telecommunications market. 
In the first section of this chapter, I explicated the multilevel innovation players as 
they were simultaneously involved in multiple alignments, carrying differing 
interests, goals, and strategies in each alignment formed. As the players were led 
towards appropriating the generic vision of WiBro, their varying concerns and aims, 
linked to the commercial deployment of an emerging telecommunications service, 
resulted in forming separate alignments from, yet to an extent concurrently with, the 
initially coordinated alignments for the shaping of the generic vision, technology, 
and standard for WiBro service. Although the separate alignments reflected differing 
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concerns and strategies towards the commercial uptake of WiBro, they were 
reconfigured in response to the choice of a single standard through the 
standardisation of WiBro. Yet, although the reconfiguration seemed to reflect a 
degree of closure in choosing a single standard for WiBro, the visions and aims for 
appropriating the single standard by the operators still diverged to a degree, 
especially competing against each other to claim their own eligibility and 
competency for getting the license for the spectrum resource. 
In the second section, I focused on the discrepancies that arose in the course of 
bringing about commercial WiBro service in the domestic market. Due to the 
globalisation of what had initially been the domestic standard, the interests and 
urgency for adopting the global standard in the domestic market differed between the 
manufacturers and the operators: the manufacturers aimed for early commercial 
deployment to secure their technology leadership whereas the operators aimed to 
secure wider interoperability prior to early commercialisation. Alongside such 
conflicts, the technical performance of WiBro systems and the feasibility of WiBro 
enabled mobile multimedia services to successfully demonstrate WiBro to 
international participants at the APEC meeting in Seoul, Korea under the 
coordination by MIC for seamless cooperation among the manufacturers, operators, 
and others. Despite the successful demonstrations of the generic performance of the 
most advanced mobile multimedia services, players faced further discrepancies due 
to diverging choices towards the appropriation of the standard for actual commercial 
WiBro service. As choices diverged, outcomes diverged from the initial visions and 
expectations, leading to disputes about continuing to promote commercial WiBro 
service in the Korean domestic market. 
In the third section, I further observed the process of appropriating and using the 
generic technological offerings and the service by the players that were, to a degree, 
committed to the coproduction of WiBro service in the domestic market. The process 
involved trial and error through the challenges the players faced as they attempted to 
bring about WiBro service in the telecommunications market. They faced a number 
of obstacles including the lack of reaching economies of scale of WiBro devices due 
to the already abudant mobile phones in the market, as well as the lack of network 
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coverage due to the huge investments required. As they continued to search for niche 
areas for WiBro service, they identified and created the niche for WiBro providing 
mobile Internet access to end users through USB modems and mobile routers. They 
also provided an advanced, yet cost-efficient infrastructure for the business 
environment, which was identified as a successful niche area for WiBro service. In 
these niche areas, one could observe further innovation taking place through the 
process of final appropriation and use. 
This chapter thus highlighted the complexities of the innovation process, involving 
the development and deployment of the generic vision, technology, and standard for 
an emerging telecommunications service. It has especially demonstrated the 
diverging interests, visions, and choices on appropriating the generic technical 
capabilities of WiBro, which resulted in outcomes that diverged from the initial 
visions and expectations. Yet, over the evolution of WiBro service in the Korean 
domestic market and beyond, complexity alone does not explain the process of 
technological innovation and change. In the following chapter, I continue to discuss 
changing contingencies in the process of innovation, and how they have been 
addressed by the innovation players involved in the shaping of WiBro service. 
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Chapter 6. Dealing with changing contingencies: The dynamics 
towards the evolution of WiBro 
6.0 Introduction 
Over the years of deployment and use of WiBro service in the domestic market of 
South Korea, many critiques focused on addressing the gap that arose between initial 
expectations and the actual take-up of WiBro and have suggested subsequent 
measures to overcome the gap (Joo, 2007b; Kim, 2009d; Paik et al., 2009; Park, 
2008). However, by focusing on the changing contingencies in the process of 
shaping WiBro services, this chapter brings the discussion beyond the scope of 
addressing the gap. Rather, I explicate the gap by addressing the shifts and changes 
in the choices of innovation players involved in the process of appropriating the 
generic technical capabilities of WiBro into specific services. I therefore examine 
changing contingencies in the shaping of WiBro service, as well as how those 
contingencies have been addressed. 
In the first section, I discuss the evolving dynamics of mobile telecommunications 
along which WiBro did not evolve as had been expected. As mobile-
communications technologies evolved towards 4G (fourth-generation) mobile-
communications standards, and as the use of mobile data surged with the 
introduction of smartphones, WiBro was further expected to evolve towards 4G 
mobile service. However, WiBro did not evolve to provide advanced mobile data 
service, but remained a niche service in the telecommunications market. 
In the second section, I examine shifting choices of key players in the course of 
deployment of WiBro, which contributed to bringing about outcomes that diverged 
from the initial visions and expectations of commercial WiBro service. The choices 
that have shifted include the choice of VoIP as an outstanding application of WiBro, 
as well as the choice of LTE by global operators of WiMAX and others towards 
fourth-generation mobile-communications services. 
In the third section, I bring the discussion to the controversy in South Korea around 
policy choice with regard to the deployment, use, and future direction of WiBro. The 
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controversy resulted in the reshaping of the generic vision of WiBro, as well as 
recent WiBro policy in Korea. 
Last, I conclude with a discussion of the observed changing contingencies that have 
accompanied the shifting choices of varying interests in the evolution of WiBro in 
the telecommunications market. 
6.1 Evolving dynamics in mobile telecommunications 
The choices surrounding the deployment of WiBro technology were shaped through 
trial and error by more or less committed players, as they struggled to appropriate the 
generic capabilities of WiBro into specific services in the existing and evolving 
telecommunications market. However, their choices were further shaped not only by 
their histories, experiences and learning through the process of appropriation, but 
also through interactions with evolving technologies, services, and industry in the 
telecommunications market. Technologies, including IEEE802.16e for WiBro and 
WCDMA for 3G mobile communication, evolved to next-generation mobile-
communications technologies, namely, the 4G. The rapid diffusion of smartphones 
led by the innovation of iPhone brought about a steep rise in the use of mobile data 
services on the existing yet evolving cellular network and infrastructure. Also, 
industries were merging and government organisations were restructuring, headed 
towards the converging market for fixed and mobile, as well as telecommunications 
and broadcasting services. 
The evolving dynamics of telecommunications technologies and services were both 
an opportunity and threat for the evolution of WiBro services. By 2009, the WiBro 
technology, IEEE802.16e, had been acknowledged as 3G mobile communications 
technology by the International Telecommunications Union (ITU), while it further 
evolved to IEEE802.16m, which was proposed for global 4G mobile wireless 
broadband technology known as IMT-Advanced,67 along with 3GPP LTE Release 10 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
67 ITU announced the next-generation of standards for global wireless broadband 
communications as ‘IMT-Advanced’: ITU defined IMT-Advanced systems to provide 
access to ‘a wide range of telecommunication services supported by mobile and fixed 
networks, which are increasingly packet-based’. The new capabilities were to go beyond 
IMT-2000 while targeting transmission rates of 100 Mbit/s in a high-mobility environment, 
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and beyond (LTE-Advanced) (ITU, 2009). The two technologies were by then 
largely regarded as competing standards for 4G, whereas the Korean government 
officially chose to support and promote both technologies, as the proposals to ITU 
were carried out by international communities68. 
As the Korea Communications Commission (KCC) officially opted for both 
standards to be implemented in the domestic market, this brought about a dilemma, 
especially with regard to how to appropriate both technologies in the domestic 
market, on the verge of what was increasingly seen as the "‘4G War’. At the same 
time, one of the key rising visions and rationale for accommodating both standards 
suggested that the domestic market be built as a ‘global mobile testbed’ 69: 
The 4G war has begun at the verge of opening up WiBro. One of the leading 
LTE players, Ericsson, is building a bridgehead in Korea. … It intends to 
challenge the WiBro birthplace. … At this stage, how are we going to 
advance WiBro while at the same time accepting LTE. We shall not be 
closed [against such a challenge]. We should accept it. Yet, we need a 
strategy, such as controlling the time of release, etc. I believe we need to be 
the global mobile testbed by being successful with WiBro as well as adopting 
the 4G [LTE] technology. New services shall find a way out by being tested 
in our nation. We shall then be the central nation for 4G mobile 
communications, create national wealth, and export our products. 
 (Speech by Lee BK, KCC, at 4G Commmunication Symposium, 29 October 
2009) 
In line with such a vision, it was deemed critical to vitalize the WiBro service in the 
domestic market to realise the vision for 4G. It was expected WiBro would evolve 
towards 4G through various business models springing from the existing mobile 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
and 1Gbit/s in a stationary environment. 
(http://www.itu.int/net/newsroom/wrc/2012/reports/imt_advanced.aspx) 
68 Both technologies, under the names of WirelessMAN-Advanced and LTE-Advanced, 
were officially designated as IMT-Advanced by the ITU in January 2012 ITU, 2012, IMT-
Advanced standards announced for next-generation mobile technology.. 




telephony. KCC was therefore keen to vitalize WiBro service, and devised a WiBro 
vitalization policy with three policy directions and eight projects in November 2009 
(KCC, 2011a). It aimed to 1) create an environment for competition among the 
operators, 2) construct effective nationwide network coverage, and 3) improve 
WiBro business. Various measures were prepared to meet these directions under the 
frame of eight policy projects, which included changing network bandwidth from 
8.75MHz to 10MHz to secure interoperability with global Mobile WiMAX service, 
providing an environment for entrance of a new operator as well as adoption of 
mobile virtual network operator (MVNO). KCC also planned to implement strong 
measures to bring about nationwide coverage of WiBro networks by applying 
rigorous review to operators’ progress against the initial plans that had been 
acknowledged through licensing (KCC, 2011a). To advance WiBro business plans, 
KCC was to provide a favorable environment for various types of convergence 
services to be brought forth through WiBro, including the interoperable service of 
WiBro/WCDMA/Wifi, mobile VoIP and mobile IPTV service. 
However, not all these plans proved to be viable nor effective in the short run. 
Despite several attempts to allocate an additional license for WiBro, KT and SKT 
has remained the only licensees to WiBro in the 2.3GHz frequency band to date. The 
goal of nationwide coverage was reached only to the extent of fulfilling the role of 
mobile hot-spots. Operators were still faced with the challenges of low demand for 
mobile data services: while WiBro had been intended to introduce data-intensive 
services in the market, thereby bringing about services differentiated from the 
existing mobile telephony, it was further diagnosed, and increasingly regarded by 
many that WiBro, as an advanced physical infrastructure, could not alone bring 
about the rise of demand for mobile data services (KCC, 2011a, b). 
The demand for the mobile Internet, however, finally arose rather rapidly with the 
introduction of the iPhone in 2009 and the successive adoption of smartphones, 
implemented through the existing 3G mobile network. In Korea, the mobile data 
traffic increased from 409TB to 10,132TB during the period between December 
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2009 and June 2011 (Lee et al., 2011a, 37p).70 Such an increase in the mobile data 
traffic was spurred by the rapid uptake of smartphones,71 of which the increase rate 
was 35.8% between 2009 and 2011(Moon et al., 2011, 53p). The rise in mobile-
service use and the subsequent surge in mobile data traffic also brought about 
renewed expectations that they would drive the growth of WiBro services in the 
domestic market (Seok et al., 2011). There was indeed an increase in the number of 
subscribers to WiBro service during the period of wide adoption of smartphones 
including the iPhone. 
However, WiBro service was still limited to the use of mobile routers to connect to 
wireless Internet. The rise of mobile data-service use in the telecommunications 
market did not bring about rapid uptake of WiBro either, despite the hopeful 
anticipation by many that a high rise in mobile-data use would eventually bring 
about the adoption of WiBro. For some, the choice of WiBro had already shifted to 
seeking other opportunities to advance to next-generation communications. 
In the next section, I observe some key shifts in the choices for appropriating WiBro. 
These choices further shaped WiBro services, yet diverged from the initial plans and 
visions. 
6.2 Shifting choices: Towards the evolution of mobile services and standards 
As for WiBro, there was no outstanding application to drive the use of WiBro 
beyond simple Internet-access service. Indeed, mobile VoIP had long been 
considered the outstanding application for WiBro, and the KCC had finally allowed 
VoIP using WiBro for commercial deployment in December 2008 (KCC, 2008). 
They had also allowed use of the same prefix number—‘010’—for existing mobile 
telephony. Yet, such a radical decision in the regulatory framework did not bring 
about much turbulence in the market for mobile telecommunications. Whether to 
adopt VoIP as an outstanding application on WiBro was left to the two operators that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
70Moon et al. 2011 A Study on the Structure of Smart Ecosystem and the Regulatory 
Framework, 54p; Lee et al 2011, 37p. 
71Smartphones rapidly diffused in Korea with the introduction of the iPhone through KT in 
November 2009. As of 1 May 2012, half of Korea’s mobile users owned a smartphone: 




owned the cellular voice and WiBro networks. Yet, neither of the operators 
implemented the VoIP service using their WiBro network, as this could be a threat to 
their own existing mobile telephony service over the CDMA and WCDMA/HSDPA 
networks (Kim and Hwang, 2009). 
Indeed, KT’s vision and the actual positioning of WiBro service had undergone a 
significant change, especially since its merger with KTF, the mobile subsidiary of 
KT, in 2009. Although KT had long insisted that VoIP on WiBro should be allowed 
with the prefix number for the mobile phone service, 010, its merger with the second 
largest mobile operator in Korea had ensured a radical shift in their view of the 
relationship between the two networks: 
From KT’s viewpoint, there was no need for WiBro voice. There had been, 
before the merger with KTF. At first, we had pursued a triple-play concept 
that would enable voice with video, broadcasting, and Internet. … For 
HSDPA, a subset technology to WCDMA , voice is the key. It has 
nationwide coverage. However, the capacity falls short for data [service]. … 
WiBro is data-service centered. Coverage focuses on big cities. It planned to 
expand, also considering expansion with a focus on the big cities. Apart from 
those places, the usage is not heavy, and therefore HSDPA can be used. For 
users, technology is not important. The vertical handover between different 
networks is possible. 
(Director at KT, 16 October 2009) 
KT had thus come up with a strategy of positioning HSDPA for voice and WiBro for 
data. By 2010, WiBro was evolving in close relationship with the evolving 
communications standards from 3G to 4G (KISDI, 2011). Yet, the physical 
infrastructures and the services of WiBro were increasingly positioned as 
complementary to the existing yet evolving mobile standard towards LTE. 
Especially with the limited network coverage areas of WiBro, WiBro could not alone 
compete as a reliable mobile communications service against the existing mobile 




The relationship [between WiBro and LTE] may as well be seen as 
complementary. An operator that does not choose WiBro can just make its 
way towards 4G-LTE following the evolutionary map of mobile 
communications. KT should go towards LTE. But it also operates the WiBro 
network. … But the purpose of WiBro is not voice communication. Wireless 
[mobile] data communications … were initially born for data. The purpose of 
the mobile-communications network has been voice. So the technical 
characteristics differ. … However, KT has to invest over one trillion Korean 
Won to build all the networks for such coverage, and yet it also has to go for 
LTE, so this requires setting up the relationship. 4G has complete coverage: 
it can be used in the toilet, and it can be used on the peak of the mountain. So 
mobile broadband has to diffuse through 4G. Although WiBro covers Seoul, 
it doesn’t work at higher levels inside buildings and skyscrapers. ... So it is 
inconvenient. But we couldn’t invest more to build the network like the voice 
network. But [WiBro’s] network capacity is far better than that of the voice 
network.72 Eventually the market for mobile broadband will open up, people 
will use smartphones, and 4G alone cannot manage the huge increase in the 
traffic. So KT could use WiBro as a complementary network. 
(Director at KT, 27 May 2010) 
Indeed, the evolution of the two differing standards—WiBro (IEEE802.16e) and 
HSDPA—towards 4G, brought about dilemmas for a single operator in having to 
invest in and operate both networks. Meanwhile, KT and SKT, as carriers of both 
networks, clearly chose their evolutionary path towards LTE (Lee, 2011) as the next-
generation mobile standard. In fact, a number of operators made the same choice 
around the globe, increasingly opting for LTE as their evolutionary path. The 
competition at the standards level suggested that ultimately, LTE would be the 
dominant 4G mobile network and service. Global market research such as that 
performed by Ovum, also projected the ratio of the markets for LTE and mobile 
WiMAX to be 82.9:17.173 in subscriber rates. Meanwhile, the WiMAX market faced 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
72 “Voice network” was often used to describe the 2G and 3G (HSDPA) network in relation 
to the WiBro network. 
73 OVUM (2011) from Kim (2012), 76p. 
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increasing shifts by WiMAX operators around the world, as they opted for LTE 
services to replace existing WiMAX service in their continuing transition to 4G 
(Jang, 2013). 
Along the shifting choices by global players towards 4G-LTE, the government 
institute for telecommunications policy in Korea, through a report on the Promotion 
Policy of WiBro Services in the Korean Mobile Market, suggested the need to 
reposition WiBro at the level of domestic policy (KCC, 2011a). They expected the 
sustained market for WiBro would continue to exist, considering its high-speed data-
transfer capability based on broadband technology. Therefore, they recommended a 
focus on emerging economies, where fixed-line Internet had not been fully 
implemented. Furthermore, LTE was regarded as a model for voice/data service 
integrated with 3G, whereas an adequate business model for WiBro was considered 
to be datacentric mobile Internet services linked to smart grids and machine-to-
machine communications. Thus, the report was, to a degree, urging for reshaping the 
generic vision of WiBro, which had initially been shaped through the reallocation of 
the 2.3Ghz frequency band as early as 2002. 
Yet, additional controversies arose with regard to the sustenance of WiBro, as the 
expiration date of the licenses in the 2.3GHz frequency band was approaching. The 
next section discusses these controversies that were closely linked with policy 
decisions about spectrum licensing. That process entailed reflecting on the past 
performance of WiBro service, its current positioning, as well as future outlooks and 
strategies of the players involved in the shaping of WiBro service. 
6.3 The controversy: Towards reshaping of WiBro policy 
By the year 2011, nearly a decade had passed since the reallocation of the 2.3GHz 
frequency band for Portable Internet use, and five years since the launching of the 
commercial WiBro service took place. Yet, the WiBro market was still facing a 
significant gap between the initial visions and the actual adoption of the service. The 
gap was recognized in the number of subscribers, and in the actual service products 
and use in the market. WiBro had initially been expected to carry data intensive 
mobile multimedia services, anticipated to reach 8.5 to 10.5 million subscribers, with 
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sales reaching up to 7 trillion KRW by 2010 (MIC, 2004b). However, the resulting 
phase of WiBro subscribers and sales after five years of the initial launch of the 
commercial service only brought about deepening concerns about the viability of 
WiBro service in the evolving telecommunications market. By November 2011, the 
total subscribers to WiBro amounted to 799,464 (KCC, 2011c) in stark contrast to 
the anticipated number of 9,297,000 by the year 2012 (TTA, 2006). 
 
Figure 4 The gap between anticipated number of WiBro subscribers and actual 
increase in the subscribers (2006-2011)* 
Note. * Original graph has been adopted and modified from A Study on Policies 
for the Activation of WiBro Market: Korea System Dynamics Research, by Y. S. 
Lee, J. R. Chung, S. H. Park, & S. W. Kim, 2011, v. 12, pp. 37–67. 
Whilst the policy was still being prepared with an aim to boost the sales for WiBro 
service, concerns rose about the need to reposition the direction of WiBro policy, 
especially in relation to the nearing of the expiration date and the subsequent need 
for a decision about the renewal of the spectrum licenses for WiBro.74 KCC’s 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
74 Spectrum licenses were initially allocated to KT and SKT in April 2005 for 7 years. The 
first phase of use was thus to expire by March 2012. Under Clause 1, Article 16 of the Radio 
Waves Act and Article 18 of the Rules on Enforcement of RWA, the applications for 
renewal of the licenses were to be made no later than 6 months before the expiration date. 
KT and SKT were thus expected to apply for the renewal by 28 September 2011, whereas 
the policies related to the renewal, including spectrum renewal pricing, had to be completed 
before that date (KCC 2011b). 
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decision about the renewal of spectrum licenses was closely linked to how current 
progress in the development and implementation of WiBro services would be 
assessed and directed in the future. Considering the low diffusion of WiBro services 
and the deviation from its main use, delineated in the original plan for WiBro service, 
it was much debated whether the spectrum should be renewed for undifferentiated 
use by the two operators or be refarmed75 (KCC, 2011b). 
By 2011, KT and SKT had firmly taken evolutionary paths for their mobile services 
to follow LTE, in line with the major operators in the global telecommunications 
market that were increasingly opting for 4G LTE. Along such evolving choices, 
WiBro was repositioned in the market to play the role of a complementary service to 
4G LTE, mainly for the distribution of rising data traffic (Kwak et al., 2011). In 
particular, KT stressed the need to bring WiBro as a tool to adequately respond to 
the explosion of mobile data traffic, which was expected with the further 
implementation of LTE (Hearing in 4G Mobile Conference, 27 September 2011). 
KT’s strategy to implement 4G service thus included bringing together LTE and 
WiBro to provide 4G service to customers with low cost mobile data access. SKT’s 
implementation of WiBro service in number of subscribers and the network coverage 
area had been far below what KT had accomplished, with sales at 17% of the total 
sales of WiBro service during 2010 and 2011 (KCC, 2011b). Yet, KT and SKT both 
applied for the renewal of their licenses whilst insisting that the assessment criteria 
for their use of the spectrum be extended to consider the current role of WiBro as a 
complementary service network. 
Meanwhile, KCC aimed to produce a policy to bring about further diffusion of 
WiBro service with the introduction of a fourth mobile operator. By bringing in a 
fourth mobile operator, in addition to KT, SKT and LGT, the overall intention was to 
induce competition in the mobile-communications market and thereby lower the cost 
of mobile services. KCC’s intention to introduce the fourth operator was indeed 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
75 Refarming: “Reassigning government-regulated electromagnetic spectrum for services 
with higher value. The users of the existing spectrum are forced out, although they may be 
compensated in some manner. The frequency bands are assigned to communications 




closely linked to its aim of promoting the coevolution of WiBro and LTE (KCC, 
2011b). LTE was already being rapidly implemented throughout the country by the 
three incumbent mobile operators, and it was expected that the fourth mobile 
operator would operate a WiBro network through the licensing of the WiBro 
spectrum. WiBro service would then eventually be implemented with voice service 
through mobile VoIP (m-VoIP). 
To realize such a plan, KCC had to prepare policy tools, including a policy to initiate 
roaming between existing 2G or 3G networks and the WiBro network, as well as to 
introduce MVNO. In response to such policy-level changes, a consortium was 
formed named the Korea Mobile Internet (KMI), through the participation of 
industry players76. KMI applied for a WiBro license in June 2010, whereas the 
eligibility and capability to become a telecommunications operator were to be 
assessed by a judging committee composed of experts from varying fields including 
law, economics, finance, and technology. However, KMI failed to obtain a license 
for WiBro and enter the telecommunications market as the fourth mobile operator77 
(Yoon, 2011). The plans submitted by the consortium were assessed and diagnosed 
as not meeting the minimum requirements to secure the license, whereas the business 
plan seemed to be based too much on optimism and the level of funding seemed 
insecure to carry out the large-scale investment.78 Following failure to license the 
fourth mobile operator, KCC had to choose one of three policy options: renewal, 
nonrenewal, or refarming of the spectrum in the 2.3GHz frequency band. 
On 16 March 2012, KCC announced the approval of spectrum-license renewal for 
KT and SKT (KCC, 2012). This confirmed the changes in the generic vision of 
WiBro that had guided WiBro policy since its inception. The generic vision of 
WiBro was indeed reshaped by accommodating the differences and changes. At the 
policy level, the WiBro promotion policy shifted to advancing WiBro in a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
76 Industry players in KMI included DVS Korea, Stem Science, Jaty Electronic, Cmotech, 
C&S Asset Management. (http://www.telecompaper.com/news/kmi-sees-wibro-licensing-
process-delayed--760325) 
77 http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20111216000637 
78 KMI had its third attempt in the same year its second application was rejected, in 2011. 
Internet Space Time’s (IST) first application was also rejected along with the third time 
application by KMI. 
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complementary relationship to 3G, evolving to 4G LTE. The plan to promote WiBro 
thus included the construction of wider service coverage around the areas with a 
large floating population, such as subways and highways, as well as deploying 
mobile public routers in cities and intercity buses. KCC would also promote price 
plans to couple WiBro with 3G and LTE as well as WiBro independent service to 
enable low cost, large-scale data service. WiBro was redefined as being data 
centered, but the major mobile devices were to be laptops, tablet PCs, and mobile 
routers. 
Yet, the controversy around the use of the spectrum for WiBro did not end with 
KCC’s final decision upon renewal of the WiBro licenses to KT and SKT. To some, 
the policy repositioning of WiBro as a data-service network was considered 
affirmation of the failure of WiBro policy. Rising voices argued for reallocating the 
WiBro spectrum for other uses, in particular Time-Division Long-Term Evolution 
(TD-LTE) 79, as there were increasing numbers of global operators of WiMAX that 
were opting to shift to TD-LTE for their mobile communications service 
(WiMAXForum, 2012). TD-LTE, or LTE TDD was one of the two variants of the 
3rd-generational partnership project (3GPP) LTE technology which had been 
acknowledged as the standard for LTE along with LTE-frequency division duplexing 
(FDD), the two being differing versions of LTE. The global alliance of TD-LTE was 
expanding as global operators and system and terminal manufacturers joined to 
implement the technology (Ayvazian, 2013; Samsung Electronics Co., 2012). The 
debate about shifting use of the spectrum from WiBro to TD-LTE was further 
heightened as KT officially remarked about the need for the policy to allow the 
2.3GHz frequency band be used for TD-LTE in a timely manner (Lee, 2012). 
Although KCC firmly opposed KT’s intention to opt for TD-LTE, along with others, 
towards such a shift, much criticism fell upon the government’s inflexibility against 
the fast-evolving technological landscape. Critics also alluded to Japan’s ‘Galapagos 
Effect’ which was often used to explain Japan being isolated, due to its unique 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
79 Abbreviation for Time-Division Duplex LTE vary: TD-LTE, TDD LTE or LTE TDD. 
TD-LTE is one of the two versions of Long Term Evolution (LTE). In this research, I have 




technological advancement, from the rest of the world (Chung, 2012). In parallel 
with such criticisms and concerns, modest attempts arose from the government 
sector, as KISDI the government policy institute for ICT, published a report 
suggesting the need to review WiBro spectrum policy (Yeo, 2012). The report 
pointed to the global trend of WiMAX being positioned as complementary to LTE, 
and argued it was necessary to review current use of the spectrum for WiBro for 
purposes such as TD-LTE. The report on ‘The next generation mobile 
communications network and spectrum policy direction’ warned, however, that a 
radical turn to TD-LTE carried the risk of following the trail of WiBro, as there were 
also uncertainties inherent to the ultimate expansion and evolution of TD-LTE. 
Such policy-level discussions and debates on the use of WiBro in the 2.3GHz 
frequency band and on the subsequent need for a shift to TD-LTE called for 
reflection on past choices in policy decision making as much as it required better 
choices for the future. Such concerns were reflected in a comment by one of the 
interviewees: 
Not just to criticize and argue about what had been wrong; policy can be 
wrongly made. But in order to carry out the next stage, we need to have an 
accurate review of what had been the problems. 
(Head of Department at NARS, 21 December 2012) 
Although there seemed to be a resonant view of problematising the current state of 
WiBro in relation to how the WiBro should have been, the comment also seemed to 
urge a reflective choice on future policy making. 
Whilst the shift from WiBro/WiMAX to TD-LTE increasingly seemed to be the 
global trends of market players, such a shift at the domestic level required a 
reframing of WiBro policy using hindsight; to amend the choices in relation to the 
present reflections on the past and the future. Another report by KISDI on market 
trends and the future direction of WiBro suggested additional changes to WiBro 
policy in relation to the growing LTE market (Kim, 2012). First, the report 
recommended that a strategic shift to TD-LTE be considered to adapt to evolving 
global market trends. Second, sustained advancement of WiBro could be sought 
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through niche markets such as special-purpose networks (e.g., emergency networks 
and machine-to-machine communications) and as a substitute network for 3G in 
developing countries. Third, early introduction of WiBro-Advanced (802.16m) 
through the fourth mobile operator would be considered a way to pursue further 
technological competency for future adoption of LTE-Advanced. 
In October 2013, the Ministry of Science, ICT and Future Planning (MSIP)80 
announced a plan to allocate spectrum in the 2.5GHz frequency band for either 
WiBro or LTE TDD, whichever was chosen by the new operator (MSIP, 2013a). 
Existing licensees of WiBro were not allowed to shift their services to LTE TDD. 
However, WiBro policy was extended to include the 2.5GHz frequency band under 
consideration, which was a frequency band used more widely for mobile WiMAX 
service around the world (KCC, 2011b). The 2.5GHz frequency band was to be 
licensed to a new telecommunications operator that would have the choice about the 
technology to be used, between WiBro and LTE TDD (MSIP, 2013a). A focus on 
TDD-related innovations was firmly sustained in WiBro policy as TDD had been 
one of the key technical features of WiBro since the initial conceptualisation of the 
technological innovation. The policy further stated the plan to support and promote 
the development of TDD-related core technologies, next-generation TDD systems 
and devices, and applications services to advance TDD technologies and enhance 
national competitiveness (MSIP, 2013a). 
WiBro policy was thus reshaped as it incorporated changing contingencies, 
especially reflecting on past choices, current dynamics, and future uncertainties. The 
legacy of TDD-based technological innovation was to continue through the 
development and deployment of either WiBro or LTE TDD.81 Alignment with a 
wider array of global players was sought by allocating the 2.5 GHz frequency band 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
80 Ministry of Science, ICT, and Future Planning was established on 23 March 2013, 
succeeding the role of the previous Ministry of Education and Science Technology (MEST) 
while integrating certain roles of the Korea Communications Commission (KCC) and the 
previous Ministry of Knowledge Economy. The restructuring of the government 
organisation took place in line with the administration, led by the newly elected President, 
Park Geun-Hye on 25 February 2013. 
81 WiBro utilises a Time-Division Duplexing (TDD) scheme, and the technical similarities 
between WiBro(WiMAX) and LTE have been widely acknowledged in the field. 
 
 165 
for the adoption of either the WiBro or the LTE TDD standard. The Korean 
government had initially opted for two pathways to 4G—LTE-advanced and 
WirelessMAN-Advanced—at the verge of ITU’s standardisation of IMT-Advanced 
for next-generation global wireless broadband communications. The government 
further sought to open up the domestic market for an additional version of LTE to 
evolve and compete for 4G mobile service and beyond. 
The controversy around past choices shaping WiBro, current dynamics, and future 
uncertainties thus brought WiBro policy to be reshaped to accommodate changing 
contingencies of evolving technologies, services, and human choices towards the 
coevolution of the spectrum resource, technology, and the standard. 
 
6.4 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have focused on the shifting choices that responded to and 
constituted the changing contingencies in the mobile-telecommunications market in 
South Korea and beyond. Along the evolving mobile-communications standards and 
services, WiBro did not evolve as had been anticipated. Rather, human choices 
played a crucial role in the evolution of WiBro services. The choices shifted in 
relation to evolving mobile technologies and services, and the shifting choices led to 
further divergence of the outcomes from the initial plans and visions. Such 
divergence then brought about a societal controversy around past choices for WiBro, 
the current market performance of WiBro, and future directions for WiBro, and to 
what degree uncertainty loomed. 
In the first section, I examined evolving mobile technologies and standards, as well 
as mobile services that further brought about expectations and efforts to promote 
WiBro services. However, WiBro did not evolve as had been expected, despite 
ongoing efforts to bring the service to eventually take off in the evolving 
telecommunications market, as had been envisioned in the past. 
Second, I observed shifting choices that played a crucial role in the shaping of 
WiBro services; especially in the course of appropriating generic capabilities of 
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WiBro, as well as towards the future evolution of mobile communications. Despite 
the regulatory decision to allow VoIP for WiBro service, none of the operators chose 
to deliver voice-over WiBro. No need existed for voice-over WiBro as KT merged 
with KTF, the second-largest mobile operator in Korea. Furthermore, KT and SKT, 
the two operators of WiBro, both chose LTE and WiMAX for their evolution of 
mobile networks towards 4G. WiBro was thus repositioned as a datacentric service 
for mobile communications, expected to play a complementary role to the existing 
mobile network and service that were evolving to 4G LTE, which largely deviated 
from the initial positioning and envisioning of WiBro in relation to existing and 
evolving telecommunications services. 
Third, I discussed the controversy that resulted from the significant gap between the 
initial visions and expectations of WiBro and actual outcomes. As the expiration date 
for the spectrum allocated to WiBro approached, a controversy arose with regard to 
further use of the spectrum frequency. It was much disputed whether to renew 
licenses with the same operators for the same use, or to reframe licenses for other 
uses, especially reflected in past choices, current performance, and the future 
uncertainties around WiBro. KCC, however, decided to renew the spectrum licenses, 
accompanied by the reshaping of the generic vision of WiBro. Yet, further 
controversy arose as KT insisted on the need to shift the use of the spectrum from 
WiBro to TD-LTE, which was another emerging standard for 4G with growing 
alignments with interests around the world. The recent decision by the government 
was finally made to accommodate the changing contingencies of evolving 
technologies, services, and human choices that continued to shape the coevolution of 




Chapter 7. Discussion 
7.1 Introduction 
In this thesis, I have explicated the story of WiBro in South Korea from its birth to 
its commercial uptake, and the evolution of the surrounding technology and services. 
Based on the research framework introduced in Chapter 3, I made in-depth 
observations from the initial stages of the technological design and development to 
the commercial uptake. This research has been a contemporary yet longitudinal 
study of a technological innovation. This single longitudinal case study, based on the 
social shaping of the technology has taken into account processes linked to the 
innovation that emerged as early as 2001. The primary focus of this study has been 
on the gap that emerged during the innovation process between the initial visions and 
actual outcomes of technology adoption and use. The gap thus represented the 
complex processes of innovation involving various choices in design, development, 
and use (MacKenzie and Wajcman, 1999; Williams and Edge, 1996; Williams et al., 
2005). Yet, the technology is still evolving, and the services based on the technology 
are still in use. Through this research, I have addressed the complexities and 
uncertainties of technological innovation, especially in relation to how to manage the 
inherent diversity of choices and changing contingencies in the shaping of a large-
scale infrastructural technological innovation. 
In this chapter, I discuss the general findings based on a longitudinal case study of 
WiBro in which I examined the lifecycle of an innovation that began in 2001 and is 
still evolving. I delineate the findings by linking them with the research questions 
raised in Chapter 1 of this thesis, leading to a brief discussion of the mode of 
governance of technological innovation and change suggested based on the findings 
from this research.  
7.2 General Discussion 
In Chapter 2, the literature review, I defined the research problems in relation to 
various attempts to address opportunities and uncertainties of technological 
innovation. Attempts to drive technological innovation in a certain direction are 
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often found to take place at various levels - of firms’ organisations, communities, 
societies, and nation states. Particular aims and visions often become the initial 
driving forces to bring about technological innovation. However, despite the 
projections and strong visions that drive technological innovation, actual outcomes 
often diverge from the initial visions and anticipations. Studies in STS have 
particularly addressed these issues by scrutinising the process of technological 
innovation, the choices of various players involved and the interactions beween them 
that shape technologies (Russell and Williams, 2002; Williams and Edge, 1996; 
Williams et al., 2005). The studies have highlighted the complexity of interaction 
and challenges arising in the attempts to incorporate the visions and aims into actual 
use. I particularly observed contingencies during technology uptake which in turn 
generated  further uncertainties about the future. 
By undertaking a contemporary case study of WiBro I was able to examine 
processes that did not necessarily link to a known or prefigured result or outcome, as 
would be the case in a retrospective examination of a technological change. I 
observed the interactions among the players and their choices in the course of a 
search for an unknown future. Much of the process under study reflected coherent 
relations from the outset, and I observed the process by applying the concept of an 
arena to bring an integrated view of dispersed processes that came to be linked to an 
innovation process over time: the term arena was adapted from the concept of 
‘development arena’ (Jorgensen and Sorensen, 1999; Jørgensen and Sørensen, 2002). 
In Jørgensen and Sørensen’s (1999) conceptualisation, the development arena 
denoted a space to analyze and describe processes in the making: the processes of 
“becoming, shaping and structuring” (Jorgensen and Sorensen, 1999, 416p). Based 
on this view, innovation activities dispersed over multiple locations were integrated 
in the process of the development of HDTV as an emerging telecomunications 
technology. 
The case of WiBro highlighted such emergent and dispersed processes, yet were 
coordinated to a degree. By applying the concept of an arena, I observed the 
dispersed innovation processes from the stage where they were only loosely linked 
through individual lines of interactions, mobilised in prior structures and boundaries 
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of interactions, such as spectrum-allocation regulation and related research 
organisations; national R&D programmes; and standard setting at the 
Telecommunications Technology Association (TTA), an ICT-standardisation 
association in Korea. Through an emergent process of coordination, the WiBro case 
showed how robustness for technological innovation was built up, to an extent, to the 
successful development of a complex infrastructural technology. The WiBro case, 
however, further exemplified that such robustness in a particular innovation path 
needs to break down and flexibly respond to changing relations and evolving 
technologies, such as, as it reached the stage of application and commercial uptake. 
The main interest of this study has thus been in examining the configurational 
process where the choices through past activities and interactions, present positions, 
and strategies, as well as future outlooks co-shaped the technology. It is a process 
represented by changing roles and interactions in which the key problem is to solve 
the question of how to accommodate uncertainties of the future. This study has 
particularly focused on the opportunities and challenges of coordination over the 
lifecycle of an innovation of a large-scale infrastructural technology. Coordination in 
the case of WiBro was a major attempt by the government and other players to 
develop a novel technological infrastructure and service in South Korea. An 
overarching aim was to achieve technological leadership in the global 
telecommunications market while solving and tackling immediate problems arising 
in the domestic market of South Korea. Yet, although the coordination effort led to a 
degree of successful development of a novel infrastructural technology, it faced 
challenges as it came to the stage of commercialisation. This research has attempted 
to explicate the differing dynamics leading to the stages of technological 
development and commercial uptake.  
In the course of this research, the research questions were modified a few times: in 
particular reflecting the changes in the definition of the gap that was assumed in this 
research. Initially, the research questions addressed the problem of diffusion, which 
sought to explain and to remedy the gap between expectations and actual uptake of 
technological innovation. However, gradually I came to see the gap as an inherent 
feature of this particular history of technological innovation of WiBro rather than a 
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problem that could be tackled with an immediate solution. The research questions 
were finally revised and addressed as follows:  
RQ.  1. What are the dynamics that led to the design and development of an 
emerging technology of WiBro? 
 - How did alignments among the innovation players emerge and evolve 
towards the design and development of WiBro? 
RQ. 2. How were the WiBro services deployed, and what caused the gap 
between the initial visions of WiBro and the commercial uptake? 
 - What choices did the innovation players make, how did they interact 
towards the commercialisation of WiBro, and how did the WiBro 
services evolve? 
RQ. 3. How did WiBro services evolve, and how and to what extent could 
the gap be mediated? 
 - How did the dynamics of innovation differ through the stages of 
technological development and uptake, and how should the gap be 
addressed? 
The first research question aimed to explicate the dynamics leading to the 
development of a complex infrastructural technology. It aimed to examine the aims, 
visions, purposes, and intentions of varying interests involved in the process of 
developing WiBro technology, as these constitute the choices that shape the 
coevolution of technology and society. In particular, coordination was the key focus 
of inquiry, especially linked to the process of design and development of large-scale, 
complex technologies and systems.  
The in-depth case study of WiBro demonstrated an emergent process of forming 
alignments and coordination that arose through interactions among diverse interests. 
Multiple interests were initially prompted by particular individual needs and aims 
upon availability of a critical resource for innovation: the 2.3GHz spectrum 
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frequency band. Rather than drawing on the process of building alignments through 
a particular role, a powerful vision, or an authority (Ansari and Garud, 2009; Yoo et 
al., 2005), this study examined the process in which several arenas were formed as 
multiple interests reached out for what seemed to be available resources, tools, and 
actions for future innovation. Initial coordination took place in relation to spectrum 
allocation as the multiple stakeholders aimed to secure the licenses for the spectrum, 
albeit for differing purposes. This formed an innovation arena (‘spectrum arena’) 
constituted by interests and alignments that sought to bring about an innovative use 
of the spectrum resource. A generic vision of an emerging telecommunication 
technology and service was shaped through the negotiations held in this coordinated 
arena: the Portable Internet, later renamed WiBro. 
Upon shaping the generic vision of the Portable Internet and MIC’s subsequent 
regulatory decision on the reallocation of the spectrum frequency band, a national 
R&D programme was formed and coordinated as a national scale R&D aimed at 
developing a technological system, HPi, that realised the vision of the Portable 
Internet. Yet, such alignment was incomplete in that participating players sought and 
preferred differing, competing choices of technology for commercial deployment. 
These differing options were competing to set the standard for Portable Internet, as 
the spectrum policy had designated a single standard to be developed and deployed 
for commercial Portable Internet service in the domestic market. The differing 
choices and competing alignments converged around a single type of technological 
specification through standardisation. 
The standards arena was established by MIC, as MIC coordinated a standard-setting 
group through TTA, deciding to bring Portable Internet service at the 2.3GHz 
frequency band as a single standard. The generic vision that had been shaped 
through negotiations at the spectrum arena was thus relayed to the standards arena 
where diverse arrays of players participated in the standard-setting process. The 
three innovation arenas were linked through the standardisation of the Portable 
Internet through which HPi technology was selected as the baseline technology for 
the single standard. 
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The emergent process of building alignments and shaping relations towards the 
innovation of WiBro is illustrated in Figure 5: 
 
 
Figure 5. Interlinked structures for the development of WiBro. 
 
A seemingly complete alignment was established between the emergent arenas of 
innovation. However, an in-depth case study further explicated this process as 
involving tensions and disputes that coexisted through the emerging alignments. In 
the spectrum arena, disputes around the boundary between fixed and mobile as the 
fixed-line carriers and the mobile operators were together involved in defining the 
feature of wireless for the emerging convergence service, Portable Internet. In the 
national R&D arena, differing intentions and differing commitments existed towards 
the development of HPi system, despite their formal collaboration in the R&D 
programme. In the standards arena, a large number of players in the 
telecommunications field participated in the shaping of the standard whereas 
diverging choices arose in candidate technologies in the pre-commercial market for 
Portable Internet. These tensions and disputes were moderated yet not resolved, as 




The process of building alignments also involved interactions of aligning visions 
among multiple interests in and beyond the initial boundaries of arenas. For example, 
as Samsung began to participate in the national R&D programme for HPi, it began 
contacting foreign players including the international standard-setting organisation, 
IEEE, thereby making an informal linkage between HPi and IEEE. This brought HPi 
to be more closely aligned with TTA’s vision for globalisation of the national 
standard. HPi was finally chosen as a technological base for a Portable Internet 
standard, yielding a formal linkage between the HPi and TTA. TTA then approached 
IEEE and the two organisations reached harmonisation of their standards after going 
through a number of negotiations, thereby bringing a formal linkage between TTA 
and IEEE. Through the process of building alignments, often supported by 
coordination, the HPi was successfully developed based on the global standard, and 
became the world’s first commercialised system. 
The processes involving tensions, conflicts, and active engagements in forming 
strategic relations, however, brought recognition of an ‘incompleteness’ of alignment, 
backed by a formal configuration of a seamless alignment. The standardisation 
seemed to have brought about a degree of ‘closure’ to diverging choices by 
configuring alignments around a single national standard. However, the tensions and 
conflicts were not completely resolved but only mediated to reach a formal 
agreement through regulatory decision making. Also, shifts in alignments and 
relations could be observed, as the national standard was harmonised with an 
international standard. Furthermore, alignments further extended as the 
standardisation was extended to be linked to other international standards-setting 
fora, including WiMAX Forum and ITU. 
This case study demonstrated how the shaping of a generic vision indeed brought 
multiple interests to be aligned to certain processes of innovation. In studies of 
sociotechnical innovation and change, scholars have often placed emphasis on the 
role of “guiding visions” or expectations that motivate multiple actors to be aligned 
towards a particular goal (Berkhout et al., 2004a; Borup et al., 2006; Rotmans and 
Kemp, 2001). The generic vision implies the vision is ‘generative’ (Borup et al., 
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2006, 285p): the vision becomes the source for generating activities, providing 
legitimation and attracting diverse interests. Yet, the generic vision observed through 
this case of WiBro suggested a vision that could be appropriated by many whose 
immediate aims and goals differed to a degree. Thus, I observed the players to be 
actively involved in the process of shaping the vision through negotiation, and also 
appropriating the vision in relation to their particular histories, present needs, and 
future goals. In fact, through the emergent process of coordination, one could 
observe how multiple interests were actively searching, while at the same time being 
effectively aligned towards and through the shaping of the generic vision of Portable 
Internet/WiBro. 
In the beginning, I intended to link the findings about unresolved problems and 
conflicts as well as shifting relations and alignments to the problem of what I had 
perceived as a problem of diffusion; a view supported by a perspective that 
technology is ‘ready-made’, and thereby perceiving users as passive recipients of a 
taken for granted technology (Sørensen, 1996). However, the ongoing process of 
shaping and appropriating the generic vision of an emerging technology seemed to 
suggest it would be misleading to interpret such findings as causes for what was 
regarded as a diffusion lag by the holders of a static vision of the technology being 
widely diffused. Rather, these findings linked to design and development of a 
complex infrastructural technology and standard led to a question about how    these 
visions, alignments, and technology were further shaped by the process of 
appropriation of the technology as a product that was finally marketed and used. 
The second research question has guided such further search, especially focusing on 
the gap I and others initially recognised as a diffusion gap, yet which was further 
understood in relation to a gap between initial visions and expectations and actual 
outcome of technology uptake. 
RQ. 2. How were WiBro services deployed, and what caused the gap 
between the initial visions of WiBro and the commercial uptake? 
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 - What choices did the innovation players make, how did they interact 
towards the commercialisation of WiBro, and how did the WiBro 
services evolve? 
This inquiry links the story of the technological development with that of the 
commercial uptake. By applying the concept of appropriation from the social-
learning framework (Williams, 2000; Williams et al., 2005), I explicated the process 
of a generic vision, technology, and standard being appropriated by the intermediate 
players towards the commercial use of WiBro systems and services: in particular, 
through the process of coproducing commercial products and services based on the 
single standard of WiBro. This has led to identifying further dynamics influencing 
the shaping of WiBro service during commercial uptake and use. 
I observed how the alignments to bring about commercial WiBro service had been 
configured around the single national standard set through TTA and extended as a 
global standard. By linking this process of setting standard and the attempts to adopt 
the standard, this case study highlights the divergent choices on appropriating the 
standard to particular services to be deployed in the commercial market. Such 
availability of diverging choices around the single standard was especially 
demonstrated as the players competed for licenses for WiBro service in the 2.3GHz 
frequency band. Each player proposed differing visions and strategies as well as 
differing applications and business models towards the deployment of the single 
standard for WiBro. Such reflected differing interpretations of a generic technology 
and standard depended on their own differing histories and background, current 
positionings, and future goals and strategies in the evolving telecommunications 
market. This comprehensive observation of the processes of appropriating the 
generic vision of WiBro towards the future deployment of WiBro service 
demonstrated how the availability of divergent choices was mobilised, as the players 
involved themselves in what could be viewed as a ‘multi-level game’(Williams et al., 
2005) where the players pursue their own covert goals while still being aligned to 
formally shared goals. 
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During the process of actual deployment of WiBro services, based on collaboration 
among the partnering players, however, that multilevel game was further observed to 
be leading to certain discrepancies in the process of coproducing commercial WiBro 
products and services. First, discrepancies were observed between the manufacturer 
of WiBro systems and the operators, as they came to together appropriate the WiBro 
standard into commercial products and services. Although they had been closely 
aligned towards the vision of globalising the domestic WiBro standard, there was a 
degree of differing urgency towards the commercial deployment of WiBro products 
and services in the domestic market. This was due to the differing goals and 
concerns by the manufacturers and the operators linked to adopting the global 
standard in the domestic market: the manufacturers aimed to achieve global 
leadership through the world’s first deployment of their own product systems, 
whereas the operators preferred to secure wider interoperability before the actual 
deployment of the service. 
Through the comprehensive case study, I observed how unforeseen choices were 
made, especially as the players responded with differing capacities, goals and 
strategies, to the large-scale investments to be made. Hanaro Telecom returned the 
spectrum license it had acquired before actual deployment efforts took place. SKT, 
the mobile operator, did not actively pursue the commercial deployment of WiBro 
service as its own existing and fast-evolving network of HSDPA (High-speed 
Downlink Packet Access) was increasingly viewed as competing with WiBro in 
future services in the market upon full deployment. KT had therefore become the 
sole operator of WiBro actively engaged in the process of commercialisation; their 
efforts did not expand through competition but were rather faced by oppositions and 
obstacles towards the deployment of advanced WiBro services. SKT soundly 
opposed KT’s plan to bring about VoIP service as an outstanding application for 
WiBro, which resulted in a lack of active engagement of the existing mobile-phone 
industry in collaborating with KT. Such lack of competition for deployment of the 
commercial WiBro network and service in the market and discrepancies in the 
process of coproduction of commercial WiBro products and services further resulted 
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in unmitigated problems of limited network coverage and lack of outstanding 
applications even 3 years after the initial launch of commercial WiBro service. 
In contrast, the global market for Mobile WiMAX, to which WiBro was a service 
profile, seemed to expand rather rapidly, whereas the Korean manufacturers and 
operators were actively expanding their business by exporting and deploying their 
products and services in foreign markets. Furthermore, such increasing adoption of 
Mobile WiMAX in the global market was further accompanied and strengthened by 
the inclusion of the Mobile WiMAX standard in the mobile communications 
standard of IMT-2000 designated by the ITU. The advancement of the market for 
Mobile WiMAX (including WiBro profile-based systems) also brought about 
disputes in Korea regarding the role of a domestic policy to promote WiBro service: 
that is, whether to promote the domestic market for WiBro or concentrate on foreign 
markets by recognising the different market needs for WiBro/Mobile WiMAX 
between the domestic market and the markets abroad. Indeed, such diverging 
outcomes of the commercialisation of WiBro and Mobile WiMAX between the 
domestic and global markets represented a degree of differing and diverging modes 
of uptake of the generic standard between the national boundaries of the marketplace 
on which the standard was appropriated through implementation and use. 
I observed additional divergence in certain areas of WiBro applications and products 
in the Korean domestic market. Although the producing and marketing of advanced 
types of WiBro services using PDAs and mobile phones were constantly faced with 
challenges of commercial uptake, USB modems and mobile routers to access the 
Internet through WiBro seemed to stabilise as a representative WiBro service in the 
telecommunications market. As there were a small number of users of such service 
in the market, it was considered a niche-market service. I also identified other niche-
market services as the operators, especially KT, struggled to bring about WiBro 
services to market at an appropriate level of adoption compared to their other current 
investments. These included WiBro applications deployed in a taxi company to hire 
taxi services, as well as building of an advanced digital communications 
infrastructure in the world’s leading shipbuilding company based in Korea. Such 
deployment of WiBro services demonstrated how the modes of uptake of the generic 
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technical capabilities of WiBro could differ, depending on varying factors such as 
the industry fields that were adopting the service, the service types, market sizes, 
commitments by the members supplying and adopting the service, and many others. 
In such niche-market areas, I observed relatively strong commitments of the 
interacting players (e.g., between KT and Moda), whereas their interactions led to an 
innovation that had not been foreseen (i.e., mobile routers). In particular, in the case 
of HHI’s deployment of WiBro to build the digital shipyard, creative innovations 
took place during use of the WiBro service, that produced further innovations in 
developing WiBro-enabled products and services based on the close interactions 
among committed members of the company. 
The close examination and a comprehensive analysis of the interactions among the 
innovation players—mainly at the intermediate level of appropriation of commercial 
products and services—thus highlighted the complexities and contingencies in the 
process of appropriating the generic technology and standard to specific service 
deployment and use. Varying, and often unforeseen sociotechnical factors influenced 
the choices that shaped WiBro products and services. This, in the case of WiBro, 
resulted in the market uptake of WiBro products and services that largely deviated 
from the initial visions and expectations. Such complex processes involving varying 
contingencies during the process of appropriating the generic technological offerings 
highlighted an aspect of the learning process: Although at a much smaller scale and 
in limited application areas than had originally been perceived, the experiences and 
the interactions among the committed developers, users, and intermediaries of 
WiBro niche-market services demonstrated the social-learning process (Williams et 
al., 2005). The process entailed a cyclical-learning process between the committed 
players whose perceptions, strategies, and actual adoption of particular technologies, 
infrastructures, or services further led to niche innovations within the limited 
boundaries of their application areas. 
However, the boundary of such cyclical-learning processes among the committed 
players did not expand. Indeed, this case demonstrated the depth of a cyclical 
learning process that resulted in further innovation through adoption and use. In 
addition to the comprehensive learning process explicated through the study, I also 
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observed the choices that delimited the boundary of such a learning process: the 
boundary of the application areas of WiBro. I discuss this topic in answering the 
third research question, which inquires about the additional choices that shaped the 
evolution of WiBro services. 
RQ. 3. How did WiBro services evolve, and how and to what extent could 
the gap be mediated? 
 - How did the dynamics of innovation differ through the stages of 
technological development and uptake, and how should the gap be 
addressed? 
Since the initial conceptualisation of WiBro as an emerging ‘home-grown’ mobile 
and fixed-convergence technology and service in the early 2000s, the technology and 
standard evolved rather rapidly and, to an extent, rather radically. The WiBro service 
profile of Mobile WiMAX evolved to 3G mobile communications along the 
inclusion of Mobile WiMAX in the IMT2000 family of mobile-communications 
standards by the ITU in 2007. It further evolved to 4G (IMT-Advanced) standard as 
it was officially acknowledged to be included in the IMT-Advanced family of 
standards along with LTE in 2012. Mobile services also evolved, with a rapid 
increase in the use of wireless/mobile-data communications, driven by the 
innovation in mobile phones, represented by the introduction of the iPhone and 
smartphones. Accompanying these changes were rising expectations and policy-
oriented efforts towards the eventual rise in the market uptake of WiBro services in 
Korea. However, despite such anticipations and expectations along the rapid 
evolution of mobile standards and services, WiBro service in Korea did not further 
expand in its applications areas and the scale of adoption from niche-market services. 
Such a contemporary yet longitudinal case leaves the research to be placed still in a 
fluctuating space and time to observe ongoing interactions that are shaping the 
technology and the services to coevolve in a certain direction. The problem of 
uncertainty continues whereas this study explicated the complex interactions that led 
to diverging choices and outcomes, resulting in a degree of deviation in the current 
mode of uptake of WiBro away from initial visions and expectations. By answering 
 
 180 
the third research question addressing to what extent and how the gap was mediated, 
I do not attempt to solve the problem of uncertainty. Instead, I bring a discussion 
regarding what has further shaped the boundaries of such complex interactions in the 
process of disseminating WiBro technology and services over time. 
I observed that operators made radical choices that shifted away from and delimited 
the interactions from pursuing the initial goal of realising advanced fixed-mobile 
convergence portable multimedia service. To begin, there was a radical shift in the 
choices of key intermediaries, the operators of WiBro. KT merged with its mobile 
subsidiary and second-largest mobile operator in Korea, KTF, in 2009. This resulted 
in KT’s radical shift in the choice for applying VoIP as a key strategic service for 
WiBro, as VoIP would be a threat rather than an opportunity for a mobile operator. 
Such a radical shift in choice resulted in the reshaping of KT’s vision of WiBro away 
from next-generation fixed-mobile convergence service towards a data-centric 
mobile network for providing Internet-access service. Furthermore, as the mobile 
technologies and services evolved towards 4G telecommunications, both operators 
of WiBro, SKT and KT, chose to evolve their networks through the Long Term 
Evolution (LTE) standard, which was then competing with WiMAX as two evolving 
standards towards next-generation mobile communications. 
Such radical shifts in the choices of key operators of WiBro resulted in a controversy 
around the South Korean policy to promote WiBro service in the domestic market. 
The controversy resulted in part from discerning the gap between the initial visions 
and expectations of WiBro and actual uptake. At the same time, it resulted from the 
need to make further choices in the future shaping of WiBro service in the domestic 
market, through the renewal of WiBro licenses. Therefore the controversy 
represented a learning process where differing choices from differing backgrounds 
and knowledge were reflected. Following the controversy, especially in relation to 
the renewal of the spectrum license for WiBro, KCC made the final choice on 
renewal of licenses to KT and SKT. That decision was regarded as an 
acknowledgement of the changes the operators had made on the positioning of 
WiBro service in the current and evolving market of mobile communications. The 
decision therefore involved the reshaping of the generic vision of WiBro, which had 
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long been guiding WiBro policy: WiBro, which had initially been conceived as a 
fixed-mobile convergence service, was positioned as a data centric mobile Internet 
service to complement existing mobile services and telecommunications 
infrastructures. 
Therefore, the gap that had initially been identified as a diffusion problem, and then 
as an inherent aspect of the innovation process involving complex interactions, 
finally came to be viewed as a space also filled with interplays among players 
involved in the reshaping of the generic vision of the technology. Then, the question 
of how to mediate the gap emerged in the question of how to accommodate changing 
contingencies over the lifecycle of a technological innovation. Indeed, South Korea 
is still facing uncertainty with regard to the future evolution of WiBro towards TD-
LTE. Whilst controversy had arisen about the need to shift the use of spectrum 
licenses in the 2.3GHz frequency band from WiBro to TD-LTE, recent WiBro policy 
has allowed an additional spectrum license in the 2.5GHz frequency band for either 
WiBro or TD-LTE service use, whichever is selected by the new licensee. The 
interactions among players with differing backgrounds, differing capacities, and 
differing knowledge, as well as differing strategies for the future have thus resulted 
in the reshaping of WiBro policy to accommodate changes in domestic needs as well 
as increasing choices in TD-LTE by global WiMAX operators. 
Therefore, this comprehensive longitudinal case study of an emerging large-scale 
infrastructural technology and service has demonstrated how the dispersed processes 
of innovation over multiple arenas were coordinated to co-shape the generic vision 
of an emerging technology. Coordination in the early stages of technology design 
and development involved mediating differing interests towards the shaping of a 
generic vision. However, as multiple interests came to appropriate the generic vision 
into developing and deploying specific commercial products and services, 
coordination challenges arose in how to mediate the gap between the initial visions 
and actual uptake; between diverging choices upon appropriation; as well as through 
changing contingencies over time. Coordination efforts were then aligned with the 
process of reshaping the generic vision of the technology. Such a demonstration of a 
complex and contingent processes involving the innovation and the evolution of a 
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large-scale infrastructural technology thus suggests a mode of governance that 
accommodates both the complexities and the changing contingencies inherent in the 
process of design, development, and commercial uptake of innovation. 
7.3 Towards the Distributed Governance of Technological Innovation 
This longitudinal study of WiBro thus suggests a particular mode of governance of 
technological innovation and change: a distributed governance of innovation.82 
Based on this research on the case of WiBro, distributed governance has been 
conceptualised as having decentralised coordination efforts by the government and 
others in initiating, appropriating, and further shaping the generic vision of an 
emerging technology. Thus, what is distributed depends on what is at stake: it may 
be differing aims and purposes that bring players to act; it may be differing 
knowledge that constitutes complex technological systems; it may be differing 
arenas of innovation that emerge towards innovation; and it may be the diverse 
setting and relations that change over time. The distributed governance of innovation 
is particularly relevant to large-scale and complex technologies where dispersed 
innovation takes place. Dispersed innovation denotes the dispersed processes of 
innovation that take place based on current structures of innovation with particular 
histories, backgrounds, and capacities, mobilised by individuals who are actively 
engaging themselves to available resources, activities, and tools to shape certain 
technologies. 
The distributed governance of innovation model, based on this study, suggests a 
flexible approach towards shaping, developing, and appropriating the generic vision 
and technology that need to be constituted through a multiplicity of interactions and 
engagements over a lengthy scale of time, for example, large-scale infrastructural 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
82 The term distributed governance was first mentioned by Williams in relation to this 
research, suggesting the term be linked to explain conflicting interests that were yet 
governed (Meeting note on 28 June 2010). Williams later explained the distributed-
governance models as involving two elements: governance—moving towards an interactive 
process of policy intervention where the state also becomes part of the governance process; 
and distributed—denoting an intervention brought by changing rules of interactions, leading 
to a widely dispersed mutual shaping process involving diverse players (in Suh, J. H., and R. 
Williams, 2013, Standardisation: a configurable space for the distributed governance of 
innovation, Research provocation for IFRIS/DIM IS2-IT International Workshop; 
Standardization as space(s) for innovation, Champs-sur-Marne, France.) 
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technologies.83 Based on this research, the term ‘flexibility’ may denote having a 
decentralised structure for coordinating innovation: coordination can be brought by 
availing dispersed spaces for interactions through which the generic vision is shaped 
towards a collaborative and collective large-scale innovation, as was demonstrated in 
the shaping of innovation arenas in this research. Flexibility, however, may also be 
related to requiring a degree of learning process during the shaping of the 
technological innovation, which may result in accommodating differences into what 
is being shaped. Further, flexibility may denote an institutional ability to 
accommodate changing visions, choices, and strategies of involved innovation 
players. 
Therefore, central to flexibility is the social-learning process (Williams et al., 2005): 
the process that involves negotiation between conflicting interests, often with 
different capabilities and commitments by players with differing backgrounds from 
which they become involved. Yet, this research has brought further emphasis to how 
learning could be accommodated: for example as shifting choices by the innovation 
players, as changes in the generic vision of technological innovation, and as bringing 
changes in policy. By accommodating not only the complexities—observed through 
the interactions of diverging and a multiplicity of choices, but also the changing 
contingencies that occurred through the choices of evolving technologies, services, 
and industry—innovation may be unhindered by the compressed story of an 
innovation: the story that brings the gap between initial visions and actual outcomes 
in need of being mediated. 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
83 I recently encountered a paper that explicitly discussed the concept of flexibility in relation 
to long-term changes in information infrastructure (in this case, a research infrastructure) 
face (Ribes, David and Polk, Jessica Beth. 2014. Flexibility Relative to What? Change to 
Research Infrastructure Journal of the Association for Information Systems 15 (5)). The 
author approached the concept of flexibility especially in relation to research infrastructure 
that needs to be adaptable and resilient to what it must support; such as scientific research. In 
the ongoing processes and changes that occur in the long time scale of sustained research, 
‘flexibility’ is considered not as a thing but a capacity that can be understood as being 




Chapter 8. Conclusion 
Central to this thesis has been the multiplicity of choices and the issues related to 
how to coordinate or build alignments through changing processes of a large-scale 
innovation over time. The single longitudinal case study of WiBro has provided an 
opportunity to examine the complex interactions among the varying industry, 
government and other players as constituting the process of building and configuring 
alignments towards shaping and achieving the particular vision of WiBro. The vision 
had been shaped as a generic vision upon which multiple interests projected their 
own aims and purposes. This longitudinal study has provided insights into how the 
generic vision was further shaped and reshaped as the innovation players sought to 
appropriate this generic vision towards the commercial deployment of particular 
WiBro systems and services in the current telecommunications market.  
 
This research was initially motivated as a research on the process of diffusion of 
innovation. Adopting a processual approach to investigating the shaping of WiBro 
brought a shift away from seeking for the factors that caused the low market uptake 
of WiBro – widely diagnosed as the problem of diffusion. Indeed, during recent 
years WiBro has increasingly been regarded not only as an innovation which failed 
to achieve initial expectations and visions. WiMAX, to which WiBro belongs as a 
service profile, has also been widely viewed as having failed to secure its position in 
the next-generation (4th generation or 4G) communications market around the world, 
in competition with LTE. Thus, during the recent period in which this research has 
been carried out, scholars have investigated the causes for such an outcome, aiming 
mostly to bring about lessons from the past choices and the current outcomes. These 
studies have suggested varying reasons for the lack of wide adoption of WiBro in the 
domestic market of South Korea and beyond, such as: the barriers faced by 
innovation of WiBro due to the market being defined by the incumbent players of 
existing mobile communications (Kang et al., 2011); the dismantling of actor 
networks around WiBro as a fourth generation (4G) communications standard (Shin 
et al., 2011); the lack of service capabilities and service-related activities by the 
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relevant players (Kim et al., 2014); and institutional rigidity that has delayed 
institutional rearrangement necessary to bring about new large-scale ICT systems 
(Choung and Hwang, 2013).  
 
To some extent, learning from the past towards making better choices for the future 
may be a necessary procedure in the aftermath of a collectively driven innovation 
efforts into which a large number of players have invested significant resource and 
time. However, such learning is often guided by a ‘compressed (hi)story’84 of WiBro: 
a history or a story of WiBro told against a set of values and visions that were 
created in the initial stages of technology design and development. By telling a story 
based on a widely accepted criteria of past choices or results (e.g. wide market 
diffusion, socio-technical transition, etc.), however, one may overlook the necessity 
for reconstructing the criteria – often including the vision and the values towards 
which alignments are formed. This research has demonstrated the need for a broader 
approach towards the learning that incorporates the past, present and the future: 
Learning, therefore, should be extended to incorporate an ongoing process of 
changing perceptions and actions that are brought to be negotiated and further 
shaped into producing an alignment or a coordination towards a particular innovation 
path.     
 
Contribution to knowledge 
This study has contributed to enhancing our understanding about the complex 
processes of innovation by broadening the view of innovation processes: from a 
process confined by the initial statement of goals and visions towards a process of 
co-configuring the changing visions, technologies and policy. The longitudinal study 
of an evolving technology has traced the emergence of multiple arenas of innovation 
where complex and shifting relations were examined as they together shaped the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
84 ‘Compressed (hi)story’ in this sense is closely linked to and may be juxtaposed with the 
‘compressed foresight’ (Williams 2006): The term ‘compressed foresight’ was used to refer 
to the attempts to look into the future in greater detail, resulting in making the future seem 
imminent, as if it were sure to come, thus making the future “compressed into the present” 
(Williams 2006, 328p). ‘Compressed history’ may also be in some cases corollary to the 
‘compressed foresight’: the story or a history of a particular innovation is reviewed and told 
against the scenarios that were formed through the compressed foresight. 
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technology over time. This delineation of multispatial and multilevel dynamics has 
resulted in laying out a ‘biography’ of WiBro, thereby contributing to those attempts 
to gain more indepth understanding of the complex processes of socio-technical 
change through the study of the biography of technologies (Hyysalo, 2010).   
 
This study also contributes to knowledge by extending the scope of social learning 
beyond the development and use of the technology. The complexity that has been 
observed through the case of WiBro encompasses not only the problems and 
challenges ensuing from the diversity of interests and choices of multiple players, 
but also the changing contingencies over time. The shifting relations and 
commitments of the players, as well as the changing visions of WiBro across 
differing arenas of innovation and over time have provided a further comprehensive 
understanding of social learning taking place over multiple cycles of technological 
innovation.   
 
The case of WiBro thus suggests the prospects of a technology cannot be understood 
simply in terms of the features of the technology being shaped: rather, the 
sustainability lies in the ongoing process of co-shaping the visions, technologies, 
policy and overall activities of the society in making choices upon future. 
 
Reflections and future research 
In the course of this research, my own research choices have been shaped by various 
factors, e.g. accessibility to research sites and interviewees, and interview contents, 
let alone the problems defined and the research questions. They in turn, have shaped 
the depth and the boundaries of research. I have made observations particularly on 
the interactions among the developers and intermediate users who were the co-
producers of the commercial products and services. The interactions observed were 
mostly based on the resulting choices and actions made at the organisational level – 
e.g. the corporate decisions, and inter-firm relations and interactions. By 
investigating these interactions, I have been able to demonstrate how a distributed 
governance gained a momentum to shape and reshape particular pathways of 
innovation. The empirical focus on a large number of innovation players across 
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different arenas over time meant that the position of each organisation was 
characterized by a limited numbers of interviews with organization members and 
gave little scope to study differences within organisations.  In consequence, the 
process of decision-making and attendant conflicts and negotiations within an 
organisation has in effect been black-boxed – and not studied systematically. 
Individual firms and organizations by default have thus been framed as single 
unitary actors whose inner concerns and conflicts were not taken into account of, 
despite their influence upon shaping the corporate or organisational decisions. 
Further research might usefully bridge intra- and inter-organisation interactions. By 
being able to link decision-making processes within and between organisations, the 
future research may benefit from more comprehensive and detailed understanding of 
multi-level interactions leading to particular choices and the potentially complex 
games played within as well as between firms in distributed governance.  
 
The focus upon the intermediate level interactions involving the suppliers, 
government and the operators of the WiBro service leaves another sphere of 
interactions unexplored – viz the interactions between the suppliers and end-users. In 
fact, many studies on the market adoption of WiBro have resorted to survey based 
research on the potential or current customers of the WiBro service. The choices of 
end-users are indeed an important facet of the technology being shaped, and they do 
play a significant role in the shaping of the innovation process. However it has not 
proved possible to give adequate attention in this research to the role of the end-users 
and their interactions with the supply side players during the process of design, 
development and use of WiBro. The domain of end-user interactions with the 
suppliers of the technology and service is indeed a space that must not be overlooked, 
especially concerning large-scale infrastructural innovations (e.g. ICTs, energy 
sector innovation). These innovations often entail a significant portion of 
negotiations at the level of setting the rules of the game – i.e. setting standards, 
making regulatory decisions, etc. – which mainly involve suppliers and intermediate 
players that can only draw upon imperfect images and representations of potential 
end-users that may be filtered and shaped thought their world view and interest. This 
can be potentially very dangerous in bringing about innovations particularly where 
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these have pervasive impact in society and become entrenched. Therefore, it is also 
important that future research should address these problems and study the juncture 
of these often separate fields of study.   
 
Implications for policy 
In Korea, the uncertainties confronting a large number of innovation activities – 
often supported and coordinated through policy – have also been described and 
analysed in relation to the changing mode of innovation activities by industry as well 
as the nation’s innovation policy: e.g. regarding the challenges of going from 
catching-up to post catching-up modes of innovation (Choung et al., 2014; Song and 
Lee, 2007; Song et al., 2007). The term “post catching-up”85 mainly indicates the 
technology leadership achieved by the Korean national firms in the recent decade 
that came to pursue innovation by constructing their own foresight processes (Song 
and Lee, 2007; Song et al., 2007). Framing the uncertainties in relation to the 
technology leadership achieved emphasises the rising needs for the players to 
develop capabilities for dealing with unforeseen impacts and outcomes. In addition, 
it implies the need for change in the roles of the institutions – mainly the government 
and the public research institutes – that have traditionally offered leadership in 
coordinating and supporting industry towards innovation (Choung et al., 2014; Kwak 
et al., 2012).  
 
Whilst the change seems endemic to the current mode of governance of innovation 
in Korea, it is also evident in other economies. Though it is a particular feature of 
innovation of new ICT infrastructures where the scale and complexity of 
developments goes beyond the capacity of individual firms, some aspects are evident 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
85 Although I mention the concept of ‘post catching-up’ here, I bring the concept only to 
refer to one aspect of policy framing of uncertainties of innovation. An informal 
conversation about the concept with my colleague Eunsun Kim has prompted me to have 
this stance. I have however mentioned the concept in relation to this study of WiBro as some 
scholars have considered WiBro as an exemplar case of what they frame as “post catching-
up” innovation policy (Song, W., D.-o. Park, and Y.-j. Kang, 2007, Managing Techno-
economic Uncertainties in the Post catch-up stage, Science and Technology Policy Institute); 
Choung, J.-Y., H.-R. Hwang, and W. Song, 2014, Transitions of Innovation Activities in 
Latecomer countries: An Exploratory Case Study of South Korea: World Development, v. 




in other technological developments. The distributed governance of innovation 
model proposed in this research offers a way to bring about such change: to achieve 
and involve reflexivity in the course of coordinating and directing certain activities 
towards innovation, through the interactions with the diverse players whose interests 
are often dispersed over multiple choices and cycles of innovation process. 
Coordination, upon which the role of the government has long been emphasised, 
may then be considered not as a thing to be pursued towards achieving a robust 
alignment, but as a process that requires constant reshaping through cyclical 
processes of negotiation among the diverse interests. We hope that this study can 
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